ScottBrim

Ken, if the Cascadia Fault lets loose with The Big One at 02:00 in the morning, all you Puget Sounders will be having quite a few more headaches to deal with in addition to the ones you may have had before you turned in. In other news, my youngest son has now been offered career status. My advice to him is that he hasn't yet done all the useful things he can do in the USMC, and that he should stay on through another contract while getting the kind of diverse experience that will serve him well whatever he decides to do next in life.

The Zumwalts are not good candidates for lasers, railguns, and for DEW weapons for the simple fact that these new systems will have shipboard footprints well in excess of what the DDG-1000's tumblehome hullform can handle without getting into regimes where potential hullform instability becomes an absolute certainty, not just a possibility. The DDG-1000 architecture shares the same basic problem the LCS architecture does. It is a permanent prisoner of the prior bad decision making that produced it.

Halidon, back in 2008, the Navy's senior leadership attempted to cancel the Zumwalt program altogether, recognizing that no one was certain the ships would work; and if they did work, no one was quite certain what the ships would be working for. By 2008, some number of the technical and operational assumptions under which the program had been originally justified had been overcome by events and/or by a recognition that some number of those original assumptions were faulty from Day One. By 2008, five-inch ERGM had been cancelled because its unit costs unburdened by R&D had approached $100,000 per round for a buy of 10,000 rounds. The AGS system's 155mm LRLAP round would clearly be suffering from the same unit cost issues for a similar quantity buy. Another issue is that the 155mm AGS system carries an exceptionally large shipboard footprint relative to the terminal effects at the target it is actually capable of delivering, making its future value as a general-purpose fire support system for use aboard other types of displacement-constrained warships highly questionable. Regarding the future value of the AGS ordnance handling system, the handling systems for railguns are likely to have significantly different technical and operational requirements in comparison with the 155mm AGS ammunition handling system. AGS cannot handle conventional projectiles. The ordnance used by a railgun system -- assuming a practical railgun ever comes to fruition, a dubious prospect IMHO -- will likely be a true projectile, it will not be a gun-launched rocket-boosted gliding missile as is the 155mm LRLAP. Regarding the Zumwalt's tumblehome hullform, it was recognized by 2008 that improvements in networked anti-stealth sensor technologies which are embedded inside a network-centric information processing environment would render all large surface warships unstealthy, regardless of any passive stealth features they might carry. Not to mention that a surface combatant becomes immediately visible once it begins to employ its radars and once it begins firing its weapons. Moreover, the tumblehome hullform is not as volume efficient as a conventional hullform on the same displacement. By 2008, it was recognized that the supposed stealth benefits of the Zumwalt's tumblehome hullform were completely illusory and that the considerable risks of using this hullform were not worth the meager benefits it might provide in that short period of time which passed before advances in networked sensor technology rendered the hullform worthless as a stealth technique. The Mk-57 VLS may prove useful aboard other ships. The automation features might also prove to have some value, assuming they are reliable enough. But this has yet to be demonstrated in actual practice. Parts and pieces of the Integrated power System will be used in other ships. Passive measures such as heavy armor and stealthy superstructures & hullforms are no longer effective as vessel survivability features. The future survivability of a warship will depend upon active measures such as lasers, a variety of offensive and defensive missiles, a variety of offensive and defensive gun systems, and directed microwave energy systems -- with all of these systems being directed and coordinated across the battlespace by distributed sensor intelligence embedded within a battleforce network information architecture.

The $476,000 figure has to be the marginal unit cost of the LRLAP 'projectile', unburdened by R&D, for the rounds that will be consumed in AGS system testing over the next several years. What would be the marginal unit cost of a buy of 3000 LRLAP projectitiles? (The round is actually a gun-launched rocket-boosted gliding missile.) Five-inch ERGM was cancelled after its estimated marginal unit cost less R&D approached $100,000 for a buy of 10,000 rounds. The marginal unit cost of a buy of 3,000 LRLAP rounds unburdened by R&D costd has to be in the range of $150,000 to $200,000 at least. In 2005, after the Zumwalt program had been cut to seven ships from an original figure of 32 in the late 1990's, it was clear that the utility of the 155mm AGS system would be very limited compared to what was originally envisioned, simply owing to the fact that there would never be enough Zumwalts on the gun line to supply effective 155mm support. Suggestions were being made in 2009, after the program had been cut to three ships, that with such a limited number of ships carrying 155mm AGS, and given the excessively large shipboard footprint the system carries relative to its true utility as an NSFS system, it made more sense to replace the two AGS guns with a centerline Mk-41 VLS configuration. This option was never given serious consideration. "Why not?", we must ask. Once IOC has been declared for the Zumwalt Class and a few hundred 155mm LRLAP rounds have been loaded aboard the first Zumwalt hull, the Navy will then declare that the USMC's near-term and mid-term NSFS requirements have been achieved and that priority will shift to further development of railgun technology. In reality what will happen is that a practical railgun which can do what the latest 5-inch conventional gun systems can do will never actually appear aboard a US Navy warship, most all the money needed to field such a system having been spent shoring up US Navy TACAIR instead.

