The US Marine Corps - why?

[RETAC21]

A minor nitpick on the French Marines, the correct spelling is Marsouins.

[Ed Gilbert]

Ken - the 1st Cav reorg seems to go well beyond the standard practice of utilizing the usual suspects as emergency infantry.

 

The umbrella DivArty will be broken up and all assets placed directly at Brigade level. This would be analogous to going back to the USMC's pre-1941 system of brigades as the basic organizational element,with artillery as part of the brigade organization versus the direct support system. This raises the possibility that artillery could be (mis)used the way USMC tanks were in the RVN, or at least underutilized. What they seem to be getting rid of would be the regimental level logistics, command-coordination, and support functions. While in theory advanced communications can substitute for a command level, I'm not at all sure that a small section at division staff level can in reality sub for a multi-battalion command and support layer.

 

It sounds like once again the 1st Cavalry is being morphed into a very task-specific one-war-only division as it has been in the past. I question the wisdom of a structure that makes the division a group of what would be MEB equivalents.The USMC maintains the artillery regiment, from which battalions can be lent to the MEB. The Army seems to be going back to a separate maneuver brigade model. While this would allow them to 'compete' with the MEBs for the fireman role, I'm pretty sure would be disastrous in a more conventional war. The USMC division structure maintains the capacity to concentrate and control the division's primary firepower in serious combat, but still give out loaners to the MEBs.

 

Then there's the issue of manpower shortages - which is probably the real one.

 

Here's a link to a Times article:

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/30/national/30army.html

[FALightFighter]

The 1st CAV artillery is not going away, only the Divarty headquarters- its DS battalions will become organic to the maneuver brigades. IMHO, this is admitting in our organizational structure the de facto situation since the mid-90s base closures, deactivations and re-alignments, that the Division is no longer our basic unit of employment- the Brigade is. Think about it- only 3 of 10 active duty division have had all their brigades stationed togethere- 7 had a de facto separate brigade stationed somewhere else. And the 1st CAV is not the first to reorg- 3ID, 101AASLT, 10MD, 4ID and 2ID have all reorg'd already. The SBCTs are already separate bde's anyway. 25ID is reorging now, and 1ID and 1AD will as they return from deployment (or may have already, unsure).

 

Personally, I think this is a good change for the Army- we train as BDEs, we fight as BDEs, why not organize as BDEs. I have seen the conflicts that occur when you "belong" to 2 BDEs, and both BDE CDRs want to feel like they own you. It is not good, does not benefit the units, and does not efficiently train units for war- the be all, end all of the Army. It doesn't work, so lets not do it any more.

[Tomexe]

Nobody else has a marine corps with its own air force, & the general solution to any perceived need for large-scale amphibious landing forces is to make sure some of the army has suitable training.

 

What other country has the requirement for over water forced entry on another country? There are really only two other countries that are even big enough to afford to create such a force, Russia and China. Right now the LACK of a force such as the USMC is crippling China's policy options against Taiwan.

 

We haven't used the USMC in its specialized role since Korea due to the lack of a target, not because the need has gone away. Any country can force us to use a large scale amphibious assault again simply by fortifying, mining, or in the extreme demolishing their ports.

 

Ports are also surrounded by cities, and as we now have re-learnt, Armor is necessacary to successfuly take a city with politically tolerable casualty levels. M1's dont fly well, and they need a airport even if they did and THEN you have to keep them fueled. But all you need to land M1s by LCAC is a flat beach and ships carry pleanty of JP8.

 

The USMC is not wierd in having its own Air Force, the wierdness is that US Army does not, except for helicopters.

 

The 1947 attempt to divide this up more logically would of probably worked better than what we have now. Had someone OTHER than Truman been the referee, or had balistic missiles and space operations been less sci-fi at the time it might have worked. Intercontinental bombing and transport, and protection of CONUS from the same did not appear a big enough job to justify a seperate branch at the time especally on a reduced peace time budget so the proponents of the AF were forced to ask for more- the control of ALL land based aviation at the minimum was required. The attack on Navy/Marine aviation was just stupid though.

