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Interesting article on the use of Shaheeds by Russia and countermeasures applied by Ukraine Yuri Kasyanov Officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Radio engineer, aerial reconnaissance specialist There are two key technological problems that Ukraine and the Ukrainian defense industry have not yet resolved and that affect the course of the war and Ukraine's position in future peace negotiations. These two problems are "shaheeds" and ways to effectively combat them. It has been two and a half years since Iranian long-range kamikaze drones appeared in Ukrainian skies, but Ukraine has still not been able to achieve parity with the enemy in this type of weaponry; and during this time, no effective ways have been found to combat the "shaheeds." I have written many times about why Ukrainian long-range drone attacks cannot match Russian ones in either quality or quantity. There are many reasons for this, the first and most important of which is the lack of quality management in both the development and production of long-range strike drones and the use of Ukrainian “shaheeds.” The topic of long-range unmanned strikes — deep strikes — is being addressed by almost all security forces and two dozen enterprises. The erosion of resources is producing a “zoo” of low-quality and high-cost drones that are unable to overcome the dense air defense and electronic warfare systems of the Moscow region (in particular), while the capabilities of two dozen semi-garage artisanal production facilities physically cannot meet the needs of the Ukrainian defense forces in hundreds of such devices per day. Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence, plans to increase the rate of use of "Shaheds" in Ukraine in the near future from 200 to 500 devices per day. In order to increase the effectiveness of domestic deep strike and regularly strike military facilities in Moscow ( which is also very important as a political argument), it is necessary to consolidate the efforts of developers and manufacturers, reduce the "zoo" of drones to one or two models, the quality and capabilities of which should be at least equal to the capabilities of Russian "Shaheds". That is, effective state management of this industry and the unification of all deep strike military units under a single Command of long-range unmanned bombing are urgently needed. This idea is not new, it is logical. Such consolidated holdings of developers and manufacturers of weapons exist in all developed countries, and our enemy does too. And single bomber commands have been known for a long time, as soon as bombers (piloted) appeared. It is only here that the topic of deep strike is dealt with in every power structure, because it is, first of all, good PR. Good, but ineffective, — we see this from the result. We also all see the low effectiveness in countering enemy strike drones. In two and a half years, we have advanced from a haughty mocking denial of the very threat posed by Iranian drones to the massive use of battle chariots armed with heavy machine guns and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns. And that, in fact, is all - neither anti-aircraft missiles comparable in cost to the Shaheds nor interceptor drones have been created. And here, according to the cost/effectiveness criterion, we lose three times to our adversary, who, having created mass production of Iranian "shaheeds", was able to increase the number of daily launches to such an extent that no anti-aircraft missiles in the world would be enough to repel even a weekly attack. In addition, mass production has allowed the enemy to reduce the cost of the Shahed to such a level that even the cheapest anti-aircraft missile or the cheapest anti-aircraft interceptor drone will be clearly more expensive than the Shahed itself (with the exception of cheap FPV copters, but they are ineffective against the Shahed). The third factor is the cost of maintaining the ground infrastructure to counter the "Shaheeds." Today, it is thousands of crews with small arms; tomorrow, even if anti-aircraft missiles or interceptor drones comparable in cost to the "Shaheeds" appear, hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of additional crews equipped with new weapons will be needed. The problem is that today's "shaheed" hunter crews—mobile fire groups with small arms or groups armed with man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) or FPV interceptor drones—can only operate effectively within line of sight of the target. That is, these groups must constantly move after the targets, and there must be many of them. This approach is extremely costly and inefficient. The problem could be solved by creating a long-range, reusable aircraft-type interceptor drone, fast enough to pursue the "shaheed", but with a longer flight time in target search mode, equipped with powerful optics, good navigation and communications equipment, target sensors, and non-lethal weapons. The rejection of the disposability inherent in anti-aircraft missiles and kamikaze drones of the copter type will make such an air defense system a fairly inexpensive solution, even if the unmanned interceptor aircraft is equipped with the maximum set of expensive equipment. "Non-lethal weapons" can be of various types. I will not list the options here, so as not to give the enemy the cards in his hands. But the very fact of not using explosives on board a drone in the event of an accident (fall) will make such a device relatively safe for the crew and those on the ground. To reliably protect a large city like Kyiv from Shahed raids, ten mobile groups armed with reusable interceptor drones with a flight radius of up to 30 km will be enough. That is, the entire air defense system of the capital against Shahed can include only 140 people (a company), 30 vehicles and 30 interceptor aircraft (including spares). And that is a completely different story. Separately, it is worth mentioning jamming and spoofing satellite coordinates (EW). Currently, this method of combating "shaheeds" is clearly preferred, because it is easier (although not cheap) to stuff the country's territory with powerful jammers and have an on-off switch in Kyiv. However, the result of total jamming is unsatisfactory, because the "shaheeds" fly to Kyiv without any problems without using satellite navigation, and only in the area of the target do they begin to circle in search of reliable signals in order to adjust the route to the target. Of course, a certain part of the drones, due to suppression and spoofing, do not reach their targets and even fly to Belarus (for example), but still a significant percentage of kamikaze drones fall as debris. At the same time, dense suppression of satellite navigation signals or spoofing throughout Ukraine (out of fear) harms our military navigation systems, our use of high-precision munitions (the same "Haymars") and drones - reconnaissance, strike, and interceptors. It is obvious that both achieving parity with the enemy in the use of long-range kamikaze drones and combating the enemy's "shaheeds" is primarily a state management task, not a technical one. Technical solutions exist, they are known, but no one needs them. https://zn.ua/ukr/war/jak-zakhistiti-kijiv-vid-shakhediv.html

