WWII - Casualty rates in US infantry units

[LucaJJ]

This is, in fact, Mansoor's thesis, that the individual replacement system, despite obvious drawbacks vs. unit replacement, allowed the US Army to keep most of its divisions on the line, in continuous operations [not continuous combat], and this was essential because of the 90 [89] division program, which he does criticize. Thus, for the US, the replacement system works better than that of the Wehrmacht, which is worn down to a shadow.

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I find that interesting. Most of the writings one runs across (at least since I started reading about this sort of stuff 20 yrs ago) criticize the individual replacement system in the strongest terms, while praising unit manning.

 

I suppose it could be a case of unit manning achieving better peak efficiency but for a shorter time (then the unit has to be pulled back for a long while to reconstitute), while indiv. repl. is 'efficient' in keeping a unit more or less permanently operational. I suppose the Germans, who could not afford to pull units back, did end up with 'divisions' that were reinforced batallions. I would guess that in a VietNam-like situation unit mannign might have worked a bit better than reppledepple?

Edited May 26, 2005 by LucaJJ

[Jim Martin]

While I found Mansoor's book enjoyable and informative, I found that he contradicts himself in his critique of the 89 division program. On the one hand, he makes mention of the greatly overstressed logistics situation in the ETO after July 1944; the divisions already on the Continent could hardly be kept in beans and bullets. He then beats the US Army over the head for not having enough divisions in theater reserve to allow for an adequate rotational system. Which shall it be, Mr. Mansoor?

 

The US Army couldn't supply anymore divisions in the theater at the time of major combat operations, and that's why there weren't any additional divisions in theater. Pretty simple, really. We might have had a 200 division army, we still couldn't have put more boots on the ground "Over There"--at least put them over and then still kept them fed and moving.

 

This is, in fact, Mansoor's thesis, that the individual replacement system, despite obvious drawbacks vs. unit replacement, allowed the US Army to keep most of its divisions on the line, in continuous operations [not continuous combat], and this was essential because of the 90 [89] division program, which he does criticize. Thus, for the US, the replacement system works better than that of the Wehrmacht, which is worn down to a shadow.

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[ShotMagnet]

Most of the writings one runs across...criticize the individual replacement system...while praising unit manning.

 

I suppose it could be a case of unit manning achieving better peak efficiency but for a shorter time...while indiv. repl. is 'efficient' in keeping a unit more or less permanently operational. I suppose the Germans, who could not afford to pull units back, did end up with 'divisions' that were reinforced batallions. I would guess that in a VietNam-like situation unit mannign might have worked a bit better than reppledepple?

 

To some extent the nature of the conflict might dictate policy, but there are fundamental advantages to how the Wehrmacht handled replacements.

 

The parent unit was pulled from the line (where possible) when it fell below a threshold level (I remember reading that level as half-strength). Replacements were fed into the unit when the unit was pulled and refitted; they were trained with the unit at that stage and by the time the unit was again brought back to action the replacements had been given some time to learn from the vets, and the vets some time to develop some ties with the replacements.

 

Compared with how the US managed (still manages?) their replacement system and the former seems to make a lot more sense. Wehrmacht units also tried to clump individuals from the same region into the same units. I don't know if that helped, but by the same token it'd be as if everyone in your group were from, say, Atlanta or the San Francisco Bay Area. Hard to imagine it not working.

 

 

Shot

[BillB]

Well, the 82nd Airborne figures are broken out separately under ETO and MTO, you may not have noticed. Otherwise, there is always the question as to which units the army counted as organic to the airborne divisions. For instance, it is questionable whether or not the casualties of the parachute regiments of the 2nd PI Brigade that were attached to the 82nd and 101st in England (the 501st and 508th PIR) were included in the divisional counts or as separate units. Ditto the 506th PIR, which was only attached to the 101st until 1 March when it was assigned.

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Rich, fair one, I did indeed miss the ETO/MTO separation. Even so, the disparity between the 82nd and 101st seems pretty big given that both served virtually side by side from June 1944 onward. Ref the 2nd PI Brigade, is that an official designation? Doesn't ring any bells.

 

Richard Lindquist wrote:

Stanton has heavy casualties for the 17th Abn Div. Apparently they got fed into some meatgrinders after December 1944. 13th Abn Div had zero casualties.

 

 

Thanks for that, Richard. I assume the bulk of the 17th Airborne's casualties were incurred in the Ruhr fighting in 1945? Still pretty stiff, adding up to what, about half the division in five months.

