alejandro_

x2 it sounds very interesting.

Interesting analysis of BMP role and deployment in Soviet Army On the role of BMPs "The appearance in our country, and then abroad, of the infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) made it the main equipment of the motorized infantry of tank and motorized rifle troops"1 . This is not true. Motorized infantry on BMPs became a specialized branch of the military, which at its peak of development (the late 1980s) made up only a significantly smaller proportion of the armies deployed to wartime strength. The rest of the infantry operated on APCs (at best), and a significant proportion on vehicles. In 1990, the Soviet Army had 27 armies (21 combined-arms and 6 tank), 15 army corps, not counting separate divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions. In the event of mobilization, an additional 26 armies would be deployed. In tank divisions, a motorized rifle regiment fought on BMPs, while in motorized rifle divisions, only one regiment had such equipment, with the rest on APCs (in divisions of types A and B). In cadre divisions (types C and D), one regiment was on APCs, with the rest on vehicles. In 1990, we had infantry fighting vehicles: BMP-3 - 300, BMP-2 - 8000, BMP-1 - 17000, totaling 25300. Armored personnel carriers: BTR-80 - 6500, BTR-70 - 10400, BTR-60 - 25000, BTR-50 - 5000, totaling 46900. 1. "The Heavy Tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle in Modern Armed Conflict". Colonel D.P. PROZOROV, retired Colonel V.A. LESIN. - Military Thought, No. 9 - 2025. https://t.me/Viktor_Murakhovskiy/856

Interesting analysis of what could happen in 2026 at the front. Colonel Khodarenok: The Russian Armed Forces can take control of the entire DPR in a few months In 2025, the Russian military successfully advanced deep into the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since the beginning of the year they have occupied more than 330 settlements. During the year, the Kursk region was liberated, and Chasov Yar, Seversk, Volchansk, Pokrovsk, Dimitrov, and Gulyai-Pole were captured. But it is not necessary to wait for the collapse of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine yet. What are the main tasks facing the Russian Armed Forces in 2026 and whether Kherson and Odessa will be taken — in the material of the military observer "Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenka. The main tasks of 2026 At this stage, Moscow and Kiev have significantly different ideas about the conditions of a peaceful settlement. Ukraine has not yet suffered defeats on such a scale that further resistance by the Ukrainian Armed Forces has become impossible. Therefore, the fighting will continue in 2026. In the near future, at the beginning of the year, the fighting for Krasny Liman and Konstantinovka is likely to continue, and the intensity of attacks in the Zaporizhia direction will increase. The main task of the upcoming winter campaign in 2026 is still to capture the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and finally liberate the entire territory of the DPR. Its implementation, presumably, will take at least several months and will be completed, most likely, by the onset of the spring thaw. Such forecasts are based on the combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the material reserves created. The complete capture of the remaining part of the DPR in such a time frame looks like a very real task for the Russian Armed Forces. Will the front collapse? As for the "cascading collapse of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine", the "cessation of organized resistance of the Ukrainian army", the "disorderly flight from the front line" and the "complete collapse of defense", this is possible only as a result of a series of crushing defeats of the Ukrainian military machine. So far, during 2025, the Russian army has won a number of tactical victories, but they have not developed into operational-level breakthroughs in any sector of the front. And significant defeats and defeats of enemy troops begin with them. In the meantime, the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the operational and strategic level has not undergone significant crises and collapses. Should we wait for the capture of Odessa? Most likely, it is not worth expecting the capture of Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhia in the first half of 2026. Even more illusory are the significant advance in the southern directions and the capture of Odessa, rumors of which began to spread after massive air strikes by the Russian Armed Forces against targets in this region recently. If we take Odessa from the sea, then at least we need to conduct an amphibious operation. That is, to land at least several divisions on the coast defended by the enemy. In order for such an operation to become a reality, it is necessary to seize complete dominance not only in the air, but also at sea, and have appropriate amphibious forces and landing facilities. Detailed answers to these questions almost immediately translate such actions of the troops into the realm of hypotheses and assumptions. If you attack Odessa by land, then crossing the Dnieper in its lower reaches is very little different from a naval amphibious operation: no less troops, forces and means will be required for this. The negotiation factor However, the forecasts of the actions of the armed forces of the warring parties in 2026 may change significantly and suddenly as a result of negotiations between the head of the White House, Donald Trump, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. In this case, the President of Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, as a vassal of the United States, will simply have to listen in silence to the conditions set by his overlord, the American leader. At the same time, it would be very wrong to believe that Trump is in any way "playing on Moscow's side": the US president is acting solely based on the national interests of his country. Mikhail Khodarenok The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board. Biography of the author: Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel. Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986). Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983). Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988). Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992). Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000). Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998). Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).

