The US Marine Corps - why?

[Ken Estes]

The US Army takes about 50K active duty soldiers to field an active duty division (about 480K to field 10 divisions).  The Marine corps number is about 60K (176K soldiers for 3 divisions).

 

This means that the Marines are fielding a division and an entire air wing for a 20% manpower premium over what it takes the Army to field a division.  It's an over-simplified number, but I think it is consistent with lower overhead.

 

Also, if you take that 176K active duty marines number and divide by 12, the number of divisions you attribute to the Bundeswehr for the same manpower, that puts each division at less than 15,000 total strength including its entire corps support slice and army support slice, which would put each division around what, 10K people?

190496[/snapback]

Your figures serve for a current USMC of 2 2/3divs and I don't know the size of the aircraft wings these days, but 1st MAW was never up to full strength. I was reminiscencing about the late 1980s, with a corps and Heer at around 186,000 and I do believe a Bundewehr Div was around 11,000: remember every 4th company in their combat bns was a reserve one, etc. But in any case, they had no need for the paraphernalia and extra units for amphibious and expeditionary warfare. But my point is that one cannot assume low overhead in the USMC.

[Steel Rain]

An idealized Marine division is around 18,100. That division really doesn't exist though, 1st, 2nd and 4th are plused up and larger than a division's idealized TO and 3rd is a rump of a division borrowing forces from 1st and 2nd.

 

Two thing most don't remember when they deal with end strength is T2P2 (Training, Transit, Patients and Prisoners) and supporting establishment. T2P2 kind of speaks for itself, at any one time about 10 percent of the Marine Corps fall into this category. The supporting establishment are all those guys that exist to support the FMF and in most cases to take care of those that fall under T2P2. Those that were part of the supporting establishment that could be replaced with civilians were years ago, but there are certain billets that you cannot fill with a civilian.

[Steel Rain]

This means that the Marines are fielding a division and an entire air wing for a 20% manpower premium over what it takes the Army to field a division.  It's an over-simplified number, but I think it is consistent with lower overhead.

 

A Marine Airwing is a "divisional" sized command/unit. So in effect the Marines field 6, actually closer to 5 if you take into account 1st MAW/3rd MarDiv, with those forces.

[KingSargent]

The USMC is the size it is because that size was mandated by Congress.

 

They got the size by combat performance in WW2, and the PR (which was more outstanding than the performance.

 

BTW, the Army did more amphibious ops.

[Ed Gilbert]

There have been several sizeable books written to address the issue of why the USA has the sizeable USMC, but it all boils down to institutional survival. As befits a professional historian, Ken is more cynical than I about this.

 

I tried to boil this down in the intro chapters for two of my books, so here goes:

 

Many Army five-stars-generals-to-be were POed when Gen Pershing was forced to accept a Marine Brigade in WWI over his objections. Then by a vagary of the publicity policy, the Brigade became famous. In the 1920s drawdown, the Army tried to hamstring the USMC by fighting for funds, but intense lobbying and publicity campaigns, and the Corps reinvention of itself as amphib specialists (Army said no, thanks, we'll just use some handy port) saved it.

 

Post WW2 another fight for funds, and an active effort to limit the USMC role by some senior Army officers and Pershing proteges (the Smith vs Smith affair did not help). Again, intense lobbying and publicity saves the Corps. Few recognized the significance of Walter Boomer's last command appointment as the end of eighty years of bitter rivalry sometimes marked by childish behavior from both the USMC (grabbing a lot of publicity for the Pusan defense, and denying the ROK's and 8th Army survivors their deserved recognition) and Army (the ludicrous - and vain - Pony Express flight of Stilwell to replace Geiger on Okinawa).

 

The common theme is lobbying and publicity. The Corps has never been averse to it, and uses Hollywood shamelessly. Bellisario - who produces JAG and NCIS is a former Marine. The zenith was probably "The Halls Of Montezuma", which utilized most of the 1st MarDiv in filming. They're always happy to help, so are often depicted in films as having to save the country ("Seven Days In May") or even the world ("Independence Day", "War of the Worlds" 2005 version).

 

Publicity aside, though, the Corps does a damn good job of making itself into a big elite. Are all individual Marines better than members of other branches? No, but they do a good job of instilling an Avis mentality ("We try harder") that gets the job done. I found that the basic philosophy of teaching me to be too stupid to know when to give up served me well in the academic, scientific, and business worlds.

[Ken Estes]

Ken is more cynical than I about this.

 

190582[/snapback]

uurrrp! Please Ed, 'skeptical'! Ken

[Kenneth P. Katz]

Good militaries are not the playthings of MBAs, subject to frequent reorganizations to suit the latest fads.