 

all the best,

 

BillB

[Richard Lindquist]

Thanks for that, Richard. I assume the bulk of the 17th Airborne's casualties were incurred in the Ruhr fighting in 1945? Still pretty stiff, adding up to what, about half the division in five months.

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Their biggest operation seems to be an attack north of Bastogne to the Ourthe River in January 1945 as a part of the US counterattack to clear the Bulge.

[Ken Estes]

While I found Mansoor's book enjoyable and informative, I found that he contradicts himself in his critique of the 89 division program.  On the one hand, he makes mention of the greatly overstressed logistics situation in the ETO after July 1944; the divisions already on the Continent could hardly be kept in beans and bullets.  He then beats the US Army over the head for not having enough divisions in theater reserve to allow for an adequate rotational system.  Which shall it be, Mr. Mansoor? 

 

The US Army couldn't supply anymore divisions in the theater at the time of major combat operations, and that's why there weren't any additional divisions in theater.  Pretty simple, really.  We might have had a 200 division army, we still couldn't have put more boots on the ground "Over There"--at least put them over and then still kept them fed and moving.

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Hi Jim, I think Mansoor would say that the extra divisions would not have been on line, drawing more beans & bullets, but would have facilitated an in-theater rotation of divisions in/out of line, so that they would not have been so drained as they were. A division R&R and retraining in rear areas would presumably not tax the supply system so much. This rotation would mean that 28ID, licking its wounds after Schmidt, etc., would not have had to fight for its life in the Bulge battles so soon after, and all the divs could have performed at an even better combat potential, with vets and replacements having been integrated and reformed properly.

 

But mostly, as you saw, he is countering the Dupuy, inter alia, argument that the Germans did it better and were better in WWII infantry work.

 

best wishes for you, Ken

[Richard Lindquist]

Hi Jim, I think Mansoor would say that the extra divisions would not have been on line, drawing more beans & bullets, but would have facilitated an in-theater rotation of divisions in/out of line, so that they would not have been so drained as they were.

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Subsistence logistics (Class I, II, and VI) are very predictable and are required by units regardless of mission, area of deployment, or intensity of combat.

 

Combat logistics (Class II, IV, and V) are predictable to the extent that mission, area of deployment, and intensity of combat are predictable.

 

Technical logistics (Class VII and IX) are predictable only at the macro-level (i.e. tons) but are virtually unpredictable at the "each" level.

 

NOTE: Class VII requirments are somewhat affected by combat and that portion of Class IV requirements for construction and utilities are not combat related.

 

In other words, in or out of line, the only things that change for logistics are Class II (POL), Class V (Ammo), and Class IV (Fortification and obstacle). Troops have a nasty habit of needing to eat whether they are working or not.

[Colin Williams]

Their biggest operation seems to be an attack north of Bastogne to the Ourthe River in January 1945 as a part of the US counterattack to clear the Bulge.

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Reading between the lines in some books I have the impression that the 17th in its first battles paid the price for having all that paratrooper enthusiasm without the leavening of combat experience.

[FormerBlue]

Most of the writings one runs across...criticize the individual replacement system...while praising unit manning.

 

Compared with how the US managed (still manages?) their replacement system and the former seems to make a lot more sense. Wehrmacht units also tried to clump individuals from the same region into the same units. I don't know if that helped, but by the same token it'd be as if everyone in your group were from, say, Atlanta or the San Francisco Bay Area. Hard to imagine it  not working.

Shot

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The downside to this, as seen in the US CW and by the Germans in WW2, is a particularly grim battle will result in the denuding of entire town's young men.

 

Sullivan brothers was a very big story in WW2 here; it was even the theme of a pretty popular song recently (Caroline's Spine). I sometimes wonder which towns in German really took it in the shorts at Stalingrad. With so few returnees after the war from that battle some villages must have received a very sad realization that "they ain't coming home."

 

Some of the US NG units took hits early in the war while still having regional based composition:

http://www.proviso.k12.il.us/Bataan%20Web/men_of_192.htm

 

Editing in the hopes that I've fixed that runaway quote mark.

Edited May 28, 2005 by FormerBlue

[Richard Lindquist]

The downside to this, as seen in the US CW and by the Germans in WW2, is a particularly grim battle will result in the denuding of entire town's young men.

 

Sullivan brothers was a very big story in WW2 here; it was even the theme of a pretty popular song recently (Caroline's Spine).  I sometimes wonder which towns in German really took it in the shorts at Stalingrad.  With so few returnees after the war from that battle some villages must have received a very sad realization that "they ain't coming home."

