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arctic fox

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  1. Oh crap, I thought they were going to keep one Armoured Brigade. I find these news deeply disappointing. Also, I thought Karelian Brigade did some MBT training as well. Some bad news for me. -AF
  2. Aren't we running out of tanks? The two Mechanized Groups each need 29 Leos. How many does Karelian Brigade get? Would imagine that at least the same two companies. Not too many left for the Armoured Brigade... What am I missing? -AF
  3. I may be wrong, but the following is my understanding of how Strix is used. Strix isn't to be used against a MBT company on a move. Strix has a specific function different to ATGMs and tanks. Strix is an asset for forward recon elements. Once a forward recon team detects a high value vehicle target, like a bridging or command vehicle, it calls for Strix fire. Strix is less vulnerable to enemy counterbattery systems than normal artillery batteries, because a 120mm mortar system is so much harder to detected before it fires. When it fires it is too late for counterbattery fires: It has already taken out that high value target, say a bridging or command vehicle, and enemy operations would be temporarily halted on that sector. Unlike artillery batteries, ATGMs or tanks, Strix is stealthy, fast and doesn't require that the firing system is able to see the target. Because Strix doesn't require that the target is lased, the forward recon team that calls fire isn't so easily revealed to the enemy. Needs and realities for Nordic countries are different to those of US. The main threat for countries like Sweden and Finland is a Russian invasion. Strix is a very valuable asset in terrain of northern Sweden or that of Finland. Visibility is often limited to less than 500 meters, there are many rivers to cross and trees and other vegetation often prevent effective use of ATGMs and even tanks. Furthermore small countries like Sweden or Finland have no realistic means to use their air arm against the ground forces of an opponent like Russia. -AF
  4. I have no personal experience with Strix, but this is what I have heard from Finns and Swedes who have used STRIX. Correct me if I am wrong. Strix is used (called) by forward recon elements. Targets would be static vehicles like bridging equipment, command vehicles and other high value targets. Strix is not accurate enough to be used against moving targets. Accuracy against stationary targets is about 50%. AMOS is not excellent because it is turretted, twin barreled and can be used in direct fire role. It is excellent because it can fire so that up to 14 rounds hit the target at the same moment. Imagine if all the 14 rounds would be STRIX. -AF
  5. That book has a very stupid name. I don't mean to belittle hardness of Cassino, but battles fought in campaigns like Winter War were extremely brutal. If he means just the Western Allies he might be not so far off, but then the book should have a different name.
  6. Having one more Panzer Corps wouldn't have been a solution, as they already had too many to keep them supplied. German advances at, for example, Leningrad were not stalled because of lack of troops: They were stalled because of lack of supplies. If you think about it as a game, the Germans could move only one or two units at a time. You can't move just the Panzer Corps units, because in that case you can't secure the flanks, finish off the encircled units and have secured supply lines. Perhaps if they would have had less troops they might have gotten further, in one or two directions, but I don't know if they would have held sufficient force in that case. They already had serious problems with finishing off encircled forces and they were pushed back in the Soviet winter counter-offence even with the forces they had. Imagine the situation if Germans were half the strength and Red Army would have sustained only half of the losses in 1941. I think the German plan was good, in that it attempted to destroy Red Army already in the West. Germans correctly saw the danger of not destroying the Red Army early on and going instead for big magic targets like Moscow and Leningrad. If Germans would have gone for Leningrad, not to mention Moscow which had huge reserves, early on, it might have just turned out to be another Stalingrad. In my opinion Germans, like everyone else, just did not know the full strength of Red Army and underestimated their opponent. They had some bad luck with the weather, but the logistical situation was a nightmare already before the weather monster awakened.
  7. I thought this might be taking place. I agree with you as well. Honestly, I do not know if Zhukov had Stalin's approval for what he did in Khalkin Gol. I think Stalin's purges hadn't reached, full scale, Far East yet in 1939. I just know that Soviet generals did use their own initiative at several places, and later in the war Stalin gave his generals much more freedom than Hitler gave his. I totally agree about the historical importance of Khalkin Gol. Yes, Voroshilov was very much involved in the purges and getting the old doctrine scrapped. He played to Stalin's paranoia at least by spreading rumours.