Interview with colonel Markus Reisner A well-known military expert and historian, Colonel of the Austrian General Staff, Head of the Research and Development Department of the Military Academy in Austria, Markus Reisner, in an interview with Strana, spoke about possible scenarios in the war, threats to Ukraine on the battlefield, Russia's offensive potential, Europe's ability to replace the United States in military terms, the results of the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the likelihood of a ceasefire. - The Russian-Ukrainian war has been going on for four years. Can we say that a turning point has already occurred? - I would say that we can agree that Ukraine has already written itself into history. This is really important. I will give you a similar example: Finland in the Finnish-Soviet War and in the Second World War in general. Of course, in the end they lost some of their territory, but they showed the will to fight. Many books have been written about this. I would say that the same thing happened to Ukraine. So, whatever the outcome of this war in the future, we can both agree that Ukraine has already secured its place in history. The last three years can be compared to a boxing match. On one side is a Russian fighter, on the other is a Ukrainian one, supported by Europe. In big boxing there was a very famous Russian boxer - Nikolai Valuev. He is a huge guy who won his fights not due to tactical skill, but due to his weight. He lost only two fights, because at the beginning (of the fight - Ed. ) his opponents acted very cleverly and accurately. Ukraine did the same. Valuev got, so to speak, two "blue eyes": he was "blinded" at the beginning. But the question is what will happen in the next "rounds". At the beginning of the (big) war - Ed. , the West - especially the US - were ready to help Ukraine, but only up to a certain limit. What do I mean? You may remember what happened in October 2022, when the Americans were afraid that the Russians might use tactical nuclear weapons. There were very tense negotiations between the Americans and the Russians during that period, but in the end it didn't happen. But, as we know, the Russians managed to withdraw their troops from the Kherson bridgehead. Many say that this was not connected, however, these forces were then transferred to other parts of the front. At the same time, the Russian offensive on Bakhmut began. At that moment, after the successes near Kharkov and Kherson, the Ukrainians were already planning a third offensive on Zaporozhye, which never took place because all the troops were transferred to Bakhmut. Russia has gained time. In seven months, it has dug in in the Zaporizhia region - especially between Tokmak and the area north of Mariupol. The rest of the story is well known: in 2023, the expected summer offensive of Ukraine began, but it did not bring operational success. It was not possible to cut the supply lines to the Kherson region and Crimea, including by attacking the Kerch Bridge. This was one of the key moments after which the Ukrainians decided to go on the defensive in 2024. 2024, in my opinion, was the culmination of whether the Ukrainians would be able to contain Russia and form strategic reserves, or they would no longer be able to do so. And the following happened: in 2024, the Russians finally seized the initiative, since they spent much more resources. And, of course, it is important that Russia does not fight alone. When the Russian "boxer" returns to his corner of the ring, the Chinese, Indians, North Koreans, Iranians, etc. give him something. For example, China supplies Russia with certain electronic components for weapons. The Indians buy raw materials from it. Iran - drones and assistance in building two factories for their production. The North Koreans deliver artillery ammunition - and this is 3 million shells last year and the same the year before. The Ukrainians are trapped in a war of attrition, and they can only win with the help of the West. This is a very important nuance. Western assistance is the center of gravity for the Ukrainians. Why? Because Ukraine cannot restore its forces to wage war on its own. This is often forgotten. We often focus on the tactical level, when events take place more or less on the front line. Sometimes - a little on the operational level, when we discuss, for example, Donbas in connection with the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But we often forget about the strategic level, where it is decided how long you can wage war. Russia is already conducting a third air campaign against Ukraine's critical infrastructure. The country's energy minister said last year that about 80% of the critical (energy - Ed. ) infrastructure was either destroyed or badly damaged. This means that if Ukraine does not have functioning tank factories or something like that, as was the case in Kharkov, or huge factories, then the West must provide the resources to wage war. So if the center of gravity is Western aid, and if Ukraine needs it, then the West needs to understand that if it wants Ukraine to even survive or even win the war, this aid has to come on a regular basis and in a certain amount, and it's not happening yet. Why? Because in the Ukrainian corner of the ring are the Europeans with a lot of good ideas, but without the means and the real will to produce what is needed, because of course it costs a lot of money, and the Americans say: "Well, we're not so interested in boxing anymore, let's start a wrestling competition, for example, with China." And that's actually the problem. That's why the situation is so desperate. You saw what happened in the Oval Office . And you saw Zelensky immediately realize: "Oh, my God, we have to go back to the Americans, because there are certain resources that only they can provide us, and not the Europeans." This is, for example, intelligence, which has been a major topic since the beginning of the war, but if access to data is blocked, this will complicate the whole situation even more. - Then what should be Kyiv’s realistic political and military