 

Once the decision WAS made to give the Air Force all armed land based aircraft, then they should of gone ahead and given them the parachute divisions- because the split between the Air Force and Army has made the use of parachute troops FAR more problematic than the use of Marines. If we have not used the USMC for a major amphibious assault since Korea we have used the Army's airborne forces even LESS. They are underfunded and dont really have proper equipment for their job which needs specialized light-weight equipment. (Where is the American BMD for instance?) As a specialist arm of the USAF they would have had a better chance to get such equipment- or when forced to accept Army equipment (like say main battle tanks), would have had leverage to get the specialised aircraft to handle such outsized loads as the USMC is able to get amphibious shipping out of the Navy.

 

We would of then had an Airmobile power projection arm AND a seaborn power projection arm that were two complete, tightly integrated packages. Thus making it very difficult for a opposing country to deny us entry. Trying to stop one would leave you vulnerable to the other. Instead of fighting it the Army should of said thank you for the releif of the burden and concentrated on perfecting the Armored Forces as their specialty. Neither the Marines or Airmobile troops had sustainability. The Army did. They could of resigned their role in initial entry in exchange for working on overwhelming battlefield power through a powerful group of armored divisions under the Armored Corps followed by a security oriented Infantry Corps that would specialize in taking over and holding terrain won by either the Armor OR directly from Marine or Airborne troops if the terrain was not favorable to the use of Armored divisions. This role clarification would also of helped them improve their defensive preperations in Europe.

 

The two things that prevented this were Harry Truman (who was both too diferential to others and not very imaginative) and everyones obsession over the Bomb that led them to slight conventional forces in general. If discussion of the split could have only been held off untill AFTER the Korean conflict had shown them they were wrong then things might have been different.

 

The fact is the "other countries" do what they do out of necessity, you cannot run a efficient Airmoble OR Amphibious force and have the fighting and transport arms under different services. It wont really work just to have some of the Army trained in boat landings, other countries do it that way primarily becuase the alternative is to have NO capability what so ever and they get away with this notion because- with the exception of the British Comonwealth Army's in WWII- none of them have ever had to do it for real on their own.

Any troops the Army really dedicated to Amphibious operations would spend so much time with the Navy both in training and in operations that they might as well just be a part of the Navy. Its rather the same story with Marine Corps Aviation. They need to spend so much time with the troops practicng close air support, they might as well be a part of the Marines. And added to that is the fact that while they have trained to use carriers and use carrier compatible aircraft they DO eventually have to go ashore and follow their infantry. And when they do the Fleet still needs aircraft. So why not have them titled as Marines, the different uniforms and paint jobs are not too difficult a expense. In a perfect world the US Army would still have its own Air Corps of fixed wing craft to do the same CAS, battlefield air superiority, and transport functions the Marines get. However reality is that the rising cost of waging war makes it a open question wether we will be ABLE to sustain the unique capabilities of the USMC in the future- much less fix the Airborne forces problem.

[Tomexe]

B ) Now that Amphibious assault-landings versus capable foes is too expensive, it is still very handy to have loads of floating thugs to keep the barbs in line, as well as sieze specific terrain within range of the coast. Hence, MEU's. The Fixed wing aviation.....well, that's debatable, but the rotary squadrons are definately needed.

 

What is a "capable foe" who would make amphibious landings "too expensive"? That statement assumes too much. We haven't made a large Amphibious landing since Korea because there has always been a ground route not because they had defenses that could repulse us.

 

The credable threat of a assault landing on Kuwait had a good part of the Iraqi army facing the wrong way in 91' and offered attack aircraft a very nice target at the same time. Given the amount of air power at our disposal- and two battleships within range- we still probably could of landed. The mines were far more of a potential obstical, we did have two ships messed up by them. But they could not have stopped the assault, only run up casualties. For domestic political reasons alone (the fear of the casualties that would result from a couple amtraks hitting mines runing the appearance of a "bloodless" victory) did we not make that landing- and we paid for it in the number of Iraqi troops that got away to keep Saddam in power for another 12 years and the failure to prevent the Palistinian workers uprising from trashing much of Kuwait.

