What if...

[itsuneek]

Just curious what our resident historians think, or if any book suggestions?

[BillB]

Just curious what our resident historians think, or if any book suggestions?

190871[/snapback]

 

I suspect the Germans would not have been tempted out of their successful defensive strategy with all that shit-or-bust stuff beginning with Operation Michael in the spring of 1918. Which would have meant either digging them out or maybe waiting for the British blockade to bite all the way down.

 

[Edited for afterthought] And it would also have meant that Wilson's well meaning but fatally naive scheme for the future shape of Europe would not have applied. Consequently the Germans would have been so badly beaten that there would have been no latitude for any of that "stab in the back" nonsense, and then possibly no Mr Hitler either....

 

Just my £0.02p worth.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[swerve]

Just curious what our resident historians think, or if any book suggestions?

 

Same result, but a little later.

 

The German economy was going down the tubes, & the other Central Powers were in even worse shape. The longer the war lasted, the greater British & French material & numerical superiority became. Petain & others were urging the building of a huge (IIRC Petain wanted 7000) tank force to spearhead an offensive into Germany in 1919. The casualty ratios were becoming less & less favourable to Germany, as material superiority & improved skills of the allies ate away at the early German edge, & in comparison to available manpower, loss ratios had always been tilted against Germany. By the time significant US forces went into action in France, the Germans were already calling up boys a year early. Russia was taking almost as many troops to hold conquered territory (needed for food supplies - Germany was hungry) as had been needed to seize it.

 

I'd say the most likely outcome is that the war would have ended with German defeat in 1919. Turkey would probably have sued for peace first, probably followed by Bulgaria, which would then have been rather isolated. One more cold & hungry winter would have started the inherently fragile Austro-Hungarian polity falling apart, enabling the Italians to move in, & by the spring of 1919 Germany would have been effectively alone, its allies gone or going, facing a Franco-British army on the Western front which had overwhelming material superiority & all the supplies it needed stockpiled for the massive offensive which would have rolled over the trench lines about April. The Rhine by midsummer, & Germany accepting the British terms to avoid the dreadful prospect of being forced to accept the French terms.

Edited July 4, 2005 by swerve

[FlyingCanOpener]

But sverve, what about the U-Boat threat? No US intervention means no extra destroyers for the RN, and the green light for the Germans to use them as wrecklessly as they wanted in terms of neutral vessels, since they would not be worried about sinking an American ship. I think this would have the largest immediate impact on the war...with possible disastrous concequences for the Entente...

[swerve]

But sverve, what about the U-Boat threat? No US intervention means no extra destroyers for the RN, and the green light for the Germans to use them as wrecklessly as they wanted in terms of neutral vessels, since they would not be worried about sinking an American ship. I think this would have the largest immediate impact on the war...with possible disastrous concequences for the Entente...

 

I didn't think US acceptance of unlimited sinking of US ships by the Germans was inherent in the question. It could also mean that either the Germans stayed within limits which didn't provoke the USA into joining in, or the USA limited itself to actions to protect US shipping, such as escorting convoys of US ships in international waters.

 

Several neutral states protested to Germany. Some stated that complying with the German declaration of closing of large areas of ocean would be contrary to their neutrality, but that protecting their shipping would not be.

 

The USA could have adopted the same position, i.e that it was neutral, & considered defending its shipping was not a belligerent act, but an act to preserve its neutrality, in the same way as defending its territory against incursions would be a neutral act, but permitting a belligerent to occupy part of its territory would not be. Unlike e.g. Chile (one of the neutrals which reserved the right to defend its ships while remainign neutral), the USA had the means to act on such a policy.

[FlyingCanOpener]

Of course, but the series of blatant violations by the Germans against the US can be seen as a major catalyst for intervention on the side of the Entente. By taking the US out of the war, you kind of have to assume that they would take a much more relaxed stance against the U-Boat threat, hence the question I was posing.

[swerve]

Of course, but the series of blatant violations by the Germans against the US can be seen as a major catalyst for intervention on the side of the Entente. By taking the US out of the war, you kind of have to assume that they would take a much more relaxed stance against the U-Boat threat, hence the question I was posing.

