The US Marine Corps - why?

[Guest aevans]

Sure, the Marines have IFVs and armor, but nobody is going to throw 3 (or 2.66 or whatever) divisions of Marines against 3 enemy armor/cav divisions out in the sandbox.

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They're not? Then what was the 1st MarDiv doing on February 25-26, 1991, when it took on the Iraqi 3rd Armored and 5th Mech, as well as the odd infantry battalion that didn't cut and run?

[Tomexe]

Speak of the devil, the Army and Air Force trying to get togeather and act like the Marine Corps..

 

Hmmm, USAF+ US ARMY = USMC MAGTF???

 

F-16s, Strykers will train and deploy together

BY: Elizabeth Rees, Inside the Air Force

07/11/2005

 

 

The Air Force and Army are developing a prototype force package of F-16 fighter aircraft and Stryker ground vehicles that will train and deploy together, testing a new joint construct that demonstrates how U.S. military forces could prepare for combat and fight in the future.

The Joint Mission Capability Package is a “capabilities-based force package composed of fielded weapons systems with interoperable information network equipment,” Col. Louis Durkac, who is leading the development of the “Joint MCP,” told Inside the Air Force this week. Durkac is the Air National Guard assistant to the director of requirements at Air Combat Command headquarters, Langley Air Force Base, VA.

 

Durkac and his team at ACC, along with the Army’s Stryker program management office, are drafting a concept of operations for the Joint MCP, and are heavily involved in planning for the prototype package.

 

The mission package now in development will pair a number of Air Force F-16C+ fighter squadrons with an Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team into a single joint force package that will train and deploy together. The F-16C+ is an upgraded version of the F-16C.

 

Individual units, still to be determined, will be assigned to a specific joint package so the given components’ Air Expeditionary Force rotation lines up with the Army’s Operation Iraqi Freedom rotation, Durkac said.

 

The F-16C+s and Strykers were selected for the prototype Joint MCP because they each already share interoperable communication and navigation equipment.

According to Durkac, the concept came to life as a result of several factors, including the emergence of network-centric warfare as the key to future combat as well as the latest strategic guidance issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which says joint interdependency is expected to be a linchpin for future combat

operations. “As all those things started to come together, we started saying, ‘Well, the strategic guidance tells us to do this; we have the capability right now with these [F-16 and Stryker]systems; and this is the way it’s being envisioned in the future with network-centric warfare,’” the colonel said. “So, why don’t we provide a prototype for the future and use this, not only to increase mission effectiveness but as a prototype of the future force, and learn all those lessons and develop all those capabilities?”

The Air Force’s F-16C+ is operated mostly by Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve pilots, and the 2005 base realignment and closure round, which makes big changes to the service’s reserve installations, could interfere with some Joint MCP plans. Once the BRAC process is complete, however, some of the remaining F-16C+ squadrons are slated to be lined up with a Stryker team to create the first joint force capability package.

A so-called “wildcat prototype” of a Joint MCP -- in other words, an operationally significant number but still a relatively small test batch -- could deploy as soon as next summer, Durkac said.

ACC’s Joint Strike Fighter office already is involved in the Joint MCP program as it aims to achieve interoperability with the Army’s Future Combat System. “They’re looking at all our lessons learned along the way to make sure that when they develop their interoperability, they build it right from the beginning,” Durkac said.

In the future, the military would like to operate under a true joint fires umbrella, where any air asset could show up and effectively support any ground operation. But that combat reality might be a long way off, so Joint MCPs are being built as a stop-gap solution, Durkac said.

“We’re looking at it from the other end of the spectrum, saying, ‘Wouldn’t it be a lot better if you knew who was going to show up and you trained with them all the time?’” he said. “Obviously we’d like to get to the joint fires capability where . . . anybody can show up and it works seamlessly. Practically, we think that may be a long way off.”

Durkac said the first meeting on the Joint MCP concept was held in April, although he has been working on the idea for more than a year.

Originally, there was little interest in the joint force package, according to the colonel. “Everybody had their own programs that they were working, and this was just something new,” he said, noting the buy-in to the concept has increased dramatically since then.

 

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2005/10th/CD...tations/063.pdf

[Tomexe]

The AAAV uniquely meets an implausible requirement -- a surface raid against a litoral so heavily defended that close approach by phibs is inadvisable

 

Nothing implausable at all about it.

 

SSMs cant target something as small as a AAAV, but can a LSD or LPD.