Thanks I knew there was a factory in East Germany but couldn't remember if it repaired T-64s. Useful photo for comparison of volume and dimensions, T-62A vs T-72 Ural.

Thank you Harkonnen, it is very useful to understand the design choices. I have a question about the T-64 maintenance. After 1991 capital repairs were carried out in Kharkov and Kiev, but what about in Soviet period. Was there any facility in East Germany and Russia?

I was thinking about buying this book on the Tiger company belonging to the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf, but then I saw this review by the author, who is pissed off about the editing. I was wondering if anyone has it and if it is worth buying, as it is not very expensive compared to other Tiger unit books. Ian Michael Wood 1.0 out of 5 stars Totenkopf Tigers, by Ian Michael Wood Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 27 January 2014 Format: Hardcover This is not the book I hoped for, there is a ton of material missing. It has been re-written and expanded. The script in the book was actually the first draft and not the third which was submitted. I have visited the battlefields in Hungary and Austria, I've used the Russian and German archives and interviewed Veterans, I have over 7 hours of recorded interviews. A lot of archival documents were not put in the book as well. To say this is a copy of the other guys work I think is a slight and a mlid insult to be honest, other wise I award this book one star.

CVRDE (Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment) is adapting a transmission to the DATRAN-1500 local engine, which will be used by Arjun and the future tank. https://idrw.org/cvrde-pushes-forward-indigenous-arjun-mbt-powerpack-with-reconfigured-t-type-transmission/

Report on UVZ tank deliveries - Arena-M being installed in T-90M and T-72B3A. It has been refined to work on drones. - Factory working at full capacity in 2 12 hours shifts - 2024 focused on T-72, 2025 on T-90M

Well, if you start at pretty much 0 and you grow a bit the increase in almost infinite. So Syria it is, outperforming Afghanistan...

In 2025 the Kiev forces lost more than 350 tanks. Tank losses by family (including 24 units of captured equipment that the Kiev forces later lost to the Russian side): • 156 T-64 • 106 T-72 • 37 T-80 • 1 T-90 • 2 M-55S • 18 Leopard 1 • 4 Leopard 2 • 5 M1 Abrams • 25 unidentified tanks Tanks captured from the Kiev forces by Russia in 2025, by family: • 4 T-64 • 2 T-72 • 1 Leopard 2 Strv 122A Breakdown by method of destruction based on objective control data: • 64 percent FPV drones • 5 percent loitering munitions • 6 percent combined strikes loitering munitions plus FPV • 2 percent air-dropped munitions • 2 percent other destruction methods • 21 percent method not determined As a result, at least 77 percent of Kiev forces tanks destroyed in 2025 were taken out by unmanned strike systems. Taking into account cases where objective control is missing or does not allow the method of destruction to be determined, the contribution of strike UAVs is even greater. Statistics are based on the Kiev forces armored equipment losses database on the LOSTARMOUR INFO portal. https://x.com/distant_earth83/status/2008485157745963174