goals in the current conditions? - It's always about strategy. In the case of Ukraine, it was from the very beginning the liberation of the entire territory of the country. But if you now understand that the offensive path is impossible because you no longer have the means, then you need to reconsider your strategic goal. If the West does not provide what is needed and if Ukraine itself cannot provide it - and I am not talking only about tanks, drones or artillery shells, but also about soldiers - the goals will have to be revised. The Ukrainians must at least try to convince Russia that it is better to organize some kind of ceasefire . Otherwise, Russian troops will simply continue the offensive, and then they will have to retreat to the Dnieper or something like that. Now everything will depend on what pressure the Americans can put on both sides when it comes to negotiations... - We will return to this a little later. You mentioned drones. According to statements by the Ukrainian leadership, drones are now the main focus. Is it possible to compensate for the lack of soldiers and equipment on the battlefield with their help? - The shortage of soldiers is Ukraine's biggest problem now. A regular battalion consists of about 500 soldiers, while in the Ukrainian Armed Forces the actual number of battalions fluctuates between 75 and 30% of the regular strength. A typical Ukrainian brigade must cover up to 30 km of the front line with four exhausted battalions. There is always space between strongholds through which Russian troops can penetrate in small units. But drones can "fill" these gaps and effectively fight the Russians in what we call in military affairs the "near zone", that is, at a distance of up to 20-30 kilometers. This is why Russian units are still suffering heavy losses, and why we call it a "transparent battlefield". But there is also the operational level, where it is decided where the next operation will be carried out, for example, with the participation of various army units. And if you have no idea what is, figuratively speaking, on the other side of the hill, if the Russians are already forming some huge maneuver force, then there may be problems. The value of the data provided by American intelligence is in this. But the importance of drones is also great here. With their help, you can monitor a large part of the occupied territory. Drones are even more important at the strategic level. Every two or three days, the Ukrainians try to strike targets on Russian territory with drones. There is an effect, but is it cumulative? It's like in a boxing match: if you want to knock out your opponent, it's better to hit like a machine gun. After a long series of blows, he will simply fall. But if you hit once and wait, hit again and then pause, the opponent will recover - especially if it is a person like Valuev. The problem the Ukrainians face is that they are hitting targets in Russia, but the cumulative effect is not yet so great that the Russians really feel it. At the same time, the Russians are increasingly depleting Ukraine's air defense with daily drone launches and missile attacks every two to three weeks. The importance of drones is undeniable. - If we imagine that the US will stop or significantly reduce military aid, will Ukraine be able to hold the front and how long will the Ukrainian Armed Forces last? - Many people say: "If the Russians continue to advance at the current pace, it will take 100 years before they reach Lviv." But this is due to a misunderstanding of the situation. This is a war of attrition. If one side suddenly runs out of resources, the situation on the battlefield can change very quickly. There is that cumulative effect. In one second the enemy enters your position, in a second he is already behind you, and then, lo and behold, he is already in Lviv. In my opinion, we are still not entirely honest in the West. Someone needs to say: "Europeans, listen. We agreed that we would help the Ukrainians. But the 16th package of sanctions did not produce the effect we hoped for. And all these tanks and many other things that we supplied did not stop the Russians. Let's try this option now. We will take money from the funds to combat climate change and social security and start producing shells for the Ukrainians and ourselves." True, I am not sure that the peoples of Europe will react to this with cries of "Hurray!" A lot of money is needed. The defense industry is all private companies that want to earn a lot. At the same time, in Russia, an artillery shell costs about 800-1200 euros. In Europe, its price is from 8 thousand to 10 thousand euros. Companies say: "We can supply, but it will be very expensive." There is a way out. In 1915, a crisis with ammunition arose in Britain. The government realized that private enterprises could not produce the required number of shells for the Western Front. Then the companies were nationalized and increased production. - It doesn’t seem that current Western governments are ready for such radical steps… - So, we need to look for money. Because on the other side of the "ring" there is a conveyor belt. In North Korea, they produce shells in three shifts, which will then end up in Ukraine. But there is nothing new in this. History is full of such examples. It does not repeat itself exactly, but always develops according to templates. We are again seeing war fatigue in European countries. People say that it is time to find some kind of solution. They say that the Russians can be understood... But no one asks what this will mean for Ukraine? What if the Russians want to establish a demilitarized zone east of the Dnieper? Or will events unfold in such a way that Russia will get a "land bridge" in Transnistria and that Odessa will one day be Russian? In this case, Ukraine will be a landlocked country, with limited access to resources, possibly with a government in Lvov, which the Russians will influence using hybrid methods to achieve a composition that is favorable to them. In about ten years, they will get what they wanted. These are things that need to be discussed, and I speak very frankly. - Let's now talk about the Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in Kursk Oblast , which, judging by everything, is coming to an end. How do you assess it, in whose favor did it play? - You remember that there is a war of attrition. A very long front line - about 1,100 kilometers. The Russians are attacking in different areas to prevent the Ukrainians from forming strategic reserves for new attacks. Last year, Russia planned an operational breakthrough in Donbas. To support it, they wanted to launch an operation in the direction of Kharkov, but not to capture