Ol Paint

USN is apparently pursuing the NSC modified into a FFG. If true, that's a good move for a start. That's what they should've done ten years ago. Buy a short run, and start immediate work on the follow-on. Doug

Close escort is not effective and unnecessary. Except for plane guard. So stop focusing on that. It isn't 1950 anymore. Doug

That's the beauty of my approach. By buying 5 at a time, successive rounds of RFPs can be adjusted as mission needs or technology change. Meanwhile, the ships share common subsystem components, like chillers, deck equipment, and pumps so the logistics support at the bases, training schools, and maintenance centers is common across classes. The politicians and general public won't like the plan, because they all believe warships are widgets produced in the tens of thousands. The industry leaders won't like it, because they want to lock up the market in a safe monopoly or duopoly with high barriers to entry. Doug

There's more to the Navy than CVNs. The DDGs & CGs should be focused on CVBG operations and independent operation in high-threat environments. Let's use the Taiwan scenario--the Large Surface Combatants (LSC)--would be concentrated in the forward areas in and around the 1st & 2nd island chain. The FFGs are needed for escorting ARGs and the logistics train from CONUS to the combat area, possibly leavened with a DDG or CG as an escort commander. This means the FFG needs the ability to independently operate in low- to medium-threat areas, have the ability to escort merchant shipping (including oilers, containerships, ROROs, etc) necessary for a force to hold and/or take ground, including entering the main battle area. There's also going to be a need to provide support to the Marine outposts and the USV/UUV fleet. I'd like to see a 30+kt capability in FFG, because escorting a 24kt LMSR or ARG is a lot easier if the escort has the capability to prosecute a contact then rejoin the formation--even station keeping is easier if there's some margin on speed. We're in a situation more akin to the 1980s Soviet threat where we can't rely on distance to protect our supply lines, not fighting the Houthis or Taliban, where the enemy has no ability to reach very far past the horizon. China has ASBMs, SSNs, long-range maritime patrol and strike capabilites, and is building significant surface combatant capability. Given the volume of Chinese technology, I wouldn't count on the US being the only drone fleet operators. There's definitely a role for a modern Perry equivalent--which is exactly what the USN asked for with the FFG(X) program. Doug

I believe there's a rather obvious and straightforward strategy that we could use going forward (but we won't, because everyone in decision-making circles thinks ships are the same as F150s). Break up the FFG(X) into a multi-phase contract. Phase I - Put out an immediate RFP with a 120-day deadline for a block buy of (3) FFG plus two options. The specification is identical to the FFG-62 performance spec. Competitors have the option of taking the current FMM TDP and completing the FFG-62 design, or may submit proposals based on their prior submittals. First ship contract delivery should be 2030, with 1 ship/year to follow. Detailed design TDP becomes property of the USN for potential use in follow-on competitions. Phase II - Put out a concept design RFP using an updated FFG performance spec with minor tweaks. Remove the asinine parent hull requirement--the 2018 NDAA limitation has expired. The ship shall be equipped with identical sensor and weapons systems, except require 48 strike length Mk41, 2 MH-60 (instead of H-60 + MQ-8C), and add a hull sonar. Bidders will be required to use standardized machinery--e.g. they may choose between LM2500 or MT30, they can pick from a list of existing SSDG/SSGTG generators, etc.--for commonality of fleet support, and the ship shall have 2 independent shaftlines with CPP. The hull shall be a steel monohull. Award multiple bidders $20 million contracts with a 12-16 month period of performance. Follow the CD phase with an open-competition bid process for DD&C for a (5) hull block buy. First ship under each contract to deliver in 2032, with 1 year construction centers. TDP becomes property of the USN, same as Phase I. Simultaneous to Phase II, reconstitute NAVSEA's engineering offices to restore the capability of the Navy to perform independent design. Phase III - repeat Phase II starting in 2029 with a spec update for whatever updated systems & performance is deemed necessary. This round of competition should include an in-house Navy FFG contract design for contractors to bid on. 16 months was considered enough time to develop the original concept designs, so that shouldn't change. Past history tells us that 3.5-4 years DD&C to deliver a lead ship in the LCS/NSC size range, as well as being within the realm of capability of the larger shipbuilders for complex combatants like the Flight III Burkes. Doug