 

Obviously, if you were to create the American military from nothing in 2005, you would not have a US Marine Corps. But nobody is creating an American military from scratch. Heritage and tradition are terribly important to successful militaries, and the impressive heritage and tradition of the USMC are far more valuable than any savings in overhead from consolidation. In practice, the USMC units has proven to be interoperable and except in a few cases interchangeable with comparable units from other services, and that is what really matters.

 

Another thing to consider is that there are real if intangible benefits to having a small additional armed service, which tends to be a force for innovation that benefits the entire the US military. For example, I've never read anything official that describes the MATGF organization and concept as being influential on the development of the Air Force's AEF. Nonetheless, I do not think that the similarities are purely coincidental. Ditto for the Air Forces new basic course for 2Lts, which is a fairly obvious copy of TBS.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

A Marine Air Group (MAG) is comparable in size to a USAF Wing or USN Carrier Air Wing. A Marine Air Wing is a multi-MAG organization.

 

A Marine Airwing is a "divisional" sized command/unit.  So in effect the Marines field 6, actually closer to 5 if you take into account 1st MAW/3rd MarDiv, with those forces.

190522[/snapback]

[Kenneth P. Katz]

Speaking as a USAF vet who has worked with some USMC over the years, I think that the USMC has three traditions that have served it very well over the years.

 

1. Particularly difficult basic training which screens out the bottom 10%.

2. A very thorough inculcation of a military mentality. In reality, the USMC is like any other modern military, with many more technicians and bureaucrats than trigger pullers. But a USMC radio repairman or aircraft crew chief tends to regard himself first and foremost as a Marine, while his USAF counterpart tends to regard himself first and foremost with his specialty.

3. A primary identity with the service rather than with the branch/community as is the case with the other services.

 

The downside of these virtues is an annoyng parochialism and unwillingness to recognize the contributions of the other services.

 

Publicity aside, though, the Corps does a damn good job of making itself into a big elite. Are all individual Marines better than members of other branches? No, but they do a good job of instilling an Avis mentality ("We try harder") that gets the job done. I found that the basic philosophy of teaching me to be too stupid to know when to give up served me well in the academic, scientific, and business worlds.

190582[/snapback]

[Matt L.]

I think the USMC is the only reasonable group of the four main branches - it's organized to do a mission (or set of missions) as opposed to what vehicles it would use. Likewise, the Army should have it's own CAS (beyond helo).

 

I wouldn't be opposed (in principle ) to some sort of "Sky Marines" that would be related to the AF in the same way as the USMC is related to the Navy. Just as the USMC has been incredibly useful in the last 20 years - this type of unit would be even moreso if organized with a similar mindset.

 

Just my useless opinion

 

Matt

[SCFalken]

Ideally, I'd rather have two(2) seperate Armed Forces:

 

1. A Naval and Aerospace Service, which also handles the Nukes of various sorts.

Call this one "The Fleet". This includes a Reserve Force.

 

2. A Ground Combat Service. Call them Marines or Army, doesnt matter.

To include a (single! No Guard/Reserve dichotomy) Reserve Force.

 

 

 

Basically, Navy eats the AF while Army eats the Marines.

 

 

Falken

[tanker_karl]

I had only heard the "Marsoins" in a telecast from a Bastille Day parade, and was not sure how it was spelled;

190457[/snapback]

 

The *Bigars* represent less than 10% of the overall TDM (Troupes De Marine), i.e. 3 artillery regiments versus 4 brigades nowadays(*). I have never heard the term used in the Medias, and most non-TDM would probably not make the distinction anyway (but this may have changed with the professionalization of the Army).

 

 

is there a likely translation of Biffins? I rendered it 'ragmen' once but that is another colloquialism that maybe does not work, but certainly a perjorative is intended, no? 

190457[/snapback]

 

*Biffins* is the slang for *Chiffoniers* which indeed means *Ragmen* (I don't know whether there is any slang for *Ragman* in English).

 

It was certainly intended to be very pejorative when first used (as a Navy slang), but it's IMHO become more of a tradition thing connected to the Mess Folklore (see the TDM song called *Les Biffins* at the end of the post). I don't recall any officer actually using the term outside the *Popote*, but NCOs would generally be very keen on using it any time they could.

 

OTOH, the term has largely proliferated outside its original context to the point that almost everyone's is (potentially) someone's *Biffin*.

 

E.g. (some) Navy and Air Force guys would call *Biffins* all infantry troops (TDM or non-TDM), (some) Foreign Legion units would call *Biffins* infantry troops outside the Legion, and even (some) Marine Paratroopers (*Paras Colos*) would call *Biffins* infantry troops that are not both TDM and Paras...

