67th Tigers

Indeed, the perils of memory.* The MORBAT says: BAOR Serial 1503 - 10 PARA, designated reinforcement for 1 BR Corps BAOR Serial 1504 - 4 PARA, designated reinforcement for 1st Armr Div BAOR Serial 1505 - 15 PARA, designated reinforcement for 1st Armr Div BAOR Serial 1611 - 5 RGJ, designated reinforcement for 1 BR Corps So 4 and 15 PARA are assigned to 1 Armr Div (assumidly rear area security for 7 and 22 Bdes respectively), and 10 PARA has an alternate tasking. ISTR you quote the 1989 and 1990 Pegasus Journal with respect to the proposal for forming a Parachute Regiment Group, which was trialed for but it seems from your summation of topic that it was never formally enacted. Certainly the MORBAT for 1991 indicates the PARA(V) battalions were not grouped into the same formation. The Dover resident battalion being sent to Hildesheim after TTW was from your orbat, but I take the point that from your FOI requests, it appears this was maybe not so. Rather it becomes a general Corps reserve. * About a year ago I found the MORBAT from ISTR your FOI request and realised that 10 PARA was elsewhere than 4 and 15 PARA.

The so-called "Parachute Regiment Group" was a proposal. The war roles of the TA Para bns were, per the orgcharts Louis got in a FOI request, were: Hildesheim: 4 PARA, 15 PARA and the Dover resident infantry battalion Reserve component of UKMF: 10 PARA and 1 WESSEX, plus 5 RGJ once it became operational

Not superior, slower burning. For a given weight of powder the resulting velocity was lower as No. 7 powder didn't reach all burnt (he says on a third thread).

<p> </p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>No &amp;quot;company&amp;quot; on Right and Left Flank.</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>The Guards org is:</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>Grenadier Gds</p> <p>1st Bn</p> <p>Queen&amp;#39;s Coy</p> <p>No. 2 Coy</p> <p>Inkermann Coy (carrying the traditions of 3rd Bn)</p> <p>Support Coy</p> <p>HQ Coy</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>2nd Bn</p> <p>Nijmegan Coy (2nd Bn, ceremonial)</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>Administrative companies</p> <p>No. 13 Coy (ATR Pirbright and RMAS, now only the posted instructors, but used to be the phase 1 coy)</p> <p>No. 14 Coy (ITC, recruit training)</p> <p>No. 15 Coy (RHQ and band)</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>Coldstream Gds</p> <p>1st Bn</p> <p>No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Coys and HQ Coy (No. 4 Coy is support coy)</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>2nd Bn</p> <p>No. 7 Coy</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>Admin Coys</p> <p>&amp;nbsp;</p> <p>No. 13 Coy (ITC)</p> <p>No. 14 Coy (ATR Pirbright and RMAS)</p> <p>No. 15 Coy (RHQ and band)</p> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div> <div>Scots Gds</div> <div>1st Bn</div> <div>Right Flank</div> <div>Left Flank</div> <div>B Coy (support coy)</div> <div>C Coy</div> <div>HQ Coy</div> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div> <div>2nd Bn</div> <div>F Coy</div> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div> <div>Admin Coys</div> <div>K Coy (ITC)</div> <div>L(?) Coy (ATR Pirbright and RMAS)</div> <div>M Coy (RHQ and band)</div> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div> <div>Irish Gds</div> <div>1st Bn</div> <div>No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 Coys (4 is support, 7 is HQ)</div> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div> <div>Admin Coys</div> <div>No. 5 Coy (IC, ATR Pirbright, RMAS and ceremonial detachment in London when the Bn isn&amp;#39;t stationed there)</div> <div>No. 6 Coy (RHQ and band, in 1989 this was &amp;quot;reserve strength company&amp;quot; and included men over establishment)</div> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div> <div>Welsh Gds</div> <div>Prince of Wales&amp;#39; Coy</div> <div>No. 2 Coy</div> <div>No. 3 Coy</div> <div>Support Coy</div> <div>HQ Coy</div> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div> <div>Admin Coys</div> <div>Don&amp;#39;t know, but the numbers upto 8 are filled, with the temporary coys in AFG being IX and X coys.</div> <div>&amp;nbsp;</div>

Exercise caution. He is off on his muzzle energies by a factor of > 6. The smoothbore musket threw a ball ~ 1,500 fps with about 3 kJ muzzle energy. See this for discussion of musket effectiveness: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ppTHTAlBrJoC&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=A+Detailed+Study+of+the+Effectiveness+and+Capabilities+of+18th+Century+Musketry+on+the+Battlefield&source=bl&ots=zt8aEjwHXG&sig=HqvDO6jmKqkZrVn8O3PvSX7iAPI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3MSWUOmMJcjK0QW414CYAQ&ved=0CGwQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=A%20Detailed%20Study%20of%20the%20Effectiveness%20and%20Capabilities%20of%2018th%20Century%20Musketry%20on%20the%20Battlefield&f=false

The Company were roled to the BAOR Corps Patrol Unit: - HAC - 21 SAS - 23 SAS (with 73 Bty RA OPCOM)

It doesn't occur to you that he's wrong? A passing comment in a footnote doesn't overturn the 5" thickness of the plate. 2+2+1 gives a resistance to shot 43% of a solid 4.5" plate, and on inclining it would be 76%. This ignores the backing, and the fact that about half Warrior's resistance to shot comes from the backing, but the 4.5" outer plate. Virginia II wasn't as protected as Warrior by a long way.

How bizarre. You obviously managed to navigate to page 336, and my claim that in 1864 "The Volunteer Force is 170,544 all ranks" appears in a table that says: Now, why can't you follow a simple source? A number was quoted, you managed to follow the reference to the page in the referenced book, yet then either missed it or chose to ignore it.