it, but to create such great pressure on the Ukrainians that they would be forced to withdraw their strategic or operational reserves from Donbas to Kharkov. This would weaken the section of the front in Donbas and lead to a breakthrough. Russia failed to achieve any serious success in the Kharkov area. Ukraine's counter-move was the Kursk operation with similar goals - to force the Russian command to transfer troops from Donbass, which would reduce the pressure on this section of the front. And if they had managed to capture the nuclear power plant in the region, everyone would have said: "Oh, God, stop immediately, because we don't want another Chernobyl." And this would have given Kiev a chance to say: "Yes, you can return it, but we want, for example, to get Energodar (that is, the Zaporizhzhya NPP - Ed. ) in return." Did the plan work? Partially, since the Russians used the forces prepared for the Kharkov direction for defense. However, only a few units were sent from Donbass to Kursk. And, of course, this was a big blow in psychological terms, because for the first time since the end of World War II, the enemy entered Russian territory proper. I guess if the operation had gone according to plan or even exceeded expectations, everyone would have said, "This will go down in history." But it didn't. What other options did the Ukrainian command have? We have to consider what was behind the planning of this operation and why it was undertaken as an act of desperation? Yes, of course, there is a big debate going on now: wouldn't it have been better to send them there, because, as you know, in the end there was a breakthrough near Ocheretino, which started the offensive on Pokrovsk. But, as I said, stories will be written about this. I just want to put it in context a little bit. - Okay, now about Russia. Does it have the potential for new offensive operations this year? In what areas might it conduct a spring or summer offensive? - Politically, the Russians will try to "cultivate" Trump even more. They will say: "You are a great statesman. Yes, you are absolutely right: peace is necessary. But we need to discuss this and this, and in two weeks this." I think the Russians are quite happy with how the situation is developing politically. No one expected Trump to act this way. He wants to deal with China, so let there be a stalemate peace agreement, and then the Europeans will somehow solve this problem. In terms of war, Russia will increase pressure on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As we have already said, one of the most serious problems of the Ukrainian army is the lack of soldiers, given that the front line is constantly stretching. The Russians, as my Ukrainian colleagues say, behave like water: they penetrate through any unprotected place. At some point, they may end up behind you. And all that remains is to either run away or try to retreat in an organized manner. I wouldn't say that Russia will launch a major offensive. But perhaps one of the goals of the Russian army could be to cross the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk region to show the world that they are there. After all, most people don't study the situation in detail. The headlines will flash "Dnipro", and everyone will say: "Oh my God, they have already reached the regional center (that is, Dnipro - Ed. ), which means they are already on the Dnipro!" - How likely is a ceasefire in Ukraine, which is now much talked about? What could be the general parameters of a peaceful settlement? And when can it be expected? - Imagine the following situation. You and I have to fight each other, using, for example, knives. Blood flows, bones break. And suddenly someone - let's call them the police - intervenes. They separate us and say: "Either you stop immediately, or you will be punished." In this fight between Russia and Ukraine, the only contender for the role of "policeman" is Trump. He says: "I want this to stop: enough bloodshed." And if you do not stop, I will do this and that. Let's imagine that Washington still managed to force the Russians to stop. But then Trump can "turn away", who guarantees that the war will not start again. Of course, the American president can say that he has a "young assistant", that is, the Europeans. And will the Russians take them seriously? And what will happen if they try to stand next to the Ukrainians? But Russia can attack them too, if the Americans do not stand up for them. At the moment, the Russians are saying: "We are not ready to accept the Europeans as an equal party. If European troops are on Ukrainian territory, we will consider them enemies." Russians want to be spoken to as equals. And this is what Putin has already won. He got Trump to talk to him, thereby raising his status. The American president said that Putin is a world leader who can use force to achieve peace. This is a completely different rhetoric than under Obama, who said that Russia is a regional power. This was true in practice, but politically it sounded harsh. And it hurt Moscow a lot. But this is also important to consider when we think about Russian thinking… So, going back to the ceasefire, it all depends on Trump, on whether he can get the Russians to agree to certain conditions. And Russia will say: yes, it was a good pass, but the ball is back in your court because there is still a lot to discuss. We do not want Ukraine in NATO, and the demilitarized zone should extend further east because we do not want Moscow to be attacked by drones and Storm Shadow missiles… And as Putin said the other day: who can guarantee that there will be no violations? Who will monitor this? What neutral force? Let's bring in the Chinese, whom we trust more than the British or the French… There is something that I call "the elephant in the room." These are nuclear weapons, anti-satellite weapons and other means that Russia has. The Ukrainians faced the problem from the very beginning that the Americans were ready to provide a lot, but not everything that was really needed to win the war. Because there was always this "elephant in the room." The question remains: How will Trump get Moscow to do what it needs to do to bring peace? He once talked about tougher sanctions. We've been hearing about that for years. Will it work as Trump hopes? Because if it doesn't, Russia will just keep going. Why should it stop? - Lately, the EU has often said that Putin could attack Europe after the end of the war in Ukraine. Do you think this is a real possibility? - On the one hand, we hear that Russia is already on the verge of collapse, that its soldiers are drunk, running away, etc. On the other hand, that it is going to attack Europe in three or ten