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Through out the 20th century, in the context of warfare, it seems that there have been competing philosophies on how to lead, train, and equip armed forces to allow them to emerge victorious. Broadly speaking, the (conscious or unconscious) philosophies can be categorized as either "All-Out Quality" or "Just Good Enough". These are the two extremes, and most armies would seem to fall somewhere in the middle. The All-Out Quality camp seeks to have the most superbly-led, most-intensively trained, best-equipped forces available, even at often (much) greater expense, in order to dominate on the battlefield - and ultimately, of course, win wars. This camp seeks to have the most favorable exchange ratios possible, and recognizes that quality is what counts in trying to achieve this. The lives of soldiers, and their equipment, are seen as valuable and non-expendable. The All-Out Quality philosophy is what soldiers and their direct commanders would want practiced, in order to give them the best chance of survival and battlefield victory. It's what most civilians believe is the system implemented by their armed services, so that their loved ones can come home safe. Examples of the All-out Quality mind-set include the all-volunteer British Army of the pre- and early World War One era, the all-volunteer U.S., British, and Australian armed services of today, most major NATO powers' armed services (ex. Germany, France), the Israeli full-time regular army, the German armed services pre-1944, and broadly the German land armies throughout World War 2. Then there's the camp of "Just Good Enough". The main thing that characterizes this philosophy, whether it is conscious or not, is the concept that there is a point of diminishing returns, and to have quality and performance beyond that point is too expensive and too wasteful. It recognizes and (maybe unconsciously, maybe indeed purposely) accepts that the leadership, training and equipment that such an army fields is, man-for-man and weapon-for-weapon, inferior to what it might otherwise field under the "All-Out Quality" mind-set. It's not necessarily the case that the given army and the nation behind it cannot produce better quality, but more often that it chooses not to. It chooses to settle for "Just Good Enough" to get the job done, and thereby realizes large or even massive cost savings in doing so. In the "Just Good Enough" style of raising armies, the "80% solution" is chosen over the "100% solution" when it comes to training and equipment. It treats its equipment and even its personnel as ultimately expendable, and believes that it's better to simply produce more equipment and raise yet more fresh troops, rather than suffer the expense of superb troops with superb equipment. If, for example, its soldiers and weapons-systems suffer disproportionate losses when it comes up against an enemy practicing "All-Out Quality", it accepts that as inevitable, and simply trains more men, and produces more weapons. Most soldiers and their direct superiors would not want to feel that their army has stinted on their training and their equipment, and would not appreciate the thought that they were expendable and replaceable. They would want the very best their nation's industry and training system had to offer. "100% solutions" as it were. But the "Just Good Enough" mind-set has won wars, most notably World War 2. Allied and Soviet armor was not up to German standards, but were (just barely) good enough. They were also produced in overwhelming quantities. Allied and Soviet AFV crews were similarly not as intensively trained as their German counterparts. Throughout the war, until near the very end, the Germans had an over-all quality edge in terms of the "human factors" - leadership, training and tactics. The Allies' human factors were "Just Good Enough". Not that "Just Good Enough" was universal in the Allied services. I would characterize Anglo-American Air Forces and Naval Forces as practicing All-Out Quality, while their armies were in the camp of Just Good Enough. The Soviets, on the other hand, were firmly in the camp of Just Good Enough through-out their armed services. It should be noted that the Soviet victory was the most resounding of all, achieved against the arch-practitioner of All-Out Quality, Germany. Examples of the "Just Good Enough" style of fielding armies would include the American draftee army of the Vietnam era, (possibly) the Soviet Army during the Cold War, the Soviet armed services of World War 2, and the Anglo-American land armies, again of World War 2. My question is this: Is there something to my characterization and summary of these competing philosophies, or am I simply seeing patterns of military behavior which in actuality don't exist? Is there, in fact, some point of diminishing returns to quality, such as would justify purposely choosing not to avail oneself of its advantages? In expeditionary warfare, it's clear that "All-Out Quality" is king. Spare no expense, and make sure your troops are the best-led, best-trained and best-equipped they can possibly be. The War on Terror, the Wars for regime change, and so forth, fall under the heading of Expeditionary Warfare. But what of the case of a very large, very long war? Is "All-Out Quality" still king, or is there a case for "Just Good Enough"?