I don't know if the figure is accurate, but on another forum, someone quoted the current 155mm LRLAP unit price as being $492,000 per round based on FY 2016 DOD budget documents -- just a bit higher than the $100,000 figure that was being estimated in 2008.

In watching the debates which are now occurring on various military blogs concerning the LCS and the Carter memo, a question arises from that memo which I don't think has been fully addressed in any of those debates. If the SecDef and OSD want to emphasize naval power projection missions over naval presence missions as a means of addressing budget shortfalls as they affect naval shipbuilding, then what kind of 'larger-than-an-LCS but smaller-than-a-Burke warship' is appropriate for serving that mission emphasis? A whole slew of alternative design philosophies is being pushed by various LCS critics, starting at 3000 tons with the Korean FFX's and then moving on up in displacement increments through the Nansen's, the Meko's, and the Absalons, eventually peaking out at the Type 26, which displaces roughly 8,000 tons. In this month's issue of USNI Proceedings, Norman Friedman offers his opinion that there is nothing inherently wrong with the concept of an exchangeable mission module, but that the reliability and overall suitability of the LCS as a platform for hosting the mission module concept has been severely compromised by its speedboat requirement. Friedman sees little need for the LCS speed requirement; and so the question arises, is there a need in the US Navy for a frigate which carries a displacement larger than the LCS but smaller than a Burke, one which covers a range of displacements between 3000 tons and say, 9000 tons as the upper limit, and which embarks more combat systems carrying greater throughput capacity and greater lethality than the LCS can ever carry? Or ..... is there any kind of justification at all to build such a warship, if naval power projection missions are being emphasized over naval presence missions?

And in other LCS news, as reported on Defense News by Chris Cavas, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, in a December 14th memo to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, told the Navy to "reduce the planned LCS/FF procurement from 52 to 40, creating a 1-1-1-1-2 profile, for eight fewer ships in the FYDP, and then downselect to one variant by FY 2019. Pentagon Cuts LCS to 40 Ships, 1 Shipbuilder Over on Commander Salamander, the "I told you so about LCS" response is reaching a creshendo, as it rightly should, of course. Oh, There's LCS News? Go Get the Gibbets. My own speculation here is that SecDef Carter is laying the foundation for a decision to be made in two or three years time to truncate the LCS program to a figure even lower than 40 ships, possibly to 24 or fewer. More opinions are emerging as to what purpose the Carter memo to SecNav Mabus concerning the LCS actually serves. The Carter memo has much significance beyond the issues concerning the LCS and how effective a platform it actually is. A strong difference of philosophy exists between the Navy leadership and what SecDef Carter and OSD believe ought to be the Navy's strategic focus. The Navy leadership wants an emphasis on ship numbers to support naval presence missions, while SecDef Carter and OSD want a focus on power projection missions. This article by Bryan McGrath over on Information Dissemination discusses the purposes of the memo: SECNAV Gets a Memo Information Dissemination reader "ntenghtim" offers these insights: What are the implications for the proper design of the Navy's fleet architecture as a whole if power projection missions are to be emphasized over naval presence missions?

And in other LCS news, as reported on Defense News by Chris Cavas, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, in a December 14th memo to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, told the Navy to "reduce the planned LCS/FF procurement from 52 to 40, creating a 1-1-1-1-2 profile, for eight fewer ships in the FYDP, and then downselect to one variant by FY 2019. Pentagon Cuts LCS to 40 Ships, 1 Shipbuilder Over on Commander Salamander, the "I told you so about LCS" response is reaching a creshendo, as it rightly should, of course. Oh, There's LCS News? Go Get the Gibbets. My own speculation here is that SecDef Carter is laying the foundation for a decision to be made in two or three years time to truncate the LCS program to a figure even lower than 40 ships, possibly to 24 or fewer.