Mines are less of a problem, probably they will be anchored too deep for a AAAV to hit, and even if one does, you only lose 20 men instead of 700 or so. Launching from so far off shore makes the area you would have to mine to deny amphibious use improbably huge.

 

With the casualty concious nature of the US public they cannot afford a Sir Galahad incident, where a few leaking missiles or planes come in and seriously damage or sink even ONE amphib with a large loss of life. The possiblility of the Air Forces missing a truck mounted SSM is high... hence the reqirement for the AAAVs and LCACs to be launched from while underway, at speed, and well off shore, it makes the job of the fighters and AEGIS ships much easier if the soft sides are exposed as little as possible.

 

While lining up enough forces to stop a amphibious landing with traditional WWII type beach defenses is suicide for the defender- you just create targets for our aircraft- the troops coming over the beach to link up with the ones comng by air are still going to be subject to being engaged by enemy mobile forces. They still have to fight their way to the link up. All that is more easily and quickly defeated by not having to stop and change vehicles.

 

The high speed and long ocean range of the AAAV also makes it possible for them to move laterally along the shoreline and undertake other missions without having to move the shipping as often to accompany them.

 

Using LCACs in their place- or to piggy back in the old AAV7s wont work because the LCACs are needed to haul the M1's, and there are not enough LCACs to to both. Even if we bought more the Amphibious shipping can not carry them all, we have a lot of older hulls like the Tarawas and the Ancorage Class that due to their internal docking bay arrangements (unless they were all rebuilt during their latest sleeps and I missed it- a possibility) could only carry ONE LCAC each. And LCACs are not armored. They really need something with armor and weapons to go ahead of them by a few minutes so they don't get ambushed with man portable AT weapons before they can land their M-1s.

 

So due to the design of shipping we are stuck with, we have to have a vheicle that can fit in the same hold space as the old AAV-7 to carry the share of the load that the LCACs cannot. Now maybe they should of done something like buy a armored SRN-6 hovercraft perhaps?

 

The other thing is that the AAV-7 is a little too under-armed and under-armored to be acting as a APC in modern world. They had to replace it anyways for that reason. So they were left with the technical challange of either making a better swimming APC or making a APC out of a small hovercraft. Just making a plain APC was not a option because the LCACs couldn't support the additional burden.

 

We do need a stronger over beach element, even though the Osprey is nice, badguys are getting used to our overdependance on aviation. They are starting to become very good at setting traps for helicopter landings. Sometimes geography is still going to thwart you but it is NOT good to be a one trick pony.

[WRW]

how much does a marine unit cost to equip/operate in comparison with its airforce/army equivalent?

 

WRW

[Stevely]

Speak of the devil, the Army and Air Force trying to get togeather and act like the Marine Corps..

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2005/10th/CD...tations/063.pdf

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So the Air Force and the Army working together to improve jointness = trying to usurp the USMC? I guess so, in a six degrees of separation sort of way. Silly.

[Guest aevans]

Tomexe:

 

Please don't take my comments out of context, then set them up as a strawman. The entire quote was (Tomexe excluded text in bold):

 

The AAAV uniquely meets an implausible requirement -- a surface raid against a litoral so heavily defended that close approach by phibs is inadvisable, but which at the same time has such a porous enemy ground troop deployment that the raid force can drive around at will once it reaches the beach. Now, I'm just a poor dumb grunt, but in all but the most exceptional of circumstances, those seem like two mutually exclusive conditions...

 

The problem I see with the AAAV is not so much that it is a nifty toy, but that it is still just a relatively lightly armored vehicle, expected to roam the enemy hinterland at will without any logistical support other than what it can carry, what can be carried by logistics variants, or that can be brought in by air. This is a fantasy of the highest order, and it's going to get troops killed in practical application.

 

BTW, it's pretty obvious that you don't know much about small craft operations if you think large formation of them can maneuver for any distance parallel to shore or that there won't be significant pause on the beach to reorganize after landfall. But don't worry...this fantasy is apparently held by many people supoosedly more expert than you or I, at much higher paygrades.

[Tomexe]

The problem I see with the AAAV is not so much that it is a nifty toy, but that it is still just a relatively lightly armored vehicle, expected to roam the enemy hinterland at will without any logistical support other than what it can carry, what can be carried by logistics variants, or that can be brought in by air. This is a fantasy of the highest order, and it's going to get troops killed in practical application

But where did you get that idea? If its a "raid" it will be done on one tank of gas. Kind of like the "Thunder Runs" through Baghdad only starting from water. If they are coming to stay than it and the M1's are going to be just the tip of a long column.