 

Well, it's a fair question.

 

I think between us we've established 3 scenarios for US non-participation.

 

1) Germany exercises enough restraint in its submarine warfare that the USA is not provoked into joining the war.

 

2) USA doesn't join in despite unrestricted German submarine warfare (which, BTW, didn't target the USA specifically - the Spanish, Brazilians, Norwegians, Danes & many others suffered equally & were equally angered).

 

3) USA reacts to unrestricted German submarine warfare with lesser measures than full participation, e.g. convoying its ships, possibly in co-operation with other neutrals.

 

So we can consider how the war might have continued in each of these cases.

 

BTW, shouldn't this be in Gen Mil?

[Grant Whitley]

2) USA doesn't join in despite unrestricted German submarine warfare (which, BTW, didn't target the USA specifically - the Spanish, Brazilians, Norwegians, Danes & many others suffered equally & were equally angered).

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Note that Brazil did in fact join the war effort as a result of this. I forget the details, but she sent a small naval force to Europe, which conducted anti sub patrols or something. The experience led directly to Brazil's decision to send ground troops into combat during World War II, as she was convinced that she'd gotten the short end of the stick after the war and thought ground troops would be the ticket if Brazil wanted to be taken seriously.

Edited July 4, 2005 by Grant Whitley

[Argus]

Well if they war had continued into 1919, the RN would have had magnetic mines and ASDIC and more to the point imporved hydrophones and deaphcharges in quantity. We already had Convoy accepted as the best means to combat U-Boats and the loss curve had peaked, the R-Class subs might have been an interesting experiment too (but I wouldn't hold my breath), and the building programs are stating to bare fruit. On the other side, the KM's moral sucks (and could contaminate the U-Boat arm), the resource base is under pressure and as everyone has mentioned the blockade is biteing.

 

So for my money the KM looks to be in the position of maintaning but not improveing their position at sea, while the RN has some chance of getting ahead.

 

On land I go for the standard shit or bust offensive by the Germans too, its what they did @ in the face of US pressure, so I can't see why they wouldn't do the same again slighlty later.

 

The French had their second wind, the Commonwealth were getting good, with better material and support. So if anything I'd say the German offensive could well run out of steam quicker then historical - and then everyone starts moveing the other way, if Plan 1919 didn't get run first.

 

Actually if it did come down to a race, its one the Germans probably don't want to win with hindsight. If they hit first, they'll blow though their reserves and as per hist, be in a poor position to respond to the Ent offensive, were as the Ent's (no LOTR jokes please) has the bulk to resist and counter attack, but might run short in hitting an unweakened German line.

 

I agree the big shift would be at the confrence table, with Wilson out of the picture and minus the massive US war expansion, we might not be looking at a WWII in any shape we'd recognise, and might skip the worst of the Great Depression as well. The downside being another year of war with all the casualties on both sides.

 

Looking at the power ballance between London and Paris, without the US I'd say London would be in a much better position to moderate the terms imposed on Germany. The big question would be the communists, would another year of war result in an all out civil war in Germany rather than the historical close call?

 

If so we've got Russia, Poland and possiably Czechslovakia nibbling at the edges. The Russians will have had another year to sort themselves out, but exactly how they would stabalise (or when) I can't call. However I'd say we could end up with an Anglo-French force supporting the German establishment rather than stuffing about in Russia.

 

So WWII could well be West Vs East against Stalin, but that's really going a bit far on shaky ground.

 

shane

[FlyingCanOpener]

Going on Swerve's 2nd option (the most logical for this situation imo) none of that would matter Argus as Kaiser Bill's U-Boats would be ravaging enough merchants to put the Royal Navy in quite the quandary- do you go full bore after the U-Boats, and take your attention off of Scheer and the HSF, or do you hope for the best and keep your blockade on the Germans as tight as you can, which is a race to see who will starve first. In the case of WW1, to lose the naval war would be disastrous for the land campaign in the West...