years. Propaganda is trying to convince society both of the degradation of the potential enemy and that it can attack Europe, which means it needs to replenish the arsenals from which many weapons were sent to Ukraine. The second requires the consent of Western societies, so now they are trying to wake people up with alarming articles. For example, last year the Financial Times published an article that said that NATO can only control 5% of the airspace of member states. So, is a Russian attack on Europe possible? I would say: who knows. As a historian, I can tell you that the biggest problem with historians is that they give the impression that everything was clear from the beginning. But it is never clear. No one knew that after the First World War there would be a Second World War that would be even worse. It is unlikely that the young men who returned from the battlefield wanted to end up in another one as adults. Or maybe what we see now in Ukraine is what we saw in Spain in 1937. Or maybe it is Munich in 1938. Will Russian tanks roll into Central Europe after Ukraine? I would say no. Why would Russia do that? Because if it did, what would happen is that the Europeans would immediately unite. They would say, "Well, of course it's true: the Russians are the aggressors." Rather, they would continue the hybrid war in an attempt to weaken Western societies by weakening their will to fight. By proving that Russia is not so bad, it is the European leaders who are forcing us to fight against it. And the Russians do not want to fight the Europeans. The exception is the Baltic States. Because if Russia attacked them, and suddenly Article 5 of NATO did not work, since the Europeans would say that they do not want to die for the Baltic States, and the Americans would say that this is Europe's business, then the Alliance would simply fall apart. That is why the situation is so dangerous. Although in Ukraine everything could continue for a long time. And having reached the Dnieper, Russia will prepare to throw itself at Transnistria. I think if the Europeans don't give the Ukrainians some perspective, it could lead to the next government in Ukraine being pro-Russian. For many years now, the Europeans have been saying to different small countries in the Balkans: "Okay, you have to do this, this, this, and this, and then maybe you will become a member of the European Union." And as you can see, some countries in the Balkans are already saying: "What is going on?" - You mentioned plans to rearm Europe . This has been one of the main topics in recent weeks. There is also talk about the need to minimize Europe's dependence on US defense guarantees, up to the creation of a European defense union instead of NATO. How realistic are all these plans? - More and more people are saying that we need to produce more weapons, develop our own capacities to free ourselves from America, etc. But, as I said, it costs a lot of money. Why am I coming back to this again? Because we all live more or less well in Central Europe. Sometimes we have two cars, we go on holiday once a year. Now a person like me comes along and tells people: "Look, we all agreed that climate change is a problem. But there is another problem that is even worse. There may be a war in the future, perhaps with Russia, which we must avoid. We need to invest in defence. We will take the "climate" and "social" money and start producing what is needed for Ukraine and for us. And you may have to hand in your second car, and there will be no holiday this year." How many people would agree with that? - I think most people will disagree. - True. They will do it when "the house is on fire". Then they will call for help "the firemen". And we already feel "smoke", although we do not really see "flames" yet. - By the way, you mentioned the possible role of the US in a potential conflict over the Baltics or Central Europe. Do you think it is a realistic scenario that the US will leave NATO? And what will this mean for Europe? - We are entering an era when it is difficult to make forecasts. It is like predicting the future by looking into a crystal ball. And the most incredible thing is happening. At the recent Munich Security Conference, the Americans blamed the Europeans for everything. And if someone had mentioned this before, they would have been called crazy. Everyone believed that the transatlantic partnership, as the basis of European security, could not change even under Trump. And then, first, US Defense Secretary Hegseth said that the war in Ukraine must be stopped, and those who are against it are responsible for its victims. Then: Ukraine's membership in NATO is not a topic for discussion. And the time has come for the Europeans to enter the arena. However, they should not act in Ukraine, and if something happens, it will not be covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Then Vance showed up and said, "Our enemy is not Russia or China. You are the enemy of your people." After that, he met with Weidel (leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany party Alice Weidel - Ed. ), not with Scholz. Then there was Zelensky's meeting with Trump and Vance in the Oval Office, which no one expected to happen either. Trump is like a candy box. If it says candy on it, it's probably going to be there. In Bob Woodward's book Fury, about Trump's first term, there's a moment when the Army Chief of Staff tells his officers, "At all times of the day and night, one of you must be with the President to prevent things from happening that, in time, you can't control." That same man is now the President of the United States. Is it possible that the Americans will leave NATO? I'd say all options are on the table. We don't know exactly what's going to happen. Now is the moment when we can start developing scenarios. The positive one is if the Europeans wake up and say: "Okay, we will take care of our defense, we will have a relationship with the Americans, maybe more independent, but we will take care of our own security, to ensure deterrence when it comes to, for example, Russia and China. And this deterrence can be projected into the regions, as it is happening with Ukraine, so that the Ukrainians or whoever is left, are not attacked by Russia again." Negative scenario: nothing happens, no deterrence. Putin continues. Europeans quarrel among themselves. America will simply talk to whoever they need at the moment. This situation makes us all much weaker than before. https://strana.today/news/481848-chto-proiskhodit-na-vojne-v-ukraine-i-kohda-ona-zakonchitsja-intervju-s-markusom-rajsnerom.html

There is a topic on this subject with a discussion and analysis. Perhaps both can be unified.

