FALightFighter

When this link comes back, it should have some relevant info. https://ahec.armywarcollege.edu/documents/Learning-the-Lessons.pdf

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AFEHRI/documents/EnlistedHistory/wsimon.pdf https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCH/Marine-Corps-History-Summer-2021/Marine-Corps-Boot-Camp-during-World-War-II-The-Gateway-to-the-Corps-Success-at-Iwo-Jima-MCH-Vol-7-Number-1-Summer-2021/ https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/HistorianPamphlet-ver-04.pdf

Thanks!

@RichTO90, what is SWB?

I’m not sure that the meanings haven’t changed since WWII, but today the levels of affiliation are (my words, not the doctrinal definition): organic- intrinsically part of the unit, always present or the unit doesn’t exist assigned- permanently part of the units structure (for example you’ll see in lineages that whatever battalion is assigned to whichever BCT, but we can, and do, restructure BCTs, like we are currently doing with cavalry squadrons and engineer battalions) attached- long term but not permanent part of the unit operational control- short term part of the unit but really remain part of parent unit tactical control- under direction of the unit for a specific activity Unless one of the lower command relationships is designated, you have that inclusively (for instance, you have operational and tactical control of attached units unless they are directed somewhere else. Using this structure, I think that you are talking about organic trucks- trucks that are on the table of equipment for that artillery battery or battalion (for most of WWII, battalion was the highest fixed organization in the field artillery, with brigades or groups consisting of only the headquarters and a variable number/type of assigned or attached battalions. But you may also be talking about quartermaster truck units attached, opcon, tacon, or supporting the field artillery units.

Not comrades, temporary partners of convenience, at best. We stayed in Afghan about 20 years and 6mos too long, and spent all of that time pretending that somehow we could apply the veneer of civilization over an uncivilized culture, without trying to force real cultural change.

Is ASEAN a threat to the US in some way? Looking at their charter, https://asean.org/asean-charter/, it seems like ASEAN would be a concern for SECSTATE, not SECDEF, no?

For a more positive outlook, try “The End of the World Is Only the Beginning” by Zeihan. It get’s pretty ugly for the next 15-20 years, but the US (augmented by close physical, commercial, and cultural connections to Mexico and western Canada, as well as special relationships with UK, Australia, and Japan) is one of the best positioned places to recover. Sweden-Poland, Turkey, and Uzbekistan are also potentials. China, sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and some other areas look to be even worse off. i guess we’ll see, in time.

There must be some sort of objective truth, or there’s no point in even communicating. It’s the same mindset that attempts to justify violent responses to (e.g.) mansplaining and other “micro aggressions”, or equates sexual harassment with sexual assault (no, I’m not trying for cross-thread points). Look, if you are about to be assaulted, you are legally (and morally, FWIW) justified in responding with violence. Harassment, not so much. Back on topic, point to the “attack” on Russia, by whatever proxy you want to use for “the West” (since that is not a discrete entity that can take actions in this world). EVERY SINGLE THING you can point out is either (a) a direct response to Russian provocations or (b) innocuous actions in the business of diplomacy that fail to justify a violent response (ergo, not an ”attack”), or (in many cases) both. Despite what @Stuart Galbraith(and probably others) thinks, I am not an appeaser. I’m also NOT in favor of starting WW3. But parroting the Russian propaganda line, including deliberately misusing the word “attack” (regardless of whatever delusion Putin lives under) isn’t useful, either. Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor. Al Qaddafi attacked the US on 9/11. Iraq attacked Kuwait in 1990. The US-led/UN-sanctioned coalition attacked Iraq in 1991. The US attacked Iraq (with UNSC blessing) in 2003. Russia attacked Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and Ukraine in 2021. “The West” (or even reasonable proxies) have NOT attacked Russia, at least before the invasion of Ukraine.

That’s one of the more stupid comments I’ve seen here- and thats saying A LOT!!

At this point, we have no idea what actually happened, so your statement is AT BESTa rush to judgment, if not just utter asshattery. So some potential possibilities: - if the IFF or the missile malfunctioned, why should anyone get fired? - if the pilots turned their IFF off for some reason, who should get fired? - if the O2/3 and E6 in the CIC made a bad choice in the face of overwhelming “clutter” of incoming and returning aircraft, who should get fired? I’m sure you can come up with some other possibilities, right? Unless there is something explicit in the way the crew was prepared, the CNO is kind of out of it. The captains of the ships are closer to the scene, and much more likely to have been in position to influence the action yesterday directly, but plenty of possibilities where something happened completely out of their control. Your ignorance of the people actually involved is shown by the fact 5hat you left off USCENTCOM, NAVCENT, and the fleet and task force commanders, although I guess you covered that with “anyone else…”, although USCENTCOM is not in the Navy, so….