[Wyvern75]

Overlooked by most Europeans, there was a very hot and violent civil war in Mexico, with some groups within Mexico conspiring to send bandits and so on into Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California to attack non-Hispanics, State and Federal property. At one time the US had most of its National Guard Cavalry units on the Mexican border and this is why the Zimmerman telegram was so critical in conviencing the US that Germany was conspiring with Mexico to invade and take away parts of or all of the American Southwest.

 

Had the US not entered, other than selling products to both sides, but primarily the British, the US would have probably become more involved in what was happening in Mexico and there was enough support for the US to go in as far south as Monterey to restore order and some of the Border Mexican states would not have been upset if they had been annexed by the US. If you look at a lot of the Mexican immigration into the US in the 1920s, most were well educated and skilled. These people were run out of the country by Villa and PRI. If the US had not stayed, the resulting Mexican goverment would not have been socialist and probably more appreciative of capitalism. This goverment would have also allowed foriegn businesses to own property in Mexico and the economy would have prospered.

 

The wild card here is the "Great Depression" which originated in Europe and spread around the world, would it have happened without the reparations the Germans were "forced" to make and if the same had happened, would have the US and Mexico been affected by that Depression.

 

Also if the US had not been involved in the Great War, would have the US been as friendly with the British in the 2d Great War (assuming it would have happened) and would have the US military done enough to establish the reforms it made in WWI to control the size of Army that the 2d WW would have required?

[Grant Whitley]

Overlooked by most Europeans, there was a very hot and violent civil war in Mexico, with some groups within Mexico conspiring to send bandits and so on into Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California to attack non-Hispanics, State and Federal property. At one time the US had most of its National Guard Cavalry units on the Mexican border and this is why the Zimmerman telegram was so critical in conviencing the US that Germany was conspiring with Mexico to invade and take away parts of or all of the American Southwest.

 

The cavalry and National Guard were sent to the border after we occupied Veracruz in 1914. There was a war scare that followed that, and the Mexican press was publishing wild stories about the government raising massive armies to invade Texas and the southwest, but Huerta was really in no position to do this.

 

And there was ongoing campaign to attack the US. Villa made some raids(Columbus being the most famous) after the US government recognized Carranza in 1915. These were, if you'll pardon the expression, punitive expeditions. We'd previously supported Villa, but Carranza's top general, Alvaro Obregon had broken the back of Villa's army(the Division of the North) in battles around Celaya in 1915. Villa was finished after Celaya.

 

Had the US not entered, other than selling products to both sides, but primarily the British, the US would have probably become more involved in what was happening in Mexico and there was enough support for the US to go in as far south as Monterey to restore order and some of the Border Mexican states would not have been upset if they had been annexed by the US.

!!! You've got to be kidding me.

 

If you look at a lot of the Mexican immigration into the US in the 1920s, most were well educated and skilled. These people were run out of the country by Villa and PRI. If the US had not stayed, the resulting Mexican goverment would not have been socialist and probably more appreciative of capitalism. This goverment would have also allowed foriegn businesses to own property in Mexico and the economy would have prospered.

 

The only possible way that Mexico is not going to be "socialist" as a result of US support is if we backed Huerta. There is no way that's going to happen. First of all, we'd already been supporting Villa and the rest of the Constitutionalists for years, and Wilson was aghast when Huerta overthrew Madero and subsequently murdered him and his Vice President, Pino Suarez. In fact, our invasion of Veracruz came about because Huerta refused to sufficiently prostrate himself to us after an embarassing incident involving the imprisonment of a couple of Marines.

 

The problem with your timeline is that Huerta had been forced to flee the country later in 1914, and so the Constitutionalists had won. The rest of the Mexican Revolution was a fight between various factions of the Constitutionalists for control of the country. I guess about the best(from your point of view) would have been Carranza- but then, Carranza was an arch-nationalist and caused no end of headaches during the Punitive Expedition.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Note that Brazil did in fact join the war effort as a result of this.  I forget the details, but she sent a small naval force to Europe, which conducted anti sub patrols or something.

