Rich

Gaack! Yes, thanks, I always mix those up for some reason. You would think after five years of German I would do better. Your German is obviously quite good - I actually really wanted to revive the old " letters south " joke. I guess I didn't get the memo? What "letters south" joke? Anyway, my German stinks beyond a few tourist phrases...mostly its about reading military German.

Mussolini was willing...I would question if the RA was. In any case, while personnel to man the vessels was a bottleneck, there is little or no evidence that "supplies and equipment transportable by rail" was? The Germans more or less successfully converted a couple of thousand of vessels as landing craft over the course of three months. It is difficult to see how Italian supplies and equipment would have made any difference whatsoever. Well, yeah, especially given that you already know the Italians had no significant stock of torpedoes or torpedo-capable aircraft or trained crews and that the first half-dozen or so were not operational until mid-September. Perhaps it might be helpful if you linked to the actual conversation so others might judge themselves just exactly what the conditions resulting in that "effectiveness" were? Um, what "harbor attack" successes were those other than Alexandria and Gibraltar, which required the mother ships that you've apparently decided were unnecessary? So how are twenty MAS boats going to tip the scales in favor of the Germans?

Gaack! Yes, thanks, I always mix those up for some reason. You would think after five years of German I would do better.

Why? They didn't have a shortage of "guns and gunnery equipment". They had a lack of "good escorts" auxiliary and regular and the crews to man them. So now the RM agrees - out of the goodness of its heart I suppose - to return to port, march its crews to the local train station...and kiss Africa Settrionale and probably Albania and any ambitions in Greece goodbye. So like the rest of the RM, the Italians have no need for MAS boats in the Med. Noted. BTW, "concentration of force" is an easy thing to do in a wargame, it's just shuffling counters after all, but a bit more difficult in reality. In this case, you need to first convince the Italians that giving up North Africa, Albania, and Greece in the long run to facilitate a "concentration of force" - 20 MAS boats is significant? - in th short run. The Siluro a Lenta Corsa has a range of 15 miles. It depended on its mother vessel for operations. That is much too early. The Germans simply don't have the capability in mid-July to lift diddly-squat to England. Adding Italian crews and guns will not improve that. Planners like to pretend they are looking at enemy capabilities, but rarely do. For example, NEPTUNE was based on a good knowledge of Germaan capabilities in Ob.West, but a piss-poor assessment of their intent was wrapped up in it. So are we back to late September again? Or is it now mid-July? I wish you would make up your mind. Why don't you ask him why you didn't respond to the most important part of my comment as well? That way you might not be so reliant on another straw man for your response. Except none of that was a condition of the Armistice...and such a conditions would likely have resulted in the French fleet absconding to North Africa. Really? Are you referring to Freiwillger or Hilfswillger? Which units? "Captured Russian POW's" could be either, but there was a significant difference. Freiwilliger served in autonomous units of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, as part of the Heer. The Luftwaffe did not employ Freiwilliger. Both employed Hilfswilliger who were unarmed support personnel. Come up with some evidence.

By this logic one wonders why in 1814 Schwarzenberg didn’t respond to Napoleon’s thrust at his lines of communication by abandoning his march on Paris - on the principle that the key strategic objective apparently should be sacrificed anytime some whim of operational trivia of no importance arises. Say like the hollow threat to the lines of communications made by a beaten army, or perhaps a Swordfish attack at Tobruk that sinks a submarine depot ship. Not my point and I think you know it, but are left only with straw men to argue with.

Nope, I just get tired of Moltke's bon mot as the response to criticism of Griffith.

"Bands of farmers circling about looking for the means to victory" Wasn't that Moltke the Elder on the ACW? Funny, that's pretty much my opinion of Königgrätz...and don't even begin to get me started on the Franco-Prussian War. I think my assessment is more accurate.