Not turret. Algeria has upgraded T-72s with Sosna-U FCS and Shtora. See upgraded T-72A below.

Perhaps Roman can clarify, but it should be grenades/ammunition dropped by drones.

Thank you, some media were quick to answer the claims. Interview with commander of the medical company in 47th Brigade. Some data on type of wounds: At the beginning of the conversation, you said that the specifics of injuries do not change depending on the direction. Does this also apply to the Kursk operation, in which your brigade is currently involved? Is it mainly shrapnel? Yes, about 90%. It's fpv, mortars, artillery. There are very few bullets. Almost all the work is done by drones - dumps, fpv. Often the wounded, if they can, describe the situation in which they were wounded. Almost always it's fpv or dumps. https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3537619/komandyr-medroty-47-yi-brygady-pozyvnyyi-mahaon

AK-12 with non-standard? forward handguard

There were a feww articles in the Ukrainian and French press on this topic: Why SAMP/T may really have problems shooting down ballistic missiles For SAMP/T, of course, the ability to combat ballistic targets is declared, but there is no clarification on which Aster 30 missiles Allegedly, the European SAMP/T anti-aircraft missile systems turned out to be ineffective not only because of the lack of missiles for them, but also because they do not work well against ballistic targets. Defense Express has already devoted a publication to the first question, in which it analyzed how many missiles for SAMP/T exist in total and how many are produced. However, the problem of destroying ballistic targets voiced by the sources is really more complicated and requires a separate publication. The problem with intercepting ballistic targets, announced by "people familiar with the matter," is supposedly software-related. And this immediately evokes a parallel with the repetition of history with the problematic Patriot software that missed Iraqi Scuds in 1991. Recall that the error in the code concerned time measurement, which occurred due to the Patriot being on combat duty for a long time. But it is unlikely that SAMP/T has exactly the same problem, which became a well-known illustrative example of a bug in the code that cost the lives of American military personnel. However, it should be noted that the problem was also in the GEM-T missiles themselves, which do not guarantee the destruction of the warhead of a ballistic missile in the air, which is why the CRI anti-missile was first created, and then the MSE with kinetic interception technologies . As for the SAMP/T capability, according to official information on the capabilities of destroying ballistic missiles, it is declared only for the Aster 30 Block 1 and Block 1 NT versions of the missiles. Block 1 appeared in the early 2010s and differs from the basic version in new homing head software and updated missile control systems. The first test interception of ballistic targets by this missile took place in 2010. However, the supply of SAMP/T to the French army began earlier than this moment, back in 2007, and a little later to the Italian army, that is, they initially came with Aster 30 Block 0 missiles. It is also worth adding time to the adoption of the new version of the missile, the start of serial production and delivery to the army of Aster 30 Block 1. Moreover, in fact, immediately after the completion of work on Block 1 in 2015, the program for creating the Aster 30 Block 1NT was launched. The reason for the upgrade is to expand the ability to combat ballistic missiles. That is, the very fact of the need for the next upgrade directly indicates that the regular Block 1 is not doing well with intercepting ballistic targets. It is Block 1NT that should become one of the updates to the entire air defense system, which was called SAMP/T NG, which will be launched into production in 2026. At the same time, the French themselves said that thanks to SAMP/T NG they will be able to shoot down "even the Dagger." The destruction of which by Patiot available in Ukraine has long been no news, which also hints at certain limited capabilities of the European air defense system compared to the American one. The new Aster 30 Block 1NT differs from the previous Block 1 version in that it has a new radar homing head in the Ka-band (26.5-40 GHz), which allows it to hit targets more accurately than the previous version of the Aster 30 Block 1 ARGSN, which operated in the Ku-band (10.7-12.75 GHz). Of course, the French and British navies have proven to have shot down ballistic missiles using the Aster 30 during a civil navigation support operation in the Red Sea. But the exact missile consumption and overall effectiveness of the ship-based system have not been announced. Moreover, there may be a significant difference in the fire control system between ship-based and ground-based SAMs. That is, in general, regarding the real capabilities of SAMP/T to intercept ballistic targets, there may actually be questions not in terms of "maybe - may not", but in terms of real effectiveness, taking into account the specific version of the anti-aircraft missile and ballistic missile being intercepted. https://defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/chomu_u_sampt_dijsno_mozhut_buti_problemi_zi_zbittjam_balistichnih_raket-18218.html

Edited. I found the article in Reuters. He makes a comment on Ukrainian missile intercepts, but maybe journalist got confused: Russia's Shoigu was quoted as saying the number of claimed Ukrainian missile intercepts in general is "three times greater than the number we launch". "And they get the type of missiles wrong all the time. That's why they don't hit them," he said, without elaborating. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/air-defence-systems-repelling-attacks-ukraine-early-tuesday-officials-2023-05-16/

As I understand the APU would be mounted outside the hull.