 

Some of the US NG units took hits early in the war while still having regional based composition:

http://www.proviso.k12.il.us/Bataan%20Web/men_of_192.htm

 

Editing in the hopes that I've fixed that runaway quote mark.

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The town of Bedford, Virginia lost twenty or so men in the D-Day landings and the first week afterwards. They were all in one company of the 29th Division. There is a National D-Day memorial constructed in Bedford.

[Ken Estes]

Hi Richard,

I would say class III (fuels, POL) and V were the warstoppers in the ETO, not rations. We can run around and say that troops in training consume fuel and ammo also. But I think Mansoor has a point.

Edited May 29, 2005 by Ken Estes

[KingSargent]

Hi Richard,

I would say class III (fuels, POL) and V were the warstoppers in the ETO, not rations. We can run around and say that troops in training consume fuel and ammo also. But I think Mansoor has a point.

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Having the divisions available to allow rotation into and out of the line would have been nice, but Jim has a good point: ALL the divisions had to be shipped over from the US. Given that the logistics services were operating at pretty much maximum capacity (whether they could have been more efficient is another debate), I don't see how more divisions could have been fed into theater even if available.

 

Of course the allocations to theaters could have been changed - it would have been possible to get more divisions into NWE by reducing MTO and PTO commitments - as was in fact done for DRAGOON.

[Richard Lindquist]

Having the divisions available to allow rotation into and out of the line would have been nice, but Jim has a good point: ALL the divisions had to be shipped over from the US. Given that the logistics services were operating at pretty much maximum capacity (whether they could have been more efficient is another debate), I don't see how more divisions could have been fed into theater even if available.

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Instead of shipping divisions, McNair should have broken the infantry regiments up into independent battalions and combat commands. With nine independent infantry battalions in each division, the worst hit battalions could be exchanged for full-up battalions. They could also have used colored infantry battalions in white divisions under that scheme as well. The shot up battalions could either be reconstituted in theater or rotated back to the states for reconstitution with new draftees and OCS grads then trained up and brought back over.

[Jim Martin]

Every truck which brings beans to a unit in Theater Reserve is a truck not bringing POL, ammo and beans to a unit on the line. Not to mention that if you're going to do it "right", units in Theater Reserve would be absorbing replacements, and you'd be holding live fire exercises and weapons training with said (undertrained) replacements, further straining supplies. (edit here: I don't think the problem was ever really supplies, but the means to move them from the beach.) The problem wasn't just enough divisions to rotate into the line, but the need to train replacements in weapons and tactics. For that you may not need combat allotments of POL and ammo, but you need those things.

[Richard Lindquist]

Every truck which brings beans to a unit in Theater Reserve is a truck not bringing POL, ammo and beans to a unit on the line.  Not to mention that if you're going to do it "right", units in Theater Reserve would be absorbing replacements, and you'd be holding live fire exercises and weapons training with said (undertrained) replacements, further straining supplies. (edit here:  I don't think the problem was ever really supplies, but the means to move them from the beach.)  The problem wasn't just enough divisions to rotate into the line, but the need to train replacements in weapons and tactics.  For that you may not need combat allotments of POL and ammo, but you need those things.

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Locate the separate battalions undergoing refit near the ports. Class I is only 6 pounds per man per day. POL for an infantry battalion is pretty much for the kitchens and for admin runs. Training ammo is mostly small arms which is light. You don't need to fire the mortars than much in retraining an infantry battalion. It is mostly crew drill.

[KingSargent]

Instead of shipping divisions, McNair should have broken the infantry regiments up into independent battalions and combat commands.  With nine independent infantry battalions in each division, the worst hit battalions could be exchanged for full-up battalions.  They could also have used colored infantry battalions in white divisions under that scheme as well.  The shot up battalions could either be reconstituted in theater or rotated back to the states for reconstitution with new draftees and OCS grads then trained up and brought back over.

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Good idea, but you've still got to get them there. Leaving divisions back and just sending the infantry bns leaves fewer divisions on line (albeit with more infantry). So you get fuller bns but fewer divisions for the same amount of shipping.

Besides, the training was done by the division from a cadre drawn from an older division; to train separate bns would have messed up the training program, which was messed up enough by the drafts for replacements. It would have meant an entirely different sort of training program, with more Branch Schools and less 'hiving divisions off of older divisions'.