Hey, I was on a roll here! Yeah, I knew that, but I see I said everything had arrived by 18 February. Details, details. Yes, it resembled a Panzer division...with minimal infantry and artillery support. Yes, Rommel was Hitler's fair-haired boy. It still represents an addition of only 10% to the strength of the Panzer forces in Barbarossa, and is actually less than that in terms of tank strength...around 7%. And how does Rommel get his logistical support if he doesn't have all those Italian trucks to steal? All is well here, I seem to be forced into retirement, but enjoy it. Jolly is well and our view is superb...far from the madding crowd. Cheers!

"Fast tracking"...nearly three years since the first post and, check's notes, the first requirements for the proposed M8 AGS go back to the 1980s and it was December 1993 when the first DOD IG report criticizing the procurement was done and it was August 2001 when we published our report for CAA criticizing the entire concept of what was then called "medium weight armor". Buy-All My Stuff-Expensively and God-Damned-Dynamics Land Systems have been soaking off tens of millions of dollars every year for this nonsense for going on forty years. In that entire time have we seen one occasion when they would have been useful and could have been deployed to good use? Can you say "niche requirement contracting boondoggle"?

There wasn't a whole lot of planning involved and a pretty tight decision window. Beda Fomm reduced the Italian strength in Tripolitania to the two corps of the Fifth Army, plus whatever reinforcements the Italians could get to Tripoli. While the decision to reinforce the Italians with Sperrverbande Rommel was made in early January, the go-no-go decision was c. 8 February. The first elements of Sperrverbande Rommel began landing on 11 February. However, it did not become 5. Leichte until 18 February, when essentially all its units arrived in Tripoli. It was not anything even closely resembling a Panzer Division until substantial reinforcements arrived for it in the late summer of 1941, it seems unlikely it would be any more ready for the spring campaign, so would probably be held back like 22., and 23. Panzer division, the other two divisions created from brigades in late 1941. The decision to "tropicalize" 15. Panzer was made around the same time and was completed - in terms of the tanks - between 16 and 22 February. By that time the operations order for BARBAROSSA was already in place - 3 February - and was only modified in detail afterwards: change of emphasis in 6. Armee zone 18 March, decision to invade Yugoslavia and expansion of 12. Armee role from invasion of Greece 26-30 March, and the delayed start c. 7 April and then final date set on 30 April. Given it would be a single Panzer division, then I suspect Rommel would revert to divisional command. In January 1941 he was only a very junior generalleutnant after all.

Yep, the problem is that Arnhem in some ways is simply another Dutch cul-de-sac. Head south or east to "outflank" the Ruhr" Cross the Ijessel and more miles of polder. Head north to Apeldoorn and Meppel? Sure, flat wooded, a bit more solid ground, but you just keep extending the corridor north and British Second Army simply doesn't have the combat power in September and October to do that...logistics, remember? So, okay, west to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Looks like 60 miles of hell to me, which could have been circumvented if Montgomery had kept his eyes on the prize around 9-11 September. Sounds like fun. Aside from access to NARA about the only thing I miss moving to the PNW is the eastern battlefields and especially my ancestral home of Gettysburg. Who was your historian? I hope he did not ascribe to the late Paddy Griffiths' idea that Lee only needed a good European-style cuirassier division to win the war on 3 July 1863...

What? Airacuda was brilliant! Look on those nacelles with two AAC 37mm guns! What could be wrong with an aircraft armed by the American Merchants of Death, the Miranda Brothers (no relation to Carmen or Ernesto)? If it worked for Preston Tucker, it'd work for Jim Work at Brewster right? :D