At least that is what my understanding of the word "raid" means.

 

The AAAV uniquely meets an implausible requirement -- a surface raid against a litoral so heavily defended that close approach by phibs is inadvisable, but which at the same time has such a porous enemy ground troop deployment that the raid force can drive around at will once it reaches the beach. Now, I'm just a poor dumb grunt, but in all but the most exceptional of circumstances, those seem like two mutually exclusive conditions...

 

I don't see it as being too exceptional. The enemy has to have dispersed, mobile defenses, or we will destroy them with bombing. Even then if they dont have armored/mechanized forces they are at a significant disadvantge to the AAAVs alone. Technicals and mobs of AK wielding Militia are perfect targets that the AAAVs and their infantry could probably take on alone. But even if a mechanized force with tanks were in the area, the moment it revealed itself to respond fighters and SuperCobras would go after it, and ultimately it would have to face the M1A1s with the AAAVs.

 

What kind of force do you expect to meet? How many other countries have good enough anti-armor weapons to make this not work?

[Guest aevans]

But where did you get that idea?  If its a "raid" it will be done on one tank of gas.  Kind of like the "Thunder Runs" through Baghdad only starting from water.  If they are coming to stay than it and the M1's are going to be just the tip of a long column.

At least that is what my understanding of the word "raid" means.

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You should really go back and read carefully the documentation of the Ship To Objecitve Maneuver (STOM) concept. It assumes just what I said -- that a force mounted on AAAVs could mover overwater, cross the beach with little or no operational pause, and maneuver up to 100km inland with no other support than what they can carry with them or what can be delivered by air, both in terms of firepower and logistics. I do not believe that that is possible -- the approach to the objective would burn most if not all of each vehicle's fuel load, for one thing.

 

I don't see it as being too exceptional.  The enemy has to have dispersed, mobile defenses, or we will destroy them with bombing.  Even then if they dont have armored/mechanized forces they are at a significant disadvantge to the AAAVs alone.  Technicals and mobs of AK wielding Militia are perfect targets that the AAAVs and their infantry could probably take on alone.  But even if a mechanized force with tanks were in the area, the moment it revealed itself to respond fighters and SuperCobras would go after it, and ultimately it would have to face the M1A1s with the AAAVs.

 

What kind of force do you expect to meet?  How many other countries have good enough anti-armor weapons to make this not work?

 

It's not a case of whether or not the enemy can be overcome, but at what cost, not only in terms of men and material, but also in opportunity? Not every enemy is going to be a bunch of gun-toting yahoos. Yet that is the kind of enemy that is conceived for this thing to work.

[Tomexe]

You should really go back and read carefully the documentation of the Ship To Objecitve Maneuver (STOM) concept. It assumes just what I said -- that a force mounted on AAAVs could mover overwater, cross the beach with little or no operational pause, and maneuver up to 100km inland with no other support than what they can carry with them or what can be delivered by air, both in terms of firepower and logistics. I do not believe that that is possible -- the approach to the objective would burn most if not all of each vehicle's fuel load, for one thing.

 

100km is not very far. I have seen the same goals criticized as being unrealisticly short ranged. That supposedly Iraq and Afghanistan both prove that anyone who wanted to fight us would never set up shop so close to the ocean...

 

What IS the AAAVs range then? What I have seen quotes 65nm at 25kts on water and 300mi at 35mph on land. If their target is 100km inland they will probably have to refuel on their way out. Or carry drop tanks for the trip in that they dump when they leave the water.

 

As far as roaming with no other support than air, well the Army SFGs did this in the north and west of Iraq with only their desert mod Humvees. The fighting part would therefore not seem to be such a problem as lifting all that diesel. But at 100km inland that is only a 30min round trip for a Osprey. Its well within SuperCobra/SuperHuey range to cover refueling areas. They have infantry to cover them. They could do one refueling on a raid. Could the M1's make the round trip though?

[Chris Werb]

Not every enemy is going to be a bunch of gun-toting yahoos. Yet that is the kind of enemy that is conceived for this thing to work.

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What enemy consists mostly of gun toting yahoos but also has weapons that can inflict prohibitive losses on USN ships less than 100km from a coastline? They must(?) have had some specific enemies in mind when they drafted the requirement.

[Tomexe]

What enemy consists mostly of gun toting yahoos but also has weapons that can inflict prohibitive losses on USN ships less than 100km from a coastline?  They must(?) have had some specific enemies in mind when they drafted the requirement.

