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Richard Lindquist

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About Richard Lindquist

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    Purveyor of flints to General Washington
  • Birthday 05/31/1939

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    Lighthouse Point, FL, USA
  • Interests
    military hardware, military history

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  1. Thank you, guys. This was the big 8-0 meaning that I was born before Adolph marched in Poland. I haven't been poating here for a while because i got turned off by the six or seven steps needed to get past the security blocks. Now that it seems more open, I have a backlog of topics that I would like to raise and I will become a more frequent poster.
  2. In WWII, they were more valuable for resupply and bringing in reinforcements than to be used as APCs. The weapons versions were used ashore, but their thin skins made them very vulnerable. Siince you would need them for the next landing after this one, you didn't want to waste them.
  3. Simpson and Patch were quiet, but very competent. They also didn't burn thru corps and division commanders like Hodges and Bradley did. Patton gave his commanders some slack too.
  4. Hodges competes with Buckner for the title of the most mediocre US field army commander of WWII (Hodges, Patton, Clark, Krueger, Patch, Eichelberger, Simpson, and Buckner)
  5. Getting all-wheel drive vehicles into the field in quantity was hampered by a lack of high volume gear cutting machine tools. Prior to the war, it was a boutique specialty and no one had planned for quantity production. This was especially true for the "super-heavy" trucks (4 ton and up) for which there had been little planning. As a result, the CCKW were badly overloaded and mistreated trying to substitute for the heavier trucks in line haul. 2
  6. Yep, very well put. Oh, they did "improvise" quite a bit, from contracting the Seatrain to get Sherman tanks shipped to Egypt, to converting oilers to LST (albeit that was a RN suggestion). The problem arose from laying out plans based on Army specs and then having the Army change the specs after the ships (and bridges - the Engineers had the same problem) were built. So you have improvisations in order to get ZEBRA across European Baileys and head-scratching moments in order to get the T26 to fit through the LCT and LST and over the ramps. The problem was that adding propellant what
  7. I presumed that it was supposed to shoot the same 106×607mmR as the M40 RR. So no extra long case mouth and the gases have to somehow must be vented out to the rear as well. If you look at the drawing, the gases are vented out and up simialr to a Brit Burney Gun.
  8. Um, the "power train" in the M4A2 and M4A4 were brand new designs, although the engines were COTS. The "power train" in the M4A3 was completely new beginning in 1940, when Henry Ford cleverly stole the plans for the Merlin and re-engineered it. Only the "power train" in the M4 and M4A1 was "1930ies" and that was from late 1938. Meanwhile, if suspension defines age of design, doesn't that mean any vehicle with a solid axle is roughly a 2500 year old design? If the Ford GAA had not dropped by chance into the Army's lap (they only got it because the Air Corps didn't want it) the Sherman fl
  9. Even in 1970 there was no pressing reason to replace the M1911A1. Very few of them got used more than 100-200 rounds a year and many even less. When the PDW program began, Sionics Corp was pushing their Ingram Model 10 Submachinegun in 9mm (auto and semiauto selector) for tankers, crew-served weapons crewmen, and company medics. They also offered the Model 10 in .45 cal. They said if needed, they could make the smaller Model 11 in 9mm Kurz (.380) as an alternative for staff officers. They had a traveling circus to sell it and I set up their demo at the Ft Lee range for our agency. After
  10. Not unusual. Sometimes there was a mistake made and units landed on the wrong beach. Sometimes recon elements or the first wave found a beach unsuitable (for a variety of reasons) and subsequent echelons were diverted to an alternate beach.
  11. Then again maybe he doesn't.....at least he seems to get a lot of basic facts wrong about the MHS program and makes some false assumptions as this article points out: http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2017/07/09/mhs-failure-sig-vs-glock-depth-analysis/ Reading the comments also reveals a lot of interesting background info about the original 1983 XM9 program The XM9 program began in 1970. I was at the original meeting at Ft Benning for what was then known as the Personal Defense System (PDS).
  12. Uh, yes, there were 78, but that is ony part of the story. Of those, 7 SP and 1 towed were in the MTO for 6 infantry and 1 armored division. Another 2 towed and 4 SP were in the Pacific for 18 divisions (and 1 more about to deploy). In the ETO there were 22 SP and 8 towed for 15 infantry divisions, 4 armored divisions, and 2 airborne divisions...all well and good. The remaining 18 SP and 16 towed were in CONUS, along with all the rest of the divisions - 41 of them...and the divisions were deploying faster than the TD battalions were getting ready. On top of that, the ETO resisted towed battali
  13. And yes, attachments for TDs made sense. In the same way, it was decided that a specialized "jungle" division for the Pacific made little practical sense, which was good since it allowed standard divisions to go to either theater with little advance notice. OTOH, while MacArthur's divisions did not need TDs on a daily basis, it turned out that the ETO and MTO divisions did benefit from regular attachment...the problem was that not enough were available, just as enough tank battalions weren't available, because it was believed the pooling principle would obviate the need for a one-to-one ratio
  14. McNair gets a lot of flak, especially since Ordnance got to tell its side of the story, which was very self-serving, and he didn't. Even most of his statements get taken out of context. His famous "Certainly it is poor economy to use a $35,000 medium tank to destroy another tank when the job can be done by a gun costing a fraction as much." is often used to denigrate his recommendation to organize towed tank destroyers in January 1943, which takes it 18 months out of context. He aid that on 17 July 1941 at the conclusion of the Third Antitank Conference. He was there because he had basically w
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