The criticism is supposed to be based on comments made by crews and published in the social media. I would take it with a grain of salt. Barrel life of 200 would be lower than 2A26, used by T-64A in... 1966. This gun managed 350 EFC. Worse than Ukrainian "Oplot" and old M48 Patton - Chinese VT-4 tanks criticized in Thailand for unreliability DEFENSE EXPRESS ukr.defense.news@gmail.com January 06, 2026, 12:21 Thai Army VT-4 tank. Photo: Thai Toyal Calvary Center This is not the first time that Chinese VT-4 tanks have demonstrated poor reliability, but now it's on the battlefield, where the Thai military recommends Ukrainian Oplot-Ts, or something even older. The Chinese VT-4 tanks have been criticized by the Thai military for their poor reliability and quality. It is argued that it is better to choose units equipped with Ukrainian Oplot tanks, or even old American M48 Pattons. Such reviews are published on social media, so they should be taken with some skepticism. However, it does explain news and videos from the region where Chinese-made tanks have been seen broken and with their guns torn off. From the aforementioned problems, it follows that one of the complaints about these machines in Thailand is the low barrel life of only 200 shots, which is significantly less than foreign analogues . Use after exceeding this norm leads to a rupture, which was encountered in the footage. According to publicly available documents and recommendations for use, the barrel life of the VT-4 is stated to be 500 rounds. That is, it is practically more than twice as long, which indicates either terrible quality of production or service. It should not be forgotten that other factors, including the type of shells, can affect this value. As for other problems, the unreliability of the electronics and engine of the Chinese tank is mentioned. This can seriously complicate the use and conduct of combat operations, raising many questions. And this is not the first time that such problems have been mentioned, because back in 2024, during the Zhuhai Air Show, the VT-4 stalled and broke while trying to overcome the climb . The Thai military also criticizes the insufficient protection of the vehicles, especially highlighting the insufficient booking on the sides. It is worth noting that the Chinese offer the standard option of installing dynamic protection, so perhaps this is a question of saving on procurement. Despite all of the above, the VT-4 also has its strengths, namely a modern and highly effective fire control system with "hunter-killer" functionality. It is claimed that in this functionality it surpasses other analogues in the arsenal. So, it turns out that the Chinese tank really justifies the title of a modern example of technology in its class. However, it suffers from poor reliability, which can overshadow all the advantages, because they simply cannot be used. It should be noted that the fighting in Cambodia was the first combat experience not only for the Ukrainian "Oplot-T" , but also for the VT-4. So it is quite possible that they have a bunch of "childhood diseases" that were not detected before full-fledged practical use. Of course, all this information has not yet been officially confirmed, and the available footage from the battlefield may provide a rather "selective" and limited perspective. However, the lack of similar ones for other tanks still makes us think about the peculiarities of the Chinese tank industry, especially against the background of stories about the poor efficiency of lasers from China . Thai Army VT-4 tank VT-4 tank of the Thai army. Illustrative photo from open sources Thai officers recommend using units with the Oplot, M60A3, or even the old M48 Patton that have been modernized for complex and long missions. Such vehicles are more reliable and are able to complete tasks without additional complications. https://defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/girshe_za_ukrajinski_oplot_ta_stari_m48_patton_kitajski_tanki_vt_4_kritikujut_u_tajilandi_za_nenadijnist-21404.html

@bojan I was looking for it the other day following a discussion in twitter (yes I know).

Not surprising because NATO's recent experiences were with countries like Libya or Afghanistan. Didn't we have a discussion here about some NATO instructors telling Ukrainians that Russians did not have thermal sights in their tanks?

Probably worth taking with a pinch of salt, but for what it's worth... 'Pressed Rice.' Russian Artilleryman Criticizes North Korean Cannon A Russian artilleryman assessed his D-74 field gun, which was acquired from North Korea, and compared the quality of the metal used in its production to "pressed rice." The first footage of the D-74 field gun being used in Ukraine dates back to October of last year . Interestingly, just the day before, information emerged about the intention to return it to service and the removal of an unknown number of such artillery pieces from military depots . This raised the question of whether North Korea might once again be initiating this process , potentially transferring ammunition, spare parts, and the guns themselves to Russia as part of military cooperation. In late December, a video featuring a Russian artilleryman was posted on YouTube's Russkiy Voin channel , confirming the use of the aforementioned artillery in Ukraine and sharing his impressions of its use. Initially, he operated the 100mm MT-12 anti-tank gun as part of an anti-tank artillery division. The division operated both Rapirs and 120mm mortars, as well as the D-74. The weapon itself is said to be of Korean production, possibly built under a Soviet license. This likely resulted in its poor workmanship, causing numerous breakdowns before it entered combat. Problems arose with the gun carriage, the gun breech, and the wheel lifting mechanism. The craftsmanship of the metal components has been compared to " pressed rice ." However, it is said to be relatively easy to repair due to its Soviet technological heritage. https://defence24.pl/wojna-na-ukrainie-raport-specjalny-defence24/prasowany-ryz-rosyjski-artylerzysta-krytykuje-armate-z-korei-polnocnej

Thanks for sharing, it is very interesting. I find surprising that Syria and Egypt also lost a large number of tanks to ATGM. Sagger took all the attention and little is said about the models Israel used.