Not Hitler but former minister of defense Shoigu, who claimed that missile/UAV data provided by Ukraine was several times larger than the one launched by Russia. Even Ukrainian sources do not agree, as data presented by Ukrainian Armed Forces commander Syrskyi in August 2022 were rather different to that of KPZSU (Ukrainian Air Force Command).

The Indian Army’s much-anticipated induction of the Arjun Mk1A Main Battle Tank (MBT) has hit a significant delay, with deliveries now postponed to late 2028 or early 2029. This setback stems from a failure to reach an agreement between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and German engine manufacturer MTU Friedrichshafen over restarting production of the engines originally slated for the Arjun Mk1A. Sources close to the Indian Army have confirmed to idrw.org that, rather than adopting an alternative MTU engine requiring extensive trials, the Army has opted to integrate the indigenous DATRAN 1500hp engine, which will only enter production in 2028. This decision marks a pivotal shift toward self-reliance, even as it pushes back the modernization of India’s armoured fleet. The Arjun Mk1A, an upgraded variant of the Arjun Mk1 MBT, was ordered by the Indian Army in September 2021, with an initial batch of 118 units valued at ?7,523 crore ($907 million). Designed to enhance firepower, mobility, and survivability, the Mk1A was intended to be powered by the German MTU MB 838 Ka-501 V10 diesel engine, a 1,400hp powerplant that drives the earlier Arjun Mk1 tanks. Deliveries were initially scheduled to begin in September 2024, with the final batch expected by 2027. However, MTU’s cessation of production for this older engine model—coupled with its reluctance to restart the line for what it deemed a modest order—has derailed the timeline. According to idrw.org, negotiations between DRDO and MTU faltered when the German firm declined to resume production of the legacy engine. Instead, MTU offered a newer variant, which would have necessitated 2-3 years of trials and modifications to ensure compatibility with the Arjun Mk1A’s chassis and systems. This proposal was met with skepticism by DRDO and the Indian Army, who saw it as a costly and time-consuming detour that would further delay an already protracted program. Faced with this impasse, DRDO and the Indian Army have pivoted to the indigenous DATRAN 1500hp engine, developed in collaboration with Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML). Sources told idrw.org that the Army has agreed to induct the Arjun Mk1A with this new powerplant, bypassing the MTU option entirely. The DATRAN engine, first tested in 2023 and successfully fired again in March 2024 at BEML’s Mysuru facility, promises enhanced power (100hp more than the MTU 838) and adaptability to India’s diverse terrains—from Rajasthan’s deserts to Ladakh’s high altitudes. However, this shift comes with a catch: the DATRAN 1500hp engine won’t enter full-scale production until 2028. While the engine has shown promise in initial trials, it requires extensive ground-based testing and integration into the Arjun platform. BEML has been tasked with manufacturing 20 additional DATRAN engines, which will be used to scale up testing, including upcoming trials on older Arjun prototypes. This rigorous validation process, expected to span 2-3 years post-2025 trials, ensures the engine meets the Indian Army’s stringent reliability and performance standards, pushing deliveries to late 2028 or early 2029. The postponement is a blow to the Indian Army’s modernization plans, which rely on the Arjun Mk1A to bolster its armoured capabilities along the western and northern borders. The Mk1A, weighing 68 tons and equipped with advanced Kanchan composite armour and a 120mm rifled gun, outperformed the Russian T-90 in comparative trials in 2010, excelling in firepower and mobility. Yet, its heavy weight and dependence on foreign engines have long been points of contention, with the Army historically favoring lighter Russian T-72s and T-90s (comprising over 3,400 of its 4,000-tank fleet). The transition to DATRAN is not without hurdles. Integrating a new engine into the Arjun Mk1A requires modifications to the tank’s engine bay and transmission, a process that idrw.org sources estimate will take at least two years of testing after initial trials begin in mid-to-late 2025. The Army’s decision to wait for DATRAN rather than induct a limited batch with older MTU engines (of which DRDO holds a small stockpile) signals a long-term commitment to self-reliance, even at the cost of near-term delays. https://idrw.org/arjun-mk1a-delivery-schedule-revised-to-2028-2029-following-engine-selection/ Note that Arjun is stated as using a EuroPowerPack unit with different transmission, but engine is also different, being a V10 MB 838 Ka-501 derived from Leopard 1 MB 838 CaM 500 . Anyone knows the coding used for MTU engines? I come across designations like Ka-500/501 for different engines but no explanation. Same with MB 838, MB 873, MT 883, do they refer to any specific characteristic?

I don't recall the Europack being considered in latest or past acquisitions. Is reliability the same? The French have considered it for the Leclerc to keep it in service as current hyperbar model is no longer produced: https://alejandro-8.blogspot.com/2023/12/el-tanque-frances-leclerc-debera.html

Summary of missiles and suicide drones launched by Russia. Last February there was a large increase in Shahed used against targets in Ukraine, 3,899 vs 2,538 in January. I have trouble believing those production figures.