 

 

Song *Les Biffins* :

http://lgaud.free.fr/chants_militaires/chants/biffins.htm

 

First four sentences say :

"The *Biffins* are like lobsters,

They get red when well cooked.

Respect the Colonial Army,

Which is drinking red whine."

 

Rest of the song is so subtle it exceeds my translation skills...

 

Edit : (*) i.e. about 28,000 men currently serving as TDM.

Edited July 3, 2005 by tanker_karl

[Victor]

Of course there is the matter of chain of command. Maybe it is an impression, but I do get the impression that a USMC ground unit will have a much better chance of getting CAS than equivalent army units would from the Air Force (or Navy).

 

Ideally, I'd rather have two(2) seperate Armed Forces:

 

1. A Naval and Aerospace Service, which also handles the Nukes of various sorts.

    Call this one "The Fleet". This includes a Reserve Force.

 

2. A Ground Combat Service.  Call them Marines or Army, doesnt matter.

    To include a (single! No Guard/Reserve dichotomy) Reserve Force.

Basically, Navy eats the AF while Army eats the Marines.

Falken

190611[/snapback]

A little simplistic isn't it. Why not have just one service?

 

Take the Pukes (as in Air Force Pukes) to sea and they will puke. Will you build Air Force aircraft to navy specification (twin engine, salt resistant ...)? The American armed forces are big enough for specialisation.

[TSJ]

Particularly difficult basic training which screens out the bottom 10%.

 

Just one small point to make: The bottom 35% of my platoon was washed out in 1969. Half of my platoon were draftees but I can't really say that the draftees were anymore liable to wash out than the volunteers. The training was just freaking miserable. I can't adequately explain it. We were slapped, punched, choked and denied sick call. And all that time LtCol Touhy kept promising us that no Drill Instructor would touch us. The Drill Instructors acted like they were afraid that we wouldn't kill on command or something.

Edited July 3, 2005 by TSJ

[pi]

Particularly difficult basic training which screens out the bottom 10%.

 

Just one small point to make: The bottom 35% of my platoon was washed out in 1969. Half of my platoon were draftees but I can't really say that the draftees were anymore liable to wash out than the volunteers. The training was just freaking miserable. I can't adequately explain it. We were slapped, punched, choked and denied sick call.  And all that time LtCol Touhy kept promising us that no Drill Instructor would touch us. The Drill Instructors acted like they were afraid that we wouldn't kill on command or something.

190647[/snapback]

 

What happened to the draftees that washed out?

[TSJ]

They got a free bus ticket home.

[Guest aevans]

Particularly difficult basic training which screens out the bottom 10%.

 

Just one small point to make: The bottom 35% of my platoon was washed out in 1969. Half of my platoon were draftees but I can't really say that the draftees were anymore liable to wash out than the volunteers. The training was just freaking miserable. I can't adequately explain it. We were slapped, punched, choked and denied sick call.  And all that time LtCol Touhy kept promising us that no Drill Instructor would touch us. The Drill Instructors acted like they were afraid that we wouldn't kill on command or something.

190647[/snapback]

 

That doesn't square with what I've been told by guys who went through MCRD (either one) at the same time. According to them -- these would have been staff and gunnery sergeants at the time I was talking to them in the mid-Eighties -- the idea was to get as many recruits through with as much training as could be crammed into their brain housing groups. Everybody knew it was a cannon fodder factory.* You had to be a total imbecile or incredibly resistant to military training to be kicked out.

 

*Not that anybody liked it, but they were realistic about the situation.

Edited July 3, 2005 by aevans

[Arminius]

IMHO its because the Marines were the only force, the US Pres could comand and send to war without approval of Congress ... so no President would cut them back too much ...

 

Still true?

 

H

[Kenneth P. Katz]

Not now. Not ever.

 

IMHO its because the Marines were the only force, the US Pres could comand and send to war without approval of Congress ... so no President would cut them back too much ...

 

Still true?

 

H

190767[/snapback]

[SCFalken]

Take the Pukes (as in Air Force Pukes) to sea and they will puke. Will you build Air Force aircraft to navy specification (twin engine, salt resistant ...)? The American armed forces are big enough for specialisation.

190641[/snapback]

 

All problems that would affect only the 1st generation, and that for just the first few years.

 

Also, not every aviation unit would be CVN-oriented.

 

Consolidation is the name of the game. Single-Service parochialism prevents efficiency.