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It was intended to send the two (British built, Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo of 1910) dreadnoughts to join the Grand Fleet like some USN dreadnoughts did, but refits of those Brazilian ships in the US took til the war was over. A pair of scout cruisers and 4 DD's operated off Africa in the last months of the war.

 

On original question the assumption that seems to be made sometimes (though some pointed out already the flaw) is that the Germans launch the 1918 offensive w/o the US in the war, which seems very doubtful. And going the other way France had basically sworn off the offensive in 1917. Taking out the German offensive and US entry I don't see why that would have changed. And while some books claim the Allied battlefield successes of 1918 were the delayed fruit of tactical improvment I'm skeptical about that. I can see the situation on the battlefield itself staying the same indefinitely: Germans could hold off British (with French wary of offensive after 1917) with a considerably smaller force (than what they deployed in 1918). So changing the situation of exploiting their success in the East, also. And while the blockade had a corrosive moral effect on Germany, the actual battlefield reverses of 1918 were a huge psycological blow also.

 

Countries dropped out of WWI because their national morale cracked, under the wear of war deaths and reverses and economic disruptions. Seems like kind of a chaos theory unpredictable thing, not clear going all the way back to April 1917 and removing the *moral* effect of the US entry why that mightn't have happened to more Allied countries (did to Russia of course), then become a domino effect among them, rather than the the domino's falling on the CP side first; even given the blockade, and even assuming no revolutionary success of the sub war.

 

Joe

[Grant Whitley]

Meant to say that there was NO ongoing campaign against the US as Wyvern suggested. Villa's raids were it, and were made out of his anger and sense of betrayal by the US government. More importantly, they were staged after Villa had ceased to be a major force in the Mexican Revolution.

[RETAC21]

It was intended to send the two (British built, Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo of 1910) dreadnoughts to join the Grand Fleet like some USN dreadnoughts did, but refits of those Brazilian ships in the US took til the war was over. A pair of scout cruisers and 4 DD's operated off Africa in the last months of the war.

 

On original question the assumption that seems to be made sometimes (though some pointed out already the flaw) is that the Germans launch the 1918 offensive w/o the US in the war, which seems very doubtful. And going the other way France had basically sworn off the offensive in 1917. Taking out the German offensive and US entry I don't see why that would have changed. And while some books claim the Allied battlefield successes of 1918 were the delayed fruit of tactical improvment I'm skeptical about that. I can see the situation on the battlefield itself staying the same indefinitely: Germans could hold off British (with French wary of offensive after 1917) with a considerably smaller force (than what they deployed in 1918). So changing the situation of exploiting their success in the East, also. And while the blockade had a corrosive moral effect on Germany, the actual battlefield reverses of 1918 were a huge psycological blow also.

 

Countries dropped out of WWI because their national morale cracked, under the wear of war deaths and reverses and economic disruptions. Seems like kind of a chaos theory unpredictable thing, not clear going all the way back to April 1917 and removing the *moral* effect of the US entry why that mightn't have happened to more Allied countries (did to Russia of course), then become a domino effect among them, rather than the the domino's falling on the CP side first; even given the blockade, and even assuming no revolutionary success of the sub war.

 

Joe

191577[/snapback]

 

Yes, but the blockade was left in place in 1919 and Germany was falling apart at the seams as a result, while Austria-Hungary was going to fall from the wagon in 1918 no matter what. I can't see a Germany trying to hold alone as its southern borders falls in disarray, conceivably with allied armies advancing on Vienna.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Yes, but the blockade was left in place in 1919 and Germany was falling apart at the seams as a result, while Austria-Hungary was going to fall from the wagon in 1918 no matter what. I can't see a Germany trying to hold alone as its southern borders falls in disarray, conceivably with allied armies advancing on Vienna.