 

If we want to bring down the Kims in Korea, we will have to do a large scale beach landing. It would almost have to be cheeper than trying to fight across the DMZ and those tunnels and 50 years of prepared positions. They have two coastlines that just CANNOT be that heavily fortified. For one thing the terrain won't allow it.

[JOE BRENNAN]

We haven't used the USMC in its specialized role since Korea due to the lack of a target, not because the need has gone away.  Any country can force us to use a large scale amphibious assault again simply by fortifying, mining, or in the extreme demolishing their ports. 

191092[/snapback]

At some point lack of a target or prospective target over many decades constructively means the need has been reduced. You can never say "gone away" because I'm sure you can construct a specific scenario to support your last sentence. However I'm also sure it would be unlikely, perhaps at the margin of implausbile, compared to many other needs also competing for a limited budget.

 

I can see China's need for a large amphib force as a relatively higher priority than for us. That said, even China visibly over a long period does not put trans-strait amphib forces at a high priority. Among other reasons, you need sea and air control of the straits. Without it the amphib force is useless. Our situation is not the same at all but the idea of priorities among those capabilities is still illustrative.

 

It's not only incorrect but tends toward wastage and misprioritization IMO to justify the Marines at current relative scale on the basis of large scale amphibious assaults. I think the correct justification admits that they are mainly a second Army and such assaults are highly unlikely though the existence of the Marines and *some* spending by the Navy (but less than now) in this area provides a hedge of some US threat to perform such operations. The Marines are still justified on the basis of relatively benign additive not wasteful duplication of Army capabilities, and their virtues as a real institution (traditions, etc). As was said, starting from scratch now there wouldn't be a big USMC, but we're not starting from scratch.

 

Joe

Edited July 4, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[Tomexe]

At some point lack of a target or prospective target over many decades constructively means the need has been reduced. You can never say "gone away" because I'm sure you can construct a specific scenario to support your last sentence. However I'm also sure it would be unlikely, perhaps at the margin of implausbile, compared to many other needs also competing for a limited budget.

 

I highly disagree with this. There are way too many situations that could have been settled with a Marine Division- and the same could be said for the 82nd Airborne- where we simply either lacked the will to use force at ALL or settled for political reasons on a "Joint Forces" solution and mixed USMC and Army troops, or just token bombing.

 

The need to land a full Marine division will occur any time we cannot get a neighboring country to let us pass through to use force or, like in North Korea, where there is no neighboring country. The knowledge we have this ability is also a big negotiating factor. Given how we have NOT provided our 1 and 1/3rd Airborne Divisions with enough good air droppable anti-armor and especially anti-fortification weapons it is much safer to make such entries wherever possible by Marines who do have some fairly heavy weapons and armor (M1's, 155mm guns, SuperCobras) and can keep them supplied is a big plus.

 

If anything should be cut in a era of rising costs perhaps it should be the Army line divisions that should be cut? Who is more deployable? Who arrives with more firepower? Who is more mobile once they are on the ground? The Navy/Marines have made a package that works well togeather and can be scaled up and down and exists right now. The Air Force/Army have yet to form such a tight package with their units with the apparent exception of the Special Forces Groups.

 

The loss of this force would drasticly curtail our options in future confrontations, and leave us even more vulnerable to third party interference in our use of force options than we are today. A large part of getting countries to help us- or let us pass through- as well as deterring future agressors is knowing that we can get to them if they get us angry enough to risk the losses regardless of what anyone else tries to do to hinder us, short of getting Russia or China to threaten nuclear war on their behalf. Bombing and SF teams alone are not enough, although they certainly will in the future make it a lot more effective and safer to use the Marines and/or Airborne.