 

2 Services is, IMO, the optimal configuration.

 

Falken

[Guest aevans]

IMHO its because the Marines were the only force, the US Pres could comand and send to war without approval of Congress ... so no President would cut them back too much ...

 

Still true?

 

H

190767[/snapback]

 

It was never legally true, but the nature of the US Army as an institution made it politically hard to deploy overseas, while the Marines, being part of the naval establishemnt, could be employed at discretion without causing too many waves. A ghost of this lingers today, where sending in a brigade of the 82nd signals serious US commitment, while engaging a MEU is seen as business as usual.

[SCFalken]

It was never legally true, but the nature of the US Army as an institution made it politically hard to deploy overseas, while the Marines, being part of the naval establishemnt, could be employed at discretion without causing too many waves. A ghost of this lingers today, where sending in a brigade of the 82nd signals serious US commitment, while engaging a MEU is seen as business as usual.

190779[/snapback]

 

 

Yes. Extracting an MEU back to the ships is a lot easier than extracting a Paratroop brigade back to CONUS.

 

Falken

[Ed Gilbert]

Ken - perhaps skeptical would be a better word. Have you heard about 1st Cav at Hood deactivating its DivArty group to flesh out other units? Rocket and heavy tube artillery bye bye. Seems a sure sign that getting occupied boots on the ground is increasingly hard. The USMC would just park the guns, and send the cannon-cockers, as well as the cooks and typists out on patrol.

 

As for training in about 1969 or so, it was damned hard to get out, so a washout of 1/3 would have been impossible. I only knew of four - three suicides and a brig term for a faked suicide attempt. Even trying to make it to the mainland got you a term in the incredibly brutal Correctional Custody Platoon (we stood firewatch for them, as they were not allowed to do their own), then back to the grind. I even recall seeing one guy who had never reached puberty. He was like a six-foot toddler, but suitable for the needs of the period.

 

Close Air Support: the USMC has had really bad experiences with this. There is a book, I cannot recall the name, about air ops in Korea. Midway through the war, the USAF rammed through a 'more efficient' centralized air control system. Ground support response went from 11 minutes (USMC and USN system of on-call flights orbiting at a ready point) to several HOURS. Sometimes support did not show up at all. It's all a matter of philosophy. Read the account of the battle at An Loc in "A Bright Shining Lie". John Paul Van was watching his ARVNs get slaughtered, while USAF fighter bombers plastered the nearby village instead of a trench line. Seems that USAF mission parameters of the era gave credit for structures destroyed, so a pig barn was a better "credit" target than enemy troops. Kind of a strategic bombardment doctrine gone mad.

[Ken Estes]

*Biffins* is the slang for *Chiffoniers* which indeed means *Ragmen* (I don't know whether there is any slang for *Ragman* in English).

 

It was certainly intended to be very pejorative when first used (as a Navy slang), but it's IMHO become more of a tradition thing connected to the Mess Folklore (see the TDM song called *Les Biffins* at the end of the post). I don't recall any officer actually using the term outside the *Popote*, but NCOs would generally be very keen on using it any time they could.

190634[/snapback]

We often used 'ragman' in the USMC, but I am unsure of other usage. There is also the related 'scutman', a favorite of a well-read colonel I worked for a couple of times. But referring to other services and their branches, we already had an extensive vocabulary ready at hand!

 

Ed Gilbert, the army's arty have been in use as infantrymen for quite a while. 1st AD used its MLRS bn for BIAP security and in Jan04 its DivArty was given the zone vacated by 2nd Bde 82nd Abn in Baghdad. The three armored brigades used their attached arty bns from the outset as infantry, and they did raids, close quarters combat etc. The DivArty cdr told me that they trained themselves, using in-house talent [ranger or former SF trained etc], and did not rely on training by the inf bns that were already busy.

 

Don't know about disbanding rocket arty; ADA is gone from the divs, and must be reduced overall. 1-94th FA [their MLRS] continues in service with 1AD, but the div will likely be the last one out of Germany in 2006, and who knows what the CONUS units will do. Many thinkers are worried about the disappearance of the division structure and HQ, in a rush to get to brigades....

 

The USAF must be receiving bigtime lessons with a war on but no oppo air to focus upon. Nobody is tolerating hours and days to respond, and the 25-40 min to get air on station [best effort?] over Bag has been criticized as well.

 

Cheers, Ken

[EchoFiveMike]

The USAF must be receiving bigtime lessons with a war on but no oppo air to focus upon. Nobody is tolerating hours and days to respond, and the 25-40 min to get air on station [best effort?]over Bag has been criticized as well.

 

We were all puzzled. Medivac helos were a 5-10minute thing, but supersonic fixed wing took eternity. S/F...Ken M