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Iraq used to and Iran still does have armies that match that description and still have SSMs and jet fighters. The PRC and Korea are not much better.

 

But also the operating defininiton of prohibative loss is ANY missile or kamakzi hit, or any mine strike against ANY US surface vessel. Although this is especally foucsed on the amphibious ships which have a higher potental for large loss of life due to both the number of Marines and the quantitiy of explosive and flamable cargo they carry, the USN isnt too keen on risking any of its AEGIS ships to a minestrike either.

 

I am not joking or being flippant. These specifications are designed to appease the US publics fear of casualties. As inane a requirement as it may seem to be to history students and professional military it is a real world requirement. The goal is to totally eliminate the chance of a mass casualty incident, otherwise it is literally politically impossible to use the US military even in self defense.

 

It may be unrealistic, it may be twisted, but that is the world we live in.

[Guest aevans]

I am not joking or being flippant.  These specifications are designed to appease the US publics fear of casualties.  As inane a requirement as it may seem to be to history students and professional military it is a real world requirement.  The goal is to totally eliminate the chance of a mass casualty incident, otherwise it is literally politically impossible to use the US military even in self defense.

 

It may be unrealistic, it may be twisted, but that is the world we live in.

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If they want to avoid mass casualties, they should rethink the idea of moving a battalion overwater in small craft, then driving them around the enemy hinterland with nothing but aerial support.

[EchoFiveMike]

If they want to avoid mass casualties, they should rethink the idea of moving a battalion overwater in small craft, then driving them around the enemy hinterland with nothing but aerial support.

 

So you've reconsidered your "CAS is all you need" position? S/F....Ken M

[Guest aevans]

So you've reconsidered your "CAS is all you need" position?  S/F....Ken M

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Nope -- CAS and 5" gunfire from cruisers/destroyers should be sufficient to establish a beachhead inside which artillery and armor can be landed for use in operations further inland. Remember, I don't buy the OMFTS concept one bit, so anything that derives from it, like maneuvering in the hinterland without a full logistics and fire support establishment can't logically be associated with anything I've ever said.

[CaptLuke]

Nope -- CAS and 5" gunfire from cruisers/destroyers should be sufficient to establish a beachhead inside which artillery and armor can be landed for use in operations further inland. Remember, I don't buy the OMFTS concept one bit, so anything that derives from it, like maneuvering in the hinterland without a full logistics and fire support establishment can't logically be associated with anything I've ever said.

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I see your point, but by the same logic applies to all airborne and air mobile operations, which put troops out of fire support range without any armored vehicles at all (for the US).

 

Commanders have to be careful about airborne and airmobile operations, but they still have their uses. I would imagine that the same logic applies to AAAV assaults or raids or whatever you want to call them. Depending on the theatre, there's also the possibility of riverine or delta operations, where an AAAV is an interesting thing to have.

 

Is it worth the money? I don't know. I think the USMC could do a lot more with hovercraft, including smaller, armed hovercraft that could do shipping inspections and deal with small "speed boat" attacks like we've seen in the gulf before as well as landing troops, but that's based as much on my fondness for hovercraft as it is on analysis.

[Ken Estes]

Is it worth the money?  I don't know.  I think the USMC could do a lot more with hovercraft, including smaller, armed hovercraft that could do shipping inspections and deal with small "speed boat" attacks like we've seen in the gulf before as well as landing troops, but that's based as much on my fondness for hovercraft as it is on analysis.

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You could then trim them down to about 12,000 and rechristen them the "Royal Marines."

 

A serious amphib capability will take a lot more, but a raid force can make do with helicopters and rubber boats. If one wishes to take on a few [and fewer than in 1980-85 when OTH was decreed as the USN ampib doctrine] countries from the sea, however, an amphib force will need to deal with mines, seaskimming missiles and several other threats.

 

I recall at this point no amphib operation that paused for the assembly of a full fire support and logistic establishment before proceeding inland, that in fact succceeded, viz. Anzio! Hell, Gallipoli flopped just over the time it took to brew tea vice taking the inland objectives.

[Ken Estes]

What enemy consists mostly of gun toting yahoos but also has weapons that can inflict prohibitive losses on USN ships less than 100km from a coastline?  They must(?) have had some specific enemies in mind when they drafted the requirement.

195150[/snapback]

As to the last, that would be the USSR and a few likely allies, c1980-89.