Obviously stupid, because nothing was going on in the Med at the time... 5 July - Swordfish attack Italian shipping at Tobruk sinking a destroyer and a freighter. 9 July - Action off Calabria. 11 July - HMS Escort sunk by Marconi. 16 July - HMS Phoenix sunk by Albatross. 19 July - Action off Cape Spada. 1 August - HMS Oswald sunk by Vivaldi August - Operation HURRY to Malta. August - Warspite, Malaya, and Ramillies bombard Bardia August - Italians invade British Somaliland. 22 August - Swordfish attack Italian shipping at Tobruk sinking a submarine and a submarine depot ship. 23 August - Italians lay minefields inthe Strait of Sicily, sinking HMS Hostile. September - Resupply missions to Malta and to Egypt continue. 17 September - Mediterranean Fleet attacks Benghazi again, sinking two destroyers, while HMS Kent is torpedoed by SM. 79 (see above). 22 September - HMS Osiris sinks Italian torpedo boat. 30 September - Italian submarine Gondar sunk en route to Alexandria with load of Pigs by RAN Stuart. What is "navalized equipment such as artillery"? Do you mean a ship with guns? Or guns removed from a ship? There was all of about 40 MAS boats completed by mid 1940...how many should they ship to the Channel? Why, since they were fully occupied in the Med? Decima Flottiglia MAS was not formed until 1941. Prima Flottiglia MAS was the unit in 1940..and was badly hurt by the sinking of the mother subs Iride and Gondar and the depot ship Monet Gargano in July and August...see above, you know the activity that apparently was of no concern to the Regia Marina in the Mediterranean so they could just go help their good German buddies in France? No, the Germans did not ask for assistance, the CAI was foisted upon them by Mussolini on 10 September and did not deploy till 25 September and was not operational for another month after that...which gives some idea how complex a problem it was. Airfields first...you seem to forget that they were not a dime a dozen in northwest France and Belgium. Ditto fuel, ammunition, maintenance, spares, ground crews, accommodations, and so on. And exactly why would Hitler, who was all about prestige and appearances - he was a typical bourgeoisie Austrian after all - want to go cap in hand to his erstwhile former mentor and top fascist dog asking for help? Until 1939-1940 the patron-client relationship between Italy and Germany was very different. Do you really think that Hitler and his minions forgot that when they became top dogs in the Axis? Anyway, how exactly were the Italian fighter pilots "considerably more experienced"? Against whom? Especially in the Bf 109? Do you mean all that French naval and army artillery that the Germans took over and used? The 3,486 odd pieces from 75mm to 194mm they still had in inventory as of 1 March 1944 in Ob.West alone? Yeah, obviously they were too dumb to use it earlier. Or all those ships in the Atlantic that mostly went to British or French North African ports? Those in Vichy? How do they get to them? So if they were going to "lay their hands" on French naval personnel what would they use them as? Galley slaves? Cooks? Bottle washers? Or do they set them to navigating ships and manning sensitive equipment with minders? Highly efficient use of manpower that. Not sure they're "interesting"...not too well thought out is more the mark.

Seamlessly? That I doubt. Strategic cooperation? How much strategic coordination would be required for the Italians to provide crews for some number of vessels? Wouldn't it be the case where a train shows up in Belgium or France in July or August with crews and weapons? Seemed more doable to me than providing torpedo bombers in 1940. I don't know how much strategic cooperation would be required to do so? Apparently it was easy and they did it all the time, right? So you have examples of this strategic coordination? If it was so doable why didn't they do it?

Yeah, it's almost like the German and Italian alliance did not do well at coordinating strategically, operationally, or tactically. Who would have thunk it? Either that or Sealion was thrown together very fast and the German navy inexplicably made no requests. Either that or you have some examples of where the German and Italian alliance seamlessly coordinated to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical goals?

Yeah, it's almost like the German and Italian alliance did not do well at coordinating strategically, operationally, or tactically. Who would have thunk it?

A wing of SM. 79 in France? Sure, why not? Oh, except they only went operational in the RA on 15 August 1940...all five of them. Oh, and at the time only 50 torpedoes were actually on order. Oh, and in that first sortie only two aircraft returned, with both aircraft damaged from AA fire. AFAICT in the first month, they flew some 8 missions, with perhaps 30 sorties, and obtained one hit, damaged HMS Kent on 17 September. The only other hit during the year I am aware of was HMS Liverpool, also damaged. Until 1941, there was just one unit operational, 278 Squadriglia, with about four aircraft operational at any one time. I don't think such a commitment by the Italians to France would occur or have any real effect.

Exactly, bomber formations were a compromise between formations required for protection and formations required for bombing accuracy. See, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/4112/rec/3

Hitler was a good guy...he was an anti-communist and pro-business.