[Bob Lyle]

This is, in fact, Mansoor's thesis, that the individual replacement system, despite obvious drawbacks vs. unit replacement, allowed the US Army to keep most of its divisions on the line, in continuous operations [not continuous combat], and this was essential because of the 90 [89] division program, which he does criticize. Thus, for the US, the replacement system works better than that of the Wehrmacht, which is worn down to a shadow.

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If so, I think he is overstating his point. By 1945 we were "scraping the bottom" of the personel barrel. According to my Father (who lost his essential worker defermentv in 44) we were drafting men in their 30s and non-essential Army Air Corp personnel found themselves in an Infantry replacement depot.

The high casualty rates among FNG was an inseperable part of Individual Replacement, and would have been unsupportable if the war had gone on much longer.

[History Buff]

Instead of shipping divisions, McNair should have broken the infantry regiments up into independent battalions and combat commands.  With nine independent infantry battalions in each division, the worst hit battalions could be exchanged for full-up battalions.  They could also have used colored infantry battalions in white divisions under that scheme as well.  The shot up battalions could either be reconstituted in theater or rotated back to the states for reconstitution with new draftees and OCS grads then trained up and brought back over.

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What if the divisions had remained rectangular, with adjustments for motorization, rather than been cut to triangular configuration? Would that have helped a division's staying power and allowed it to place bn's in reserve to refit and retrain?

[KingSargent]

What if the divisions had remained rectangular, with adjustments for motorization, rather than been cut to triangular configuration?  Would that have helped a division's staying power and allowed it to place bn's in reserve to refit and retrain?

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The rectangular division was an answer to WW1 trench warfare. The idea was to attack on a one-regiment front, then feed in the second regiment of the brigade through the first, then the first of the second brigade, etc. There would usually be breakthrough from this pounding for the last regiment to exploit.

 

Unless they were going to leave out the Brigade HQs and just have four rgts under Division, you end up with too many HQs. But you would also end up with all four rgts on the line, not one back. Give a Division CO a regiment and he will use it.

 

Something that would have helped would have been the German 'ersatz'(?) bn, which was a replacement intake bn for the division that usually had an example of each weapon the division used and a cadre that introduced the FNGs to the division (chain of command, organization - the Germans had so many TOEs that it was rare to have two divisions alike). So the FNG had at least a little orientation. Of course when the excrement got deep, the ersatz went into the line and that system collapsed too.

[History Buff]

The rectangular division was an answer to WW1 trench warfare.

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That's why I said with adjustments for motorization, which should have aided mobility. Triangular divisions only had about 6500 men at the pointy end, another regiment on line and one in reserve would have been welcome, I'd think and would have helped out with the thin, wide frontages many divisions had to cope with during the fall/winter of 44/45.

 

I'm agreed on the deletion of the 2 brigade HQ's. Of course, given the manpower allocation and classification of AGF troops coupled with the WMB stand on the size of the army, we're lucky to have fielded the divisions we did.

Edited May 30, 2005 by History Buff

[Wyvern75]

The problem in WWII was the Division staffs (and especially the commanders) had problems controlling and directing combat. A lot of this had to do with communications.

 

A lot of WWII vets (who were on Regimental Staffs and some of whom became General Officers later on) think that the Regiments were what kept the Divisions going in some of the roughest times.

 

Independent Battalions while sounding good, would have been chewed up just as fast and perhaps more so. A lot of the Battalions and Regiments by November '44 were commanded by men who had been company commanders at Normandy.

[Ken Estes]

Some odds & ends:

 

Army Ground Forces (AGF - McNair's cmd] responded to the replacement problem in late 1943 by stripping 35,249 men from divisions then training in the US. Despite the training disruption, this was repeated between Apr-Sept44: 91,747 men from 22 divs still in training, average 4170 ea., corresponding to 60% of the infantry in each div.

 

The Bulge brought the final manpower crisis to the US Army. Two divisions scheduled to arrive in the ETO in December were ordered to the front, but only the 75th was sent immediately, as the 66th lost over 800 men when a U-boat sank their transport in the Channel!

 

20 Dec SHAEF ordered 2000 privates stripped from 42, 63, 70th ID [6th Army Group] for the 3rd Army. Their infantry regiments had been shipped early from the US without the divisional components in order to compensate for infantry shortages. The weakened rgts [augmented by artillerymen, signalmen and QMs] served with other divs in the 7th Army, allowing some rotation out of the line there. Dec 25, SHAEF orders stripping 25% of the inf regts of 69ID, newly arrived from the US, for use as replacements.