[JOE BRENNAN]

1. we simply either lacked the will to use force at ALL or settled for political reasons on a "Joint Forces" solution and mixed USMC and Army troops, or just token bombing.

 

2. The need to land a full Marine division will occur any time we cannot get a neighboring country to let us pass through to use force or, like in North Korea, where there is no neighboring country.

 

3. If anything should be cut in a era of rising costs perhaps it should be the Army line divisions that should be cut? 

 

4. The loss of this force would drasticly curtail our options in future confrontations,

191145[/snapback]

1. "Lack of will" is a reality within which one has to work. Long term political realities about how force will be used are part of the equation, not some irrelevance outside it, just like lack of targets is.

 

2. NK is the example I expected of the borderline implausible scenario. We're not going to attack North Korea conventionally without South Korea's cooperation, which it's extremely unlikely they'd give. And even assuming a war with their cooperation or started by NK, so fought mainly on DMZ front, if there's one defining element of institutional memory in the KPA it's not leaving sea flanks open to landings: heavy mining, obstruction and coast defences all over and reserves for sea flanks. That was true even of the rest of the Korean war from the time the NK and Chinese forces pushed the UN back south, besides being days away from being true at Inchon. Then past NK it's very made-up unlikely scenario's I think. There's a scenario for major multi-corps armored combat by the Army too, also highly unlikely and that must be considered because there are other needs related to more more likely and critical cases.

 

3. This again seems to tend toward pushing unlikely amphibious scenario's *because* otherwise there's a perceived vulberability to cuts relative to the Army. That's not a good reason. I didn't propose cutting the MC relative to the Army, just avoiding wasting MC and Navy procurement on far fetched large scale opposed landing scenarios. I don't have a problem with the MC size relative to the Army otherwise.

 

4. No force is being lost, we'd just stop wasting money on high end amphib projects by admitting that's not really why we have the Marines at such a relatively large size. I'd break the connection between amphib capacity and Marine force size. We'd still have a large amphib (gator) force compared to anyone else, I just wouldn't add to it (or build any replacements) for the forseeable future, and ditch programs like AAAV with the MC itself.

 

Joe

Edited July 4, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[EchoFiveMike]

AAAV is actually a nice system for all the punitive little raids and near sea missions that are the USMC's forte(re; Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo,Albania). OTOH, V-22 doesn't do a damned thing for us, other than kill Marines, waste money and prevent obtaining a real replacement for the CH46. S/F....Ken M

[Guest wyrmm]

Every one is ignoring the obvious, we need marines to shoot the army and detain ships companies, marine air wings to shoot the Air Farce, and of course vice versa.

[Guest aevans]

AAAV is actually a nice system for all the punitive little raids and near sea missions that are the USMC's forte(re; Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo,Albania).  OTOH, V-22 doesn't do a damned thing for us, other than kill Marines, waste money and prevent obtaining a real replacement for the CH46.  S/F....Ken M

191257[/snapback]

 

The Marine Corps has helicopters for inland missions where a beachhead isn't desirable. (Yes, even if they're old and getting older, they're still there.) The AAAV uniquely meets an implausible requirement -- a surface raid against a litoral so heavily defended that close approach by phibs is inadvisable, but which at the same time has such a porous enemy ground troop deployment that the raid force can drive around at will once it reaches the beach. Now, I'm just a poor dumb grunt, but in all but the most exceptional of circumstances, those seem like two mutually exclusive conditions...

[EchoFiveMike]

The Marine Corps has helicopters for inland missions where a beachhead isn't desirable. (Yes, even if they're old and getting older, they're still there.) The AAAV uniquely meets an implausible requirement -- a surface raid against a litoral so heavily defended that close approach by phibs is inadvisable, but which at the same time has such a porous enemy ground troop deployment that the raid force can drive around at will once it reaches the beach. Now, I'm just a poor dumb grunt, but in all but the most exceptional of circumstances, those seem like two mutually exclusive conditions...