Except they didn't. They had 26 oilers, not 30, and they were not all large fast fleet oilers. Yes, there were more tankers "supporting the fleet", because practically every Japanese tanker was technically IJN reserve. However, most of them were empty swinging at anchor, because of the lack of oil. This is nothing new, but it is exaggerated. The Japanese had refitted their "CV and BB class ships to refuel smaller ships"? So what? So did the USN. They did both astern and abeam refueling...so did the USN. Yes, the Cimmarons were built as emergency defense tankers...the UNREP gear was added later as needed. More were built, more were fitted. The Japanese? Not so many. Yeah, get out more...hopefully to one of our parties in the near future! Stay safe Ken!

Something got corrupted I suspect. The U.S. Army did not have "ammunition train battalions" in World War II. All Ordnance battalions consisted of a HQ and HQ Detachment and had no permanent organization. There were Ammunition companies, but they were none that I believe in the 700-series? Typically 700-series Ordnance companies were Aviation, Medium, or Light Maintenance. The "Ammunition Train" were units of the prewar Army, but they were not designated battalions and only numbered through 394.

How is that "new"? The Japanese had 24 AO and 2 AOG in commission and trained for underway replenishment on 8 December 1941...although not all would qualify as a "fast" tanker or "large". The US "only" had 14 of the purpose-designed Cimmaron and Kennebec-class large, fast tankers completed by the same date and only around a dozen were already in commission as of 7 December 1941, plus the 17 older, mostly slower, and not so large tankers acquired prior to 1922. So given the relative size of the fleets, indeed the Japanese were relatively more "capable". Did you think the contrary was ever being argued?

From Joe Baugher, who is pretty reliable in these matters. "On April 30, 1942, Ronald W. Harker, a test pilot for the British Rolls-Royce engine manufacturer, took a brief hop in a RAF Mustang at the airbase at Duxford. Like lots of other pilots, he was highly impressed with the Mustang. It was 30 mph faster than the Spitfire VB at similar power settings and had nearly twice the range. Upon landing, he is reported to have said that the airplane would be a natural for the new Merlin 60 series of engines that Rolls Royce was just beginning to produce. The Merlin 60 had originally been intended for the pressurized high-altitude Wellington VI bomber, but had hastily been adapted to the Spitfire VIII. Rolls Royce management was intrigued by the idea and immediately jumped into action. They requested that three Mustangs be loaned to them so that they could fit them with Merlins. Rolls Royce studied various Merlins, including the single-stage Mk XX and the two-stage Mk 61. The two-stage Merlin was the better choice because of its far superior high-altitude performance. The Merlin Mk 61 engine crankshaft was geared to two supercharger blowers stacked in series. Because of the rapid compression of air, the temperature of the air after it passed through both stages of the supercharger increased by 200 centigrade degrees. In order to lower this temperature and thus increase the mass flow of the air entering the engine, an intercooler was added, requiring an extra radiator. After much thought, it was decided to mount the extra radiator underneath the nose, in the same duct as the ram inlet for the updraft carburetor. This conversion was authorized on August 12, 1942. Initially, three Mustang Is were allocated to the program, but two more were added later. Their RAF serials were AM121, AM208, AL975, AM203, and AL963. They were assigned the designation Mustang X. No two of these Mustang Xs were exactly alike, but they all featured small chin-type radiators mounted underneath the engine, all had four-bladed propellers to absorb the extra engine power, and they were all powered by the Merlin 65, which in comparison with the Merlin 66 had a lower full-throttle height but gave higher power at lower altitudes. In comparison to the Allison V-1710, it was 205 hp more powerful at 20,000 feet and 490 hp more powerful at 25,000 feet. The first Mustang X (AL975) took to the air on October 12, 1942, piloted by Captain R. T. Shepherd. It initially had a regular Spitfire IX Rotol propeller but was later fitted with a lerger specially-designed propeller. AL963 flew for the first time on November 13, 1942, and AM121 followed on December 13. AM121 went to the AFDU at Duxford for service evaluation. The fourth and fifth were evaluated by the USAAF in full USAAF markings. These Mustang Xs were to be kept busy throughout the rest of the war, testing various later marks of the Merlin engine." ... "Meanwhile, in May of 1942, Rolls-Royce had informed Major Thomas Hitchcock, US military attache in London, that they planned to convert Mustang airframes to the Merlin engine. It just so happened that Major Hitchcock had been thinking of just this idea himself. He passed the word along to Wright Field and to North American Aviation. The idea attracted immediate interest. It just so happened that at this very time negotiations were taking place with the Packard Motor Car Company of Detroit, Michigan for license manufacture in the United States of the new Merlin engine with the two-stage supercharger. On July 25, 1942, North American was authorized to convert two Mustangs to Merlin 65 engines imported from England. These aircraft were considered sufficiently different from the existing Mustang that they were given a new designation--XP-78. NAA selected two P-51s from the batch of Mustang IAs that had been repossessed from the RAF by the USAAF. Their serial numbers were 41-37350 and 41-37421. NAA gave the project the company designation NA-101. The designation of these two aircraft was changed to XP-51B while the work was progressing. Although the early work by Rolls-Royce in conversion of Mustangs to the Merlin engine provided valuable insight to North American engineers, the British engine manufacturer did not directly participate any further in the project."