  8. Because of his own excellent initiative (yes, Soviet generals did take initiative already before and during 1941), for which he did get a lot of praise. It was one of the reasons why Soviets begun the transition back to the old doctrine in 1940. It's also a good case of the great potential of the Red Army, as Kahlkin Gol was a "blitzkrieg" operation that took place even before the German invasion of Poland. Still, Khalkin Gol was, after all, quite a small battle, and while it perhaps was Deep Battle on a small scale, it wasn't the kind of large Deep Battle the Soviets envisioned. Soviets really did scrap the old doctrine. Before they did it in 1937, the Red Army was the only force in the world, as far as I know, where concepts like Deep Battle and Combined Arms held official key position. Even Germans didn't emphasize "blitzkrieg" to such point. Not only did Soviets scrap the doctrine, they also scrapped the backbone of Deep Battle: the Mechanized Corps. I think only two Mechanized Corps (each equivalent of one German division) were left when the transition back begun in 1940. In 1941 they had to adapt, and what was left of Mechanized Corps were mostly just Mechanized Brigades. It wasn't until 1942 that they could begin to have larger level mechanized units and fight real Deep Battle. Thanks, most of all, to people like Fedorenko, who worked further with the theories created by Tukhachevsky.
  9. Soviets dropped the Tukhachevsky's and other's doctrines only for the period between 1937-1939. Soviets got the old doctrine back already in 1940, after the failures in Poland and Finland, and the success against the Japanese. By June 1941 they did not have enough resources to apply the doctrine fully and were caught in the middle of transition. In 1942 they begun to have enough resources to be able to use the doctrine, and by 1944 they mastered it better than their German opponents. While originally a brainchild of Tukhachevsky's, it was people like Fedorenko who refined the theory into practice. Why the Soviet doctrine was so advanced? I recommend comparing it to what other nations had at the time. Most of the Western Allies, with their passive defensive WW1 doctrines, believed that tanks should be used alone, and for example the British used naval tactics with tanks. There's worlds of difference to refined concepts of combined arms operational warfare and deep battle. I also recommend studying the Soviet application of the doctrines in 1944-1945. I agree Germans were better tactically, it was the strategical and operational level that the Soviets mastered.
  10. I haven't seen sources that would claim that the purges continued after 1939. Why would the purges have returned in 1942, then? Yes, Soviets learned from lessons of the past and present, and the Soviet doctrine went thru adaptions still during the war, not least because Red Army was caught in the middle of transition. The Soviet doctrine was very advanced in 1940s, even more advanced than that of the Germans and certainly more advanced than those of the Western Allies (save perhaps the US, whose doctrine I am not that familiar with).
  11. That's true and there still were executions, but as far as I know the actual purges were already over. Soviet doctrine, as such, was perhaps the most advanced in the world.
  12. I think the main reasoning is that in that one year of time the pilots and the new officers would have been a lot better trained. Many of the serving officers never got to finish their training and the pilots often had flown with the real planes only a couple of times. And of course time favors the Soviets with production. I have the impression that Stalin's purges, what comes to officers, took place mainly during 1937-1939, so in 1941 it was generally over, but there wasn't yet enough of new officers to replace the purged ones.
  13. Operations at Balkans, and other such "diversions", were used by Germans as excuses for their heavy troop presence by the Soviet border. They used the air war at West, and many other things, for similar purposes. Had there been no such "diversions", it is very likely that Soviets would not have bought so deep into German lies, and German invasion in June 1941 wouldn't have found Soviet forces so unprepared, which was one key element for German victories in 1941.
  14. Glantz points out many reasons why Soviets were caught so off balance in June 1941. The killing of officers is just one of them. Here's a quote from the book you quoted earlier ("When Titans Clashed", by David M. Glantz), from page 44. "In retrospect, the most serious Soviet failture was neither strategic surprise nor tactical surprise, but institutional surprise. In June 1941, the Red Army and Air Force were in transition, changing their organization, leadership, equipment, training, troop dispositions, and defensive plans. Had Hitler attacked four years earlier or even one year later, the Soviet armed forces would have been more than a match for the Wehrmacht. Wether by coincidence or instinct, however, the German dictator invaded at a time when his own armed forces were still close to their peak while his arch enemy was most vulnerable. It was this institutional surprise that was most responsible for the catastrophic Soviet defeats of 1941." Emphasis mine.
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