 

But the V22 isn't a helicopter Tony, and it isn't an airplane either. It's kinda like a sorta fast CH46 that goes smash quite often and has a long slow approach unless you want to fall out of the sky. It's the USMC trying to expand beyond it's littoral home turf, so to speak. While it can lift more than a CH46, up to 15k lbs externally, so I read, that limits the aircraft to 150kts, which means you have no speed(and presumably range) advantage over a conventional helo.

 

The AAAV OTOH is simply a faster, better armed AAVP-7. Yeah, they gold plated the Hell out of it IOT support their silly little OTH phib raid bullshit because the Navy is gunshy about mines. How else are you going to get any real land vehicles to shore when your LCAC's are tied up bringing in the MEU's Abrams, 7 ton trucks and/or LAV's? Or are we all going to simply go footmobile or possibly depend entirely on the CH-53's to lift vehicles in? The 53's can't even lift the prime mover trucks any more, so that's out. HUM-V's only? OK, that gives you enough trucks for a platoon per CH-53 lift, assuming you're going to dedicate all the 53's for that. I suppose you can use some V-22's to lift in HUM-V's and use the 53's to lift LAV's, that way you can have a nice little LAV supported 2 platoon(rein) package. But I just don't see this being a viable plan for the silly little politically unpopular small interventions where one savage with a SA-14 or a stinking RPG ruins your whole day.

 

Plus V-22's can't sit at checkpoint's and stop hadjis What shall we do aside from the AAAV? Keep the decrepit AAVP-7? Go all LAV's? Ken Estes will have a heart attack. Go even lighter to HUM-V's?

 

Helos are great, but as with the C130 and the Army's little air invasion Stryker force, the bulk of your combat power and it's log support has to come over the shore in some form or fashion. S/F....Ken M

[JOE BRENNAN]

1.  How else are you going to get any real land vehicles to shore when your LCAC's are tied up bringing in the MEU's Abrams, 7 ton trucks and/or LAV's?

 

2. What shall we do aside from the AAAV?  Keep the decrepit AAVP-7?  Go all LAV's? Ken Estes will have a heart attack.  Go even lighter to HUM-V's? 

191292[/snapback]

1. Down the ramps of ro-ro's or transport planes most of the time, like most real Marine combat of the last 6 decades, probably.

 

2. I think the following would be a reasonable debate: whether LVT level of swimming/surf ability is really necessary anymore, so a new 'classic LVT' equivalent, or not; so then an off shelf (river crossing 'amphibious') AFV. That would involve your point of quick (but basically administrative, limited by port facilities) landings in small interventions, that do actually happen. The impressive engineering feat of the AAAV (assuming it works) is over the top though IMO for anything at all likely.

 

On MV-22 you could throw that in (or out I guess) conceptually with what I said about focusing on the real v pursuing the upscale large scale opposed amphib mission as some sort of insurance against cuts despite its unlikelihood and lots of more real unfilled needs. Assuming the MV-22 is safe as re-engineered the difference I see is that while it and AAAV could both function as part of a mainly imaginary situation of maneuvering parallel to a defended coast, the MV-22 can do the realworld task of helping project a (small) force farther inland (eg. helping transport MEU into Afghanistan), a carry along intratheater transport. I see your point it's not better, if even as good, as a helicopter once operating in one place.

 

Joe

Edited July 5, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[Ken Estes]

Plus V-22's can't sit at checkpoint's and stop hadjis   What shall we do aside from the AAAV?  Keep the decrepit AAVP-7?  Go all LAV's? Ken Estes will have a heart attack.  Go even lighter to HUM-V's? 

 

191292[/snapback]

Ha! Ken, I was fired from writing the concept of op for the MC MidRange plan in 1986 because I had the effrontery to say that the LCACs could deliver the AAV7s or splash them after bringing them from the 25 mile horizon, go back and bring the tanks and LAVs, etc. Such a concept would not support procurement of a $4M AAAV and therefore was clearly wrong Cheers, Ken

[Ken Estes]

Plus V-22's can't sit at checkpoint's and stop hadjis   What shall we do aside from the AAAV?  Keep the decrepit AAVP-7?  Go all LAV's? Ken Estes will have a heart attack.  Go even lighter to HUM-V's? 