No, I don't believe - empirically at least - they did have enough aircraft plants. For the Bf 109, by 1 January 1941 they had five...by the end of the war they had seven, adding Ago Ocersleben in February 1941 and Geyer in Hungary in June 1943...while ending construction at Arado Warnemunde in November 1941 and at Fiesler Kassel in July 1941. For the Fw 190, by 1 January 1941 they had zero and added six during the war. Focke-Wulf Marienburg in June 1941, Arado Warnemunde in August 1941, Ago Ocersleben in October 1941, Fiesler Kassel in May 1942, Dornier Wiesmarin January 1944, and various former bomber plants via the Arbeitsgemeinschaft in May 1944. Do you notice something? Stuka? Manufactured by Weser at two plants, Tenelhof and then at Bremen in October 1942. Ju 88? Seven plants were building it in January 1941. Dornier Muenchen? They were building the Do 215 and Friedrichshafen was just starting production of the Do 215. They added plants at Wismar (very low rate in July 1941), Heinkel? One plant building the He 111. Then four very minor players...RWE, Seibel, Henschel, and Arado. They also had major problems improving the DB605...it was effectively at its developmental end in 1942. Another major problem in the German aircraft industry was that to feed the assembly plants components on mobilization, they converted much of the just constructed auto industry into component manufacture. It was all robbing Peter to pay Paul.

From pages earlier in this stem-winder, just as a reminder. The first "Jabo" Bf 109 (not "ME 109") unit was 3./Erprobungsgruppe 210, also formed on 1 July 1940 at Köln-Ostheim, which flew the Bf 109 E/4B, which was a modified Bf 109 E. It too was fitted with a bomb rack, which allowed it to be a fighter-bomber rather than a fighter. The next "Jabo" Bf 109 unit was II (Schlachtflieger)/LG 2, which had been equipped with the Hs 123 biplane ground-attack aircraft, but re-equipped with Bf 109 E/4B and Bf 109 E-7 the production version of the E/4B on 27 August 1940. Erprobungsgruppe 210 deployed to Denain on 10 July and II (Schlachtflieger)/LG 2 to Calais-Merck on 6 September 1940. They were the only fighter-bomber units until I.(Jagd)/LG 2 formed a Jabostaffel on 1 October, followed by I,/JG 51 and I./JG 53 on 2 October, five more Staffeln formed on 7 October, two on 8 October, three on 9 October, three on 11 October, one on 20 October, and one on 2 November. So until 1 October there were exactly four "Jabo" Bf 109 units. They were all equipped with Bf 109 E/4B and Bf 109 E-7. At full strength the four Staffeln would have 40 Bf 109 E/4B and E/7. By the end of October there were 21, which at full strength would have 210...but the end of October was much too late for a landing window that ended around 25 September.