OK people, let's say it again once more .... the Navy's stated reason for why the 57 mm gun was dropped from the Zumwalt Class in favor of a 30 mm gun was that the 57 mm gun was not delivering the vendor's stated performance capabilities -- not because the 30 mm had advantages in either cost savings or in weight savings over the 57 mm. Had the 57 mm gun actually performed according to the vendor's advertised specifications, there is every reason to believe it would still be used aboard the DDG-1000.

It's kinda hard to understand what these performance issues could be, the gun has been in service for many years in several navies. I can't imagine a scenario where low-firepower 30mm gun would be superior, such a scenario must be extremely narrowly defined. Only signifant performance advantage 30mm would have would be in the cost department... The rumor mill is saying that in field trials, the most recent versions of the 57mm gun and its ammunition have not met the vendor's stated performance figures in the areas of reliable operation under all environmental conditions; accurate target identification, acquisition, and tracking; and in producing reliable terminal effects at the target. Older versions of the 57mm are no longer being produced, but are also rumored to have issues, even if those issues are not nearly as severe as the ones the latest versions of the gun and its ammunition are experiencing. The LCS program is apparently sticking with the 57 mm gun. So either the DDG-1000 program managers are making a big mistake by dropping the 57mm gun from the Zumwalt Class, or else the LCS program managers are making a big mistake by keeping that gun for the Littoral Combat Ship. EDIT: Or else the US Navy is making a big mistake by keeping both the DDG-1000 and the LCS.

Strange they didn't replace 57mm from the LCS then...unstabilized 30mm chain gun costs fraction what a 57mm gun does, seems to me it would be a no-brainer to have better gun for less money. The rumor is that the performance problems with the 57mm are real and are not easily fixed, and that little or no communication on any topic is happening between the DDG-1000 program and the LCS program. This wouldn't be too surprising given that the US Navy has lost much of its in-house technical expertise over the past two decades. When technical programs are highly compartmentalized in their relationships with other major programs, news of any kind travels slowly in these kinds of circumstances; or sometimes not at all if the news is potentially very bad news for those who haven't heard it yet. Probably the definition set out by Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director Operational Test & Evaluation. Except for one thing ... the last time I looked, about six months ago, I didn't see that the first Zumwalt had been scheduled to enter formal DOT&E. Maybe the Navy could send the ship around Cape Horn in the meantime. Now you are being mean. If the Zumwalt sails around Cape Horn and survives it should be good most any sea state I guess. The North Atlantic would seem to offer some good opportunities for testing the ship in higher sea states -- unless ot course climate change causes a five-year pause in severe ocean storms, part of Mother Nature's plan to mess with our minds when we start to think we can control the earth's weather through our choice atmospheric CO2 concentrations.

Probably the definition set out by Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director Operational Test & Evaluation. Except for one thing ... the last time I looked, about six months ago, I didn't see that the first Zumwalt had been scheduled to enter formal DOT&E. Maybe the Navy could send the ship around Cape Horn in the meantime.

The two 57mm guns were dropped from the Zumwalt in favor of two 30mm guns because of the 57mm's performance issues. The Navy said that the 57mm guns simply did not perform according to the vendor's promises. Everything we say about the ship's seakeeping performance is speculative at this point until the vessel has been operated in a series of progressively higher sea states. If no serious issues are discovered with the hullform's seakeeping performance, and if the ship's other systems perform acceptably, serious pressure from Congress will then be brought to bear against the Navy leadership to keep building the Zumwalt Class beyond the three hulls now in the acquisition pipeline. If this happens, I've promised Greg Lof over on the Navweaps.com forums that I will buy him dinner at his favorate Portland restaurant.

. There she sails. As the ship was passing by on her way to her first sea trials, she was heard to whisper, "Take that all you Zumwalt skeptics!" There has been talk that some factions inside the Navy want to cancel the third ship. I think it is reasonable to predict that regardless of what is discovered while the DDG-1000's upcoming sea trials are underway, Congress will force completion of the third ship and will allocate some level of funding every year to keep the Zumwalt program alive, even if no further hulls are constructed beyond the first three. Once IOC for the Zumwalt Class has been declared, it is also likely the Navy will then issue a memorandum that the USMC's near-term and mid-term Naval Surface Fire Support requirements have been met, and that research on railguns will continue as the Navy's preferred solution to the USMC's far term NSFS requirements.

If the basic ISIS message of relentless jihad against the infidels has already been embraced by some number of fundamentalist Muslims throughout the world, then within the broad context of The Long War -- a clash of religions and cultures which may last several hundred years, if not longer -- does it matter if most ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq are eventually killed, and the cities ISIS now occupies in Syria and Iraq are eventually liberated?