 

191292[/snapback]

 

Forgot to add above, I wrote an article in the Gazette in 1973, stating that the procurement of the LCAC by the USN meant that we had the last LVT[later AAV] in hand, could in the future procure conventional infantry carriers/fighting vehicles for ops. The editor republished it c1988 as a jab to the AAAV advocates. No matter, of course. "Without an amtrac there cannot be a USMC...", openly stated as late as 1985, implicetly continuing much later.

[EchoFiveMike]

Yes, but at this point in time and given the current phib picture, the AAAV is a much better dollar spent than the V-22. We should also expand the LAV force, go to strictly M1114's for the wpns companies vice M1042/43's, get either 120mm mortars or UCAV's at the Bn level, pay for the USMC Abrams upgrades AND procure an OTS CH-46 replacement, all with the money we've sunk and continue to sink down the V-22 hole. S/F....Ken M

[Scott Cunningham]

I think having a strong USMC is a great thing for the US military. It acts a spare 3 divisions, and more importantly keeps the Army honest.

 

The US Army is one of the leading examples of 'groupthink' that there is. All ranks are expected to parrot the opinions of senior leaders ("The beret is a great idea!!!") while the USMC offers an alternative.

 

If there was no USMC the Army could do whatever it wanted and have no consequensces. It would be a monopoly. The nation would have to use it for ground ops no matter what. With the USMC there is competition. It is healthy.

 

There will always be those who demand the USMC be disbanded and its assets and resources redistributed, but that would be a major mistake. It costs a bit extra to have duplicate systems that the USMC require, but the overall effect on US military power is VERY much in the plus column.

[Doug Kibbey]

I think having a strong USMC is a great thing for the US military. It acts a spare 3 divisions, and more importantly keeps the Army honest.

 

The US Army is one of the leading examples of 'groupthink' that there is. All ranks are expected to parrot the opinions of senior leaders ("The beret is a great idea!!!")  while the USMC offers an alternative.

 

If there was no USMC the Army could do whatever it wanted and have no consequensces. It would be a monopoly. The nation would have to use it for ground ops no matter what. With the USMC there is competition. It is healthy.

 

There will always be those who demand the USMC be disbanded and its assets and resources redistributed, but that would be a major mistake. It costs a bit extra to have duplicate systems that the USMC require, but the overall effect on US military power is VERY much in the plus column.

192281[/snapback]

 

Well said, Scott.

[Simon Tan]

It's EFV.....not AAAV, dammit.

M1114s are dinky and cool but for not vastly more footprint, I would go with the M1117 ASV. You double the firepower, have more ready ammo, can have integrated FCS, have thermals and have better protection. The M1114s are for general purpose work.

 

How often do the Weaps Companies run their stuff dismounted these days? All that can be handed down to the HHC for FOB security.

 

Simon

[Steel Rain]

It's EFV.....not AAAV, dammit.

 

What exactly do you mean by that?

[ThirteenFox]

M1114s are dinky and cool but for not vastly more footprint, I would go with the M1117 ASV. You double the firepower, have more ready ammo, can have integrated FCS, have thermals and have better protection. The M1114s are for general purpose work.

192451[/snapback]

 

I'm not quite sure why you have such a woody for the M1117, perhaps it's the "coolness" factor?

 

I spent 14 months operating with them in Iraq, and while useful, they aren't nearly as versatile as the M1114.

 

Dinky and cool? I didn't realize a 6-ton vehicle falls into the "dinky" category. Cool, yes - at least when the AC works.

 

Double the firepower? On paper, yes. In real life? Don't bet on it. Our vehicles had constant feed problems with the MK19 as well as turret electrical issues. More often than not, hostiles were engaged with the M2 alone.

 

FCS? Not in my lifetime.