 

Ike requested more divisions from Marshall, and the JCS released three of the last four held in reserve: 71, 86, 97th [including my 30 yr old father, married with one kid, just drafted] which had been earmarked for the Pacific. Also in that decision came the 13th Abn, 16th and 20th ArmDivs.

 

Belatedly, SHAEF ordered in January that casuals [hospital discharges] be returned to their units vice the ETO manpower pool. 4462 black soldeirs from segregated support units volunteers for infantry duty, forming segregated inf platoons in almost 50 inf companies in the ETO.

 

By end Jan45, the crises in manpower and logistics were over. Antwerp port was open and the reinforced and refurbished US divisions would conduct an "American Blitzkrieg' in Germany over the succeeding 4 months.

 

--- most of the above from Mansoor.

[phip]

Hi. I just joined. To put a more personal face on your discussion, I'd like to mention two of my friends. One was in the 4th Inf Div (US). He joined the division in the hedgerow country and stayed until April, 1945. Going into the Huertgen Forest, he was a squad leader in a full strength platoon. Coming out, he was the platoon leader. Only 3 of the originally assigned troops (including him) were still present. The platoon had gone through essentially 3 full-platoon replacements during the battle. Another friend was an air force clerk stationed in Fla. He was pulled out, given 6 wks of inf tng, and joined the 3d Inf Div in Jan, 1945. He stayed with the division until he went home in 1946. He knew some other guys who were former air force who had as little as 1 week of actual tng.

[Bob Lyle]

Hi. I just joined. To put a more personal face on your discussion, I'd like to mention two of my friends. One was in the 4th Inf Div (US). He joined the division in the hedgerow country and stayed until April, 1945. Going into the Huertgen Forest, he was a squad leader in a full strength platoon. Coming out, he was the platoon leader. Only 3 of the originally assigned troops (including him) were still present. The platoon had gone through essentially 3 full-platoon replacements during the battle. Another friend was an air force clerk stationed in Fla. He was pulled out, given 6 wks of inf tng, and joined the 3d Inf Div in Jan, 1945. He stayed with the division until he went home in 1946. He knew some other guys who were former air force who had as little as 1 week of actual tng.

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This confirms what my father found, talking to fellow veterans after the war. I saw one report where infantry leaders in 1945 were asked to describe the service of their "most valuable" enlisted men and NCOs. The average battlefield experience for these treoops averaged six weeks for the EM and six months for the NCOs.

The Huertigan forest demonstrates the problems with rotating battalions. If you rotate a battalion at 30% casualties (which would be 50% or higher in ruifle squads) a Divisional commander could easily hav 4 or 5 battalions doing refit. But if Regimental Comat Teams were considered interchangable parts, in somplace like the Heurtigan a Division might have had 10 different regiments assigned, 3 at a time. Figure four regiments per division average, 1/4 doing refit, half in "quiet" sectors, 1/4 in active combat.

Divisional commander would hate having ro deal with a new set of Colonels every two weeks in a "meat grinder", and it would be a lot harder to move 20 RCT than 20.000 repolacements but something had to be done. Maybe it would have given them a better "gut level" understanding of when operations where costing more than they were worth.

[Richard Lindquist]

This confirms what my father found, talking to fellow veterans after the war.  I saw one report where infantry leaders in 1945 were asked to describe the service of their "most valuable" enlisted men and NCOs.  The average battlefield experience for these treoops averaged six weeks for the EM and six months for the NCOs.

The Huertigan forest demonstrates the problems with rotating battalions.  If you rotate a battalion at 30% casualties (which would be 50% or higher in ruifle squads) a Divisional commander could easily hav 4 or 5 battalions doing refit.  But if Regimental Comat Teams were considered interchangable parts, in somplace like the Heurtigan a Division might have had 10 different regiments assigned, 3 at a time.  Figure four regiments per division average, 1/4 doing refit, half in "quiet" sectors, 1/4 in active combat.

Divisional commander would hate having ro deal with a new set of Colonels every two weeks in a "meat grinder", and it would be a lot harder to move 20 RCT than 20.000 repolacements but something had to be done.  Maybe it would have given them a better "gut level" understanding of when operations where costing more than they were worth.

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If they eliminated the regimental echelon and kept the brigade echelon, the Div CG would be dealing with the same subordinates. Once the brigade CO (BG or COL??) got used to having battalions come and go, he would be OK. Most of the casualties were in the rifle battalions and they could be rtoated more easily since they had little in the way of impedimenta. Only the infantry had replacement problems.