Deleted. Didn't like the post. Doug

Way to sidestep the question. The obvious narrative is not necessarily factual. Also, where did I propose a FFG of >10000 tons? Doug

You seem to think there's some constraint on ship size, so I'm trying to figure out what you're basing this on. Ingalls - has the capacity to build up to ~50k tons. We know they have the capacity to build 4500 ton NSCs alongside the DDG, LPD, and LHA classes, apparently without significant impact on the throughput of those programs, based on their recent construction record. Austal - Can build at least 4500 tons. We know they have the capability to build at least two classes in parallel--EPF & LCS, now OPC & ATS. BIW - has the capacity to build up to at least 25k tons. Probably the closest to a throughput constrained yard amongst the big builders. NNS - has the capacity to build up to 115k tons, although it's unlikely we want to use that facility for something besides SSN and CVN construction NASSCO - has the capacity to build up to at least 35k tons, but specialized in auxiliaries. Bollinger - has the capacity to build up to 50k DWT Panamax vessels and is building the PSC, which is around 20k tons. Significant USCG experience and other government contracting. FMM - apparently has the physical plant to build up to 10k tons, if the capacity of the new shiplift is any indication. I'm leaving aside their spectacular FFG failure, because it doesn't appear to be an issue of plant capacity. Gulf Copper (just acquired by Davie to try for USCG polar icebreakers) has a capacity of up to 35k tons in their drydock. No combatant or near combatant history. So, where is this limitation on FFG or DDG size? Doug

Assuming there's such an arbitrary cutoff... You've made this statement a few times, but what is the factual basis for the claim? Doug

A 2018 slide deck that includes a description of the approach to the NMSV can be found here: https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/docs/national-defense/office-ship-operations/rrf/2661/ndrf-industry-day-presentation-post.pdf The previous version of this class was killed after the RFP came back more expensive than planned. https://www.twz.com/sea/marine-moving-medium-landing-ship-critical-to-china-fight-put-on-hold-again-by-navy That version looked like this: In the waning days of the Biden administration, SECNAV Del Toro went so far as to name the lead ship the McClung, even though no contracts had been let, as part of his frenzy to designate names for everything under the sun. After killing off the RFP, NAVSEA went on to procure TDPs for the Bollinger Israeli Logistics Support Vessel (ILSV) and the Damen LST-100. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/us-navy-takes-next-steps-for-new-lsm-medium-landing-ship-class/ This was in August 2025. At the end of September, Bollinger was awarded a contract for Block 1 of the LSM: https://www.workboat.com/bollinger-awarded-contract-for-navy-s-medium-landing-ship-program The ILSV looks like this: At this point, I'm not sure if the Block 1 LSM is this design, but probably? Yesterday, 05 December, SECNAV Phelan announced selection of the Damen LSV-100: https://www.twz.com/sea/this-will-be-the-navys-new-medium-landing-ship Article with pictures and history. Doug

After an initial hangfire, the LSM program--formerly light amphibious warship (LAW)--seems to be moving forward again. https://insidedefense.com/insider/lsm-program-office-hold-vcm-industry-day This appears to be following the NMSV model of procurement where a commercial ship management company is hired to manage the construction program. To an extent, this is sort of a return to the traditional model of the USG supplying the concept/contract design package and the bidders being responsible for only the DD&C or even just build-to-print. Doug

Yes. The threat today is not the threat of 2000, when FFG-7s could afford to lose the Mk13 without replacement, LCS could be designed with a 57mm and RAM launcher, and we were worried about IRGC Boghammers, pirates, and small-scale regional conflicts. Go look at the FFG-7 roles