Meyer

Actually, the raid on Berlin of March 6, 1944 was even costlier (and there's a mistake in the Wiki article on the Schweinfurt's raid losses, there were seven "cat E" bomber losses, not seventeen) with 69 bomber lost, plus 6 scrapped and 347 damaged, and over 700 casualties among the bomber crews.

But everyone knows that isn't because Germany lacked ability to bomb strategically.... Good one. Now, wonder why the British went for the 20mm.... As I've already told you, bombers were not classified as tactic/strategic. And a B-17 performing a CAS mission was just as tough as when bombing Berlin from 25k ft. tankerwanabe: not true for the 20mm, as they were already in service in 1939 in the 109 E-3. Cannons were installed because MGs were lacking, specially against bombers, but the pre-war bombers. The Germans, as the British, went straight from small caliber MG to 20mm for their fighters, the 13mm that appeared later was meant to replace the 7.92mm where cannons couldn't be installed.

And it was "easy" for the British and the Americans (specially the latter) to focus on strategic bombing campaigns, compared to the Germans, for whom a defeat on a ground battle could have catastrophic consequences. The strategic situation of Germany was desperate from September 3, 1939, till the end of the war with the only (relative) safe year between the 1940 armistice and the start of Barbarossa. During most of that period the Lw focus was on the campaign against the British war industry/economy. In fact, one could argue that the problem during the BoB was that the Lw was too strategic, as it switched to a strategic campaign a little too soon (before achieving air superiority). The fact remains that the RAF, even the Bomber Command, when the British were feeling more directly threatened (but safer than Germany who didn't have a channel to rely on), flew very few, compared with other types, strategic bombing missions before 1941.

This is not my argument, and (as mentioned) never said "awesome". It's all in your head. The pretty good (and best of the world, yes I'm saying this) strategic capability of the Lw prior 1942: 1. wasn't used (other that some isolated strategic missions) in 39/40 because it was a better idea to, first, gain air superiority and then support the army in the decisive battles. Again, looks like it was a good strategy. 2. Russian campaign: it was not used in 41/42 not because a lack of capability or doctrine, but because the choice was to support the army. Later, in 1944, when a decision was taken to start a bombing campaign against the Soviet industry, and the forces assembled, the ground situation prevented to the campaign to take place. The lack of relevance in the result of the war had nothing to do with the capabilities of the Allies bombing force. 3. The strategic bombing campaign against Britain lasted only 8 months, not enough time to achieve much, and yes, if faced a better opposition. Now, imagine the 70% of the RAF committed to other fronts, another AF as strong as the 8th AAF attacking the island by day, and the Lw focused in the night bombing as the first priority for some years, and I think it could have done a LOT of damage. I didn't ignore that the allies surpassed the strategic capabilities of the Lw, in fact I acknowledge it. And that argument is incorrect, the Lw was prepared to mount a strategic campaign, but that doesn't mean that it was a good idea. I have no idea what that supposed to mean. Anyway, the revenge attacks were not intended to impact warmaking capability, but to deter the enemy to continue with the attacks against the civilian population. And they failed at that, for many reasons (such as the few forces committed), but fundamentally that the British were fully committed to the area attacks.

Actually, those divisions did not have more Pz. battalions than the rest of the armored divisions, the difference was mostly in the infantry (three infantry battalions in their regiments for the SS, against two in most Pz divisions -and four for the GD-, or five companies per battalion instead of four during Kursk...), or having a Stug battalion besides the Pz.Jäg. battalion, and support weapons.

Looks like Niehorster is taking his numbers from Jentz: http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany/afv-strengths/_afv_41-06-22.htm Slightly different figures in Stahel's "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East": Pz.I: 281 Pz.II: 743 Pz.III: 979 Pz:IV: 444 Stug: 250 35/38(t): 808

Good post.

I'm with Ken with the Malta campaign, it wasn't battlefield preparation, specially in 1941. As per the attacks on Atlantic/Artic shipping, were strategic for the food/machinery, etc, and strategic interdiction for the weapons.

Yes, pretty much... of course there are always exceptions in the German army... as per the Jg.Pz.38, it was a Stug. Some Brigades were equipped with it.

As I said, the edge lasted much more than that. I think you should check the "successes" of the Bomber Command pre-1943... Retaliation attacks were an integral part of the doctrine. As per killing people, wasn't that what Harris wanted it?. Again , what were the successes of the BC prior 1943?. Well, you could say that were killing some people, but there were more aircrews killed than German civilians in 1941 and 42.. And after that, they sure killed a lot of German civilians, did that ended the war as Harris predicted it?. By that stick, the BC "failed" the entire war. Luftwaffe's doctrine was not dogmatic, strategic attacks against the economy and political centers were part of it, but it was recognized that it would take a long time to have an effect in the enemy military, and there was the danger that the ground campaign ended before that. So, the Lw focus in the campaigns of 39/40 was put on supporting the army*. I think that was the right call. As per the Russian campaign, with the Monday's paper, it would've been good for the Germans to mount an strategic bombing campaign against the industrial/energy area of Moscow-East of it, (but NO with the entire bomber force), but it would only made the war to last longer, as there was no plan B for Barbarossa, the only chance was to win in 1941. In that light, again, supporting the army was the logical choice. Edit: * after winning the air superiority, which was always the first priority on the Lw doctrine.

...

I agree that the Sturmartillerie was a development for the infantry, Manstein's original idea was to equip each Inf.Div with a Stug battalion. As it turned out, when the first Batteries were created, some were used as Heerestruppen, while others, like Sturmbatterie 640, was assigned to Inf.Reg. Großdeutschland as its organic 16.Kp. IIRC the same happened with a Batterie for the LSSAH division. Later were enlarged to Abt. (renamed as Brigades) Also, outside of the Artillerie, we have the Stug-Abt. in the Pz-Jäger Abt in the Inf-Pz-PzG. divisions...

For pretty much the whole war, there were attacks on Allied shipping. I'm sure it had some effect, anyway the effort was pretty small against bigger priorities of the Lw.

Doctrine? Are we still arguing with that? Sorry, but I take the words of J.Corum, R.Muller, H.Boog, et al, and the Luftwaffe own manuals over yours. Technology: As mentioned, the Lw had the edge on strategic bombing for some time. And range, I'm not looking only at it, was just answering the claim that the Lw lacked "range" to be consider strategic able force, or something like that. Guess you missed that. The WW2 was not only about the bombing of Britain. As far as being the main target of Lw bombers, Britain was only top priority for a very short period of time.

The Luftwaffe bombers could, already in 1939, reach targets over Britain from its bases in Germany. It's not that far. That doesn't mean that it is a good idea to do it if you have airfields in France. In fact, operations in 1944 against London and other targets were launched, for some units, from airfields in Holland and Germany. I could say the same about you with the above quote: "effective", "heavy", "hundreds of aircraft", well, certainly not before 1942, with the only possible exception of "hundreds" for the RAF. Exactly, let's look at the entire war. I would postulate that, taking in account doctrine, technical capability of the aircraft and equipment, training, and number of bombers the Luftwaffe was the number one AF in terms of capacity of conducting a strategic bombing campaign, for the period 1939-some point of 1942. An AF that was in top for a good part of the war, cannot be said that it could not do strategic attack, unless that the true strategic attack was only "invented" in 1943/4.