191751[/snapback]

Like I said I think the tendency is to assume the war plays out the same just minus US battlefield *material* contribution, which wasn't significant til 1918, so replay from that point. Whereas WWI collapses were a lot about moral factors, which would have been quite different without the prospect of major help for the Allies, world's largest economy joins the war on their side, from April 1917. And Germany's collapse was also in a big way about despairr created by the battlefield reverses of 1918 (on top of the blockade) which probably wouldn't have happened since Germany wouldn't have had the same time pressure to go back on the offensive. Austria could still have been the next major collapse (after Russia), so could France or Italy have been IMO, both of which almost did collapse in 1917 as it was. I think it would require a highly advanced politico-military supercomputer based simulation (about which the inputs would be endlessly argued) A negotiated peace, for a longer or shorter time (like Napoleonic Wars) would also be a definitely possible output also I think. I would guess clear Allied victory in relatively short time (months or a year) after the actual would be less than 50% of that probability pie, though perhaps the biggest single slice.

 

Joe

Edited July 6, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[JWB]

Germany would have lost sometime in 1919 for 2 reasons.

 

1) Germany was good at fighting wars but unable to win them. Ludendorf had a tendency to follow success with failure.

 

2) Ludendorf had absolutely no understang of tanks. At Amiens Commonwealth forces suffered 8800 casualties and the Germans lost nearly 28000 including 15000 POWs. Ludendorf was absolutely stunned and had no way to respond. He called that battle "The black day of the German army in that war". Over the next 100 days Commonwealth forces liberated 500 square miles of territory and defeated 50 German divisions. He knew the Brits were going to attack in similar fashion again and that he had no way to stop such an assault. His will to fight was dead.

Edited July 8, 2005 by JWB

[Colin Williams]

Any reasonable scenario that keeps the US out of the war requires Germany to avoid unrestricted submarine warfare and treat the US with care (i.e., no Zimmerman telegram). This alone wouldn't have impacted operations on the Western Front, but it would have made the Kaiser's position less tenable (he was under tremendous pressure from the Army and the Pan-Germans to wage all-out war) and have eased domestic conditions in Britain somewhat.

 

The impact of American involvement from April 1917 to June 1918 was almost entirely one of morale. Certainly America as a belligerent eased the supply of raw materials and financing for the Allies, but America was already banking (literally) on an Allied victory (or at least not a major defeat). I can't see a neutral America cutting back on that support. The one potential operational influence of continued American neutrality would be with Haig's Third Ypres offensive. Perhaps (and just perhaps) Haig might have been persuaded to call it off at an earlier date before he finished slaughtering the BEF of 1917.

 

Unless Allied morale proves less brittle than history indicates, I don't see any difference in the French, British and Italian ability to weather Caporetto and the Ludendorf offensives in France and Flanders. Only a couple of American divisions were needed to help stop the last German offensive in July, 1918, and I'm sure the French could have found other troops to do the job.

 

After this, the Allied position becomes much less favorable. Even though the American army didn not take part in major operations until the St. Mihiel offensive in September, by the summer individual American divisions were replacing increasing numbers of French divisions in quiet sectors and freeing those divisions to contribute to counter-offensives. I can't see the Allies doing much more than driving the Germans back to the Hindenburg Line, perhaps piercing it. The absence of a Meuse-Argonne offensive, coupled with increasing demands on French manpower to cover the front and a weakened BEF due to the nonexistence of its attached American divisions, probably means the wind-up of effective Allied operations by October.

 

What happens after this? Perhaps a stalemate leading to a compromise peace. France was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel at this time, and Britain and Germany were close to the same situation. The Italian Army was still recovering from Caporetto, and Austria-Hungary was teetering on the brink. It's just possible the Germans could have negotiated away assets in the west, such as Alsace-Lorraine, and Turkish territory in the Middle East in exchange for Allied recognition of its Russian conquests. Perhaps more likely is a continued stalemate into 1919 with a German collapse due to the blockade and the collapse of its Allies. With or without the impact of the AEF, the Germans had nothing to oppose an Allied force advancing north through the remains of Austria-Hungary.

[Nick Sumner]

I came across this some while ago and wonder what your opinions are of it.

 

http://www.greatwar.nl/frames/default-churchill.html

[cdnsigop]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned this in any post so far, but if the war had of gone past 1918; FM Haig would of been replaced by Canadian general Sir A Currie. So no more offensives like the Somme. Currie was more aware of what was needed to win offensives, and I believe he would led the allies to victory by 1920 at the latest, had been there no US involvement and there fore no spring german offensive.