Current and future developments for Leopard 2 engine. Note that EuroPowerPack derivatives are used by Arjun Mk 1A, Leclerc Tropicalisée, K2 Black Panther and Merkava Mk 4. MB 873 and 10V199 – Rolls-Royce expands production capacity for the Leopard 2 engine and develops a possible alternative Rolls-Royce Power Systems AG, formerly MTU Friedrichshafen, an engine manufacturer based in Friedrichshafen, Baden-Württemberg, is investing heavily in additional production capacity for the proven Leopard 2 engine MB 873 and is simultaneously developing the 10V199, an engine that can be used as an alternative engine for the Leopard 2 tank family, among other things. This engine is significantly lighter with the same performance, requires less installation space and promises logistical advantages in relation to the armed forces' overall combat vehicle fleet. Although the Leopard 2 has been in use for almost 50 years, the engine known as the MB 873 is still considered the gold standard today. The robustness and low vulnerability of the multi-fuel engine, even when supplied with low-quality fuel, are highly valued among tank drivers. Originally developed for the Kampfpanzer 70 project in the mid-1960s, the MB 873 has been mass-produced since 1978 for all Leopard 2 battle tanks and the entire Leopard 2 vehicle family. Although the main battle tank has undergone several modernization steps during its service life, the drive system has remained essentially unchanged. The main reason for this is logistics. A change to the engine or engines requires adjustments to the transmission, the cooling system and the rest of the drive train and, depending on the type of change, possibly even to the hull in order to be able to adjust the required installation space accordingly. These changes have such a massive impact on logistics that a repowering option for the Leopard 2 investigated some time ago by Rolls-Royce (then still known as MTU) using an engine known as the EuroPowerPack based on the MTU MT883 Ka-500/501 engine was considered ineffective by Leopard 2 users. However , with the recent award of a Bundeswehr development study for an alternative engine for the Leopard 2, known as "OLYMP", to the tank manufacturer KNDS Germany, which is to be based on a Liebherr engine - hartpunkt reported - the project seems to have gained momentum. Since the Leopard 2 fleet will certainly remain in service for several more decades, users clearly see a need to at least examine the possibility of a repowering option in more detail. investment in the MB 873 In Rolls-Royce's opinion, such an investigation would not be necessary for reasons of obsolescence. The company confirmed this when asked by hartpunkt. The opposite is the case: the Friedrichshafen engine builder has invested "heavily" in expanding MB-873 production and, according to its own statements, has doubled its production capacity. Around 100 new employees have been hired in defense engine production in order to be able to meet the generally growing demand. In the last two years alone, around 245 new Leopard 2 battle tanks have been ordered by several nations, plus an agreed option for 20 more and order announcements for around 160 additional battle tanks. In addition, there are orders and expectations for numerous other support vehicles based on the Leopard 2. All of these tanks must be equipped with new engines. "Whatever is needed, we have no difficulty producing these quantities in Germany," Rolls-Royce told hartpunkt. In contrast to the production of the Leopard 1 engines, which have not been replenished for years, the MB 873 has, according to the manufacturer, been manufactured continuously due to demand, so that the supply chains are accordingly active. Rolls-Royce also sees potential to extract more power from the engine if this is desired or necessary. The power of the MB 873 can apparently be increased from the current 1,100 kW to around 1,200 kW. However, this would require at least an adjustment to the transmission. The braking system would probably also have to be modified to cope with the additional power. Development of the 10V199 Independently of the efforts to expand the production capacity of the MB 873, Rolls-Royce is currently developing an engine based on the 199 engine series that could also be used as an alternative engine for the Leopard 2. The 199 engine series is widely used and is used in numerous combat vehicles. The 6-cylinder variants (6V199) are installed, for example, in the Fuchs 2 and Piranha V wheeled armored vehicles and the ACSV G5 tracked vehicle. The 8-cylinder versions (8V199) power the Boxer wheeled armored vehicle and numerous tracked vehicles - Ajax, ASCOD, M10 Booker and Borsuk. Since the 199 series uses the same repair and training concept as well as many identical parts (pistons, cylinder heads, etc.), significant logistical synergy advantages and economies of scale can be realized across the entire fleet of the armed forces. With the 10V199, another variant of the series will soon be available on the market, which can also power battle tanks. As Rolls-Royce told hartpunkt, the company is currently developing the engine at its own expense. The first engines are to be delivered to an unspecified customer in 2026. The 10V199, like the MB 873, is expected to be able to deliver up to 1,100 kW. The engine manufacturer also states that it carried out a study on the integration of the 10V199 into the Leopard 2 at its own expense. The result showed that the engine could be successfully installed in the battle tank with appropriate changes to the transmission and cooling. Since the 10V199 (around 27 liters of displacement) is shorter than the MB 873 (47.6 liters of displacement), space would be freed up in the tank hull, which could be used for other purposes. The weight of the 10V199 should also be significantly lower than the 2.2 tons of the MB 873. Waldemar Geiger https://www.hartpunkt.de/mb-873-und-10v199-rolls-royce-baut-produktionskapazitaeten-fuer-den-leopard-2-motor-aus-und-entwickelt-eine-moegliche-alternative/