You asked and you got. The post you objected too referenced five sources (generally with hotlinks for ease of checking) which I repeated for you here. If you wish to refuse to acknowledge the citations that's your perogative. It does not change the fact that the sources I used were in fact referenced no matter how often you wish to repeat that they were not. As to this matter, Ickysdad and myself (and others) had a long discussion with a lot of citations elsewhere. It is not my fault if he wishes to use a single secondary source (Scharf's History of the Confederate Navy) that is contrary to the Official Records and all other secondary sources. He lost elsewhere and tried to move to a "friendlier" environment, and ultimately would have used posts here as an authority (which he has a bad habit of doing).

Neither case is a "penetration". In both cases the plates were sheered, but the round did not enter (the definition of "penetration"). 1. Atlanta Your ranges, munitions and effects are wrong. Weehawken was very close to the grounded, stationary Atlanta. Below 200 yards. Weehawken fired 5 times. Twice with her 11" (probably 15 lbs NCP, 20 lbs had not been authorised yet) and three times with her 15" (35 lbs NCP firing 400 lb cored shot, not shell). Both 11" hit but did nothing. The first 15" struck the casemate, broke the plates causing the backing to break up, but the broken piece remained in place. The second 15" struck the join at the pilothouse roof, blowing it off. The third shot missed again a stationary target less than 100 yards away. When examined the USN found the Atlantas armour to have been quite a lot quality ("In some of the fractures it has broken off almost as short as if it had been cast iron"), and the pine backing was problematic. Atlanta had much weaker armour than any RN ironclad. 2. Virginia II As I have pointed out ad nauseum the damaged section of armour only totalled 5" thick, not 6". Onondaga's 15" was firing cast iron solid shot with 60 lbs NCP and hit once at 11.30am portside aft. It did indeed break and sheer a large piece of the armour, which remained in place and the round did not enter. It was not a "penetration". The squadron officers did not believe it effected her combat power (the main concern was damage to the smokestack caused by shell). 3. Against "Warrior" No-one doubts that the 15" can damage Warriors citadel, especially with heavy charges at close range using steel munitions. So what? This means an ironclad would lay off a fort much closer than the old wooden liners typically laid off. These aren't lyddite filled base fused APC shells.

The different charge bags of artillery systems already have variable burn rates and in some cases late initiating charges. If memory serves the charge 5 increment of the L35 cartridge and charge super of the L36 ignited after charges 1-4 (which were adjacent to the igniter) and were significantly down the ordnance. Long time ago so my memory may be fading.

It should also be remembered that most naval actions involving wooden men of war resulted in very few ships actually being sunk, they were mostly smashed into submission by cannonballs wrecking the upperworks, masts, sails and rigging, or by being boarded after being heavily damaged. Weapons such as the caronade sacrificed some muzzle velocity, and hence 'penetration' for weight and more efficient operation. The ACW and Crimea were essentially times of transition, with higher velocity weapons, and iron armour taking the place of thick wood. Except evidently the awesome power of USN ordnance caused the CSA ships to surrender. 67 Tigers is wrong plugging is a definition of penetration. It's also quite clear from reading the ORN that the damaging hit on the CSS Virginia II was the 15" though what does it really matter since it showed the USN had guns that could damage the best the RN had. Once you use the phrase "awesome power of USN ordnance" any facade of objectivity starts to fade. Plugging is a mechanism of armour failure usually associated at this period with flat headed rifle bolts. The cases you cite are clearly brittle fractures, and are not penetrations in the sense that the round actually entered the target. No-one doubts the 15" could damage Warrior, especially if overcharged with a steel shot. However, Warrior was not "the best" the RN had by 1865. If you read Noble, then they weren't especially worried by racking (which is what happened in the cases you cite, not a penetration but the plates deforming and fracturing, but remaining in place). The question was whether the gun could fully penetrate which it could within a certain range, calculated at 700 yards for Warrior and obviously closer for ships with heavier armour based on the (erroneous) assumption the US guns would have steel shot. There are only two circumstances an RN ship would be facing US 15" guns (either Rodman or Dahlgren); attacking a fort and a Monitor challenging them. In the former case the attacker sets the range, and can simply stay out of the effective range of the 15" (which was the plan). Making matters worse for the US is the fact that the 15" was too large for casemates and all were mounted en barbette, and barbettes are generally not fightable against any determined force that can shower them with shell (especially if mortars are brought in). In the case of a Monitor any RN ironclad except (maybe) the 1855-6 types is going to set the range by dint of their greater speed, and can stand off any monitor and pound it to pieces. Bearing in mind the slow rate of fire the monitors achieved by the time any Monitor is loading her 3rd shot the RN ship is steaming off for want of ammunition as they have expended their entire stock of ammunition.

The plan of 2010 was a 7 brigade intervention force - 16 airborne, 3 commando and 5 armour/mech brigades (each 1 armoured recce, 1 armoured, 1 armoured inf, 1 mech inf and 2 light inf bn = 2 RAC and 4 Inf units), we now have dropped one of the armour/mech brigades. Edit, 1, 3, 4 and 9 AAC are apparently being centralised under a bde HQ in force troops, so the duty rumour says...

Yes, they haven't cut enough infantry. We're already suffering with too high a tooth:tail ratio especially in some of the logistics and signals areas. The basic plan for a 6 brigade "intervention force" (one airborne, one commando, three armoured and one mechanised), a 7 brigade "adaptive force" and the force troops with a attack helicopter brigade, artillery brigade, ISTAR brigade, engineer brigade, medical brigade, two logistics and two signals brigades is sound. The key is making the reserve component work, and that means greater protection for the TA and hopefully enforcing the regular reserve commitments.

or, 150 years ago today was Malvern Hill: (no hollywood film to be found).