 

As a canadian I have always been proud of the fact that Currie was mostly the best general the british had; but if over looked in most WW1 histories.

[Rickshaw]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned this in any post so far, but if the war had of  gone past 1918; FM Haig would of been replaced by Canadian general Sir A Currie. So no more offensives like the Somme.  Currie was more aware of what was needed to win offensives, and I believe he would led the allies to victory by 1920 at the latest, had been there no US involvement and there fore no spring german offensive.

 

As a canadian I have always been proud of the fact that Currie was mostly the best general the british had; but if over looked in most WW1 histories.

196438[/snapback]

 

 

An interesting claim or claims. I've never heard of Haig being replaced. I've heard of attempts to do so, which were generally defeated because Haig had the backing of the King, if even he didn't have the backing of Lloyd-George. Currie was generally better, as was Monash, when compared to the UK Generals but even amongst them, there were exceptions such as Gough and Byng. I've actually changed my mind over Haig over the years, as I've read more and more about WWI. I started out hating him, believing him incompetent but in reality, its obvious that he, like all other generals of the period, were groping with how to come to terms with and control the new technology which had produced such a stalemate on the Western Front. If you look at the experience of the battles on that front, as a learning experience, albeit an expensive one, Haig actually shines through by the end, when during the 100 days he broke the German front, effectively destroyed their army and was advancing towards the German frontier when peace was declared. Rather than being an outmoded traditionalist, he was actually quite progressive in his ideas and his attempts to produce a solution to the German defence.

[cdnsigop]

"An interesting claim or claims. I've never heard of Haig being replaced. I've heard of attempts to do so, which were generally defeated because Haig had the backing of the King, if even he didn't have the backing of Lloyd-George"

 

I found this in a few Canadian histories a few years back, and it was stayed with me. because the war never went to 1919, it most likely over looked by most histories.

 

"if you look at the experience of the battles on that front, as a learning experience, albeit an expensive one, Haig actually shines through by the end, when during the 100 days he broke the German front, effectively destroyed their army and was advancing towards the German frontier when peace was declared."

 

You the last 100 days that was spearheaded by the Canadian Corp led by General Currie? I'll have to look more closely into haig, although i don't share your opinion of him being processive. But You are right about the WW! generals have to learn their way though war how to conduct battles and win.

[Anthony EJW]

I found this in a few Canadian histories a few years back, and it was stayed with me.  because the war never went to 1919, it most likely over looked by most histories.

 

Which one? Currie was a formidable general, but why would they bump him up to high commander when there were five perferctly good canditates with army level commands above him.

[Rickshaw]

"An interesting claim or claims. I've never heard of Haig being replaced. I've heard of attempts to do so, which were generally defeated because Haig had the backing of the King, if even he didn't have the backing of Lloyd-George"

 

I found this in a few Canadian histories a few years back, and it was stayed with me.  because the war never went to 1919, it most likely over looked by most histories.

 

I'd be interested in reading that.

 

"if you look at the experience of the battles on that front, as a learning experience, albeit an expensive one, Haig actually shines through by the end, when during the 100 days he broke the German front, effectively destroyed their army and was advancing towards the German frontier when peace was declared."

 

You the last 100 days that was spearheaded by the Canadian Corp led by General Currie?  I'll have to look more closely into haig, although i don't share your opinion of him being processive.  But You are right about the WW! generals have to learn their way though war how to conduct battles and win.

196447[/snapback]

 

 

Errhem, "spearheaded by the Canadian Corps"? I think you'll find there were a few contributions by several other nations to the "spearhead", other than just the Canadians.

[R011]

I'd be interested in reading that.

196494[/snapback]

Here's one web source for this. I've seen it elsewhere as well.

 

http://collections.ic.gc.ca/heirloom_serie...e4/160-161.html

 

It seems ot have been a brain storm by Lloyd George. Ther's no way to tell how serious he was or whether he would have been able to do it considering that the British Army leadership and the King would be very hard sells.