 

Thermals? See FCS.

 

Better protection? Hardly. They are better protected against mines, but there isn't that much of a mine threat in Iraq. Against your garden-variety IED it's a wash between the ASV and an M1114. The three M1114s in my squad were hit by over a dozen IEDs, four RPGs (including a dud), and more small arms rounds than I like to think about. Other than some minor injuries, all of my soldiers survived.

 

You can also add poor crew visibility, a 50 foot turning radius, engine cooling problems, hydraulic leaks, frequently blown wheel seals and a host of other maintenance issues. Oh, and that most important thing - cost.

 

I'll take an M1114 any day.

 

 

(back to topic)

 

Why is there a need for the USMC? Just because.

 

Regards,

 

Chris S.

(former 0311, 0313)

[Stevely]

I think having a strong USMC is a great thing for the US military. It acts a spare 3 divisions, and more importantly keeps the Army honest.

 

The US Army is one of the leading examples of 'groupthink' that there is. All ranks are expected to parrot the opinions of senior leaders ("The beret is a great idea!!!")  while the USMC offers an alternative.

 

If there was no USMC the Army could do whatever it wanted and have no consequensces. It would be a monopoly. The nation would have to use it for ground ops no matter what. With the USMC there is competition. It is healthy.

 

There will always be those who demand the USMC be disbanded and its assets and resources redistributed, but that would be a major mistake. It costs a bit extra to have duplicate systems that the USMC require, but the overall effect on US military power is VERY much in the plus column.

192281[/snapback]

 

Everything you said, plus the USMC has an illustrious 230 year history and his proved itself one of the greatest fighting organizations ever whenever it has taken to battle, so with the such a proven record, we'd be crazy to question its existence or necessity. Never fix what ain't broke.

 

The Army has a lot to learn from the USMC, IMO, especially about the basic things.

[Ivanhoe]

Never fix what ain't broke.

 

Somebody should write that down somewhere.

 

Over the last 15 years, almost everybody has been eager to "fix" the Army. Declarations are confidently made that all future conflicts are guerrilla/MOUT/counterinsurgency/hearts&testicles or whatever, despite the long history of predictive failure. And ignoring what may be the most important function of a standing army; deterrence. The best way to win against asymmetric warfare tactics is to have a full spectrum of capability.

 

Right now the incendiary topics are too heavy/too light, too tracked/too wheeled, and too numerous/insufficiently numerous. Yet nobody is talking about altitude. Our operations in Afghanistan (and Pakistan, I presume) are often near the ceilings of our helos, our spec ops troops have had trouble when first posted there because of the altitude increase from CONUS bases. And the next Latin American flareup might be Venezuela/Columbia, the latter of which offers a mountainous playing field.

[Guest aevans]

Ivanhoe:

 

The problem is that if you try to do too much, you don't do anything particularly well -- ref. the main problem with SEALs. The obivous solution is to field at least one specialized unit for every contingency. But then you wind up as an institution not having enough of anything, or using units for jobs they aren't really trained to do. My state just sent out an artillery battalion to Iraq (2/222). I seriously doubt they're going there to shoot cannon.

 

Here is where the Marine Corps does better than the Army -- instead of all of this branch and specilization silliness (except of course for the necessary MOS specializations) the Marine Corps concentrates on fundamentals, figuring any skill set can be learned if the foundation of basic knowledge is there, and the organizational philosophy is that everyone is a basically trained Marine first, then whatever else he or she happens to do.

[Ivanhoe]

That's fine, but the Marines have the advantage of a somewhat narrowed role, that of light infantry. Sure, the Marines have IFVs and armor, but nobody is going to throw 3 (or 2.66 or whatever) divisions of Marines against 3 enemy armor/cav divisions out in the sandbox. The job description of the Army includes spec ops, airborne, light infantry, heavy, everything. Sure, the Army could and should take a lesson from the Marines on fundamentals and to use a quaint term "warrior mindset" but going to 7 divisions of light infantry isn't going to work either.