An armored brigade is closer to 5000, and there are 2 of them, plus an air assault brigade of similar size and an aviation brigade, BEFORE we start talking about the Stryker, Airborne, Field Artillery and Aviation brigades already stationed in Europe. We’ve already plowed the ground of your (intentional) misunderstanding that dated website, that was only talking about one operation, not all of USAREUR-AF. And I’ll address your complaints about USAREUR-AF, too, since it’s just pissing and moaning. Throughout the ColdWar, the US had only one combatant command (USEUCOM, the four-star joint command) for all of Europe and Africa. Its service component commands (not just Army, but Navy, Air Force and USMC, too) were likewise responsible for both continents. In ~2005, we created a new combatant command, USAFRICOM, but only the Army created a separate service component command. Recently, we recombined the separate Army service component headquarters, returning to the exact same situation we had through the Cold War for the Army service components. But somehow, because you’re having a bad spell or want to snivel and whine, that’s now a problem. I don’t think we have 11 divisions “ready for Europe”, so stop changing my words and moving the goalposts. What I actually said was that 11 of 12 ACTIVE US divisions are on NATO soil, since you erroneously claimed that we only have one there. US is NATO, asI consistently corrected my peers on two different NATO assignments that spoke as if NATO is some external entity that we were helping instead of something we are an original component of. Your last paragraph goes back to your fundamental misunderstanding of how things work.Whats important is the sustainment and C2 infrastructure to support the corps, not the combat troops. It took so long in the Middle East in 1990 precisely because that infrastructure didn’t exist, and it was a field army of three corps (2 Army and 1 USMC), not a corps. And the theater army, corps and sustainment command in Europe already have much of that infrastructure in place, we’re just talking moving the combat troops. And since you decided to bring up corps now, let’s talk about that. Is there any European country that can even field a corps, with all the required corps troops? I don’t think so. Outside the US, NATO has these cute little “multinational corps” that are barely a headquarters for several divisions- no corps level troops, ADA, field artillery, sustainment, signal, logistics, engineer, military police, etc, etc ad nauseum.

You really are delusional, aren’t you. Your 4 brigade count is a dog’s breakfast of the two BCTs stationed in Europe and trying to lump FA and ADA (I think, but it may be aviation instead of one of them) with them while ignoring the three rotational BCTs, two rotational DIVARTYs, a rotational aviation brigade, and the rest of the infrastructure that is FAR more important to the theater than combat units. Yes, I stand by my 11 division statement. The only US division that can’t deploy to Europe is the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. The 25th is unlikely to do so, but even the 11th Airborne in Alaska has exercised in NATO. And that’s just active duty- I didn’t include the 8 National Guard divisions. I’ll ask again, in all seriousness, are you ok?

In all seriousness, are you ok? Because you seem to be having a tough time grasping reality. You do realize that the video you posted was ~2-1/2 years old, and the most recent update to the articles beside it was more than 18mos ago, right? I’m not going to do all of your research for you, but I think the current and next Armored BCT rotations, heel-to-toe rotations (meaning no gaps between units, or continuous presence), are 3/1Armored Division, which replaced 3/4Infantry Division this week (https://www.army.mil/article/281756/the_1st_armored_divisions_bulldog_brigade_assumes_authority_from_task_force_iron_in_poland) and 1/3Infantry Division, which will deploy in January (https://coastalcourier.com/news/3rd-ids-1st-brigade-head-back-europe-early-next-year/). I couldn’t quickly determine who 1/3ID is replacing, but I’m sure you can with a little googling. That’s two armored BCTs exactly what’s shown in your picture that you didn’t bother to read. Blah blah blah. “Divisional commands”? Do you mean Divisions? Let’s be precise. You looked at the picture that shows 6 (not 4-5) two-star headquarters (note, not divisions), and the started babbling about “logistics and communications troops. One seems to control intelligence equipment. One is an air defence unit. One is made up of light infantry and a Strike Brigade” while ignoring the two divisions that are actually important to your argument. Yes, they are rotational- we’re deploying trained units, without the distraction of dependents, to deter and exercise. I’m not going to concede, because you are flat out wrong. I don’t know if your stupid, crazy, or just contrary and obtuse, but you’re flat out wrong. Again, you’re just wrong. The Estonian land forces field a rump division, with two brigades and only 4 active and two reserve infantry battalions. Your own picture, if you had bothered to count, shows 4 armored battalions, 2 Bradley battalions, 3 Stryker battalions, and 5 infantry battalions (either air assault or airborne). Not3 I’m only counting what is actually in Europe, not the third airborne battalion that is a national guard unit. So, 4th grade math, 14 battalions vs 6. You’re comparison is just silly. I’m only challenging the bullshit you’re throwing around. I’m a professional, and know exactly what we have. And realize that the sustainment infrastructure is WAY more important than combat troops, which we can deploy fairly rapidly should the need arise. But only effectively if the support infrastructure is in place. All this is just more blah blah blah bullshit. You’re free to take a look at the facts and form your own opinion. But don’t get the facts wrong when you make your assessment. I’m not following any narrative, just looking at facts and correcting you’re skewed analysis.

Your picture appears mostly correct as far as I can tell from open source reporting. Unfortunately, you don’t seem to have any idea how to interpret it. There’s a division headquarters with 2 armored brigades, division artillery, and combat aviation brigade in Poland.Thats about 15,000 troops. There’s an additional division headquarters, with a infantry brigade and a division artillery in Romania, about 4,000 troops. In addition to the two brigades permanently stationed in Europe, you have 2 armored brigades, 2 infantry brigades, and a Stryker brigade, about 25,000 troops in maneuver brigades. For all your blather, I don’t think anyone but maybe Poland could maintain that many troops deployed. And that doesn’t count anything not deployed, including mobilized reservists. My point on reservists is not that you were counting reservists unfairly, but that counting reservists who live and work in Florida as “deployed in” Florida is stupid. They live there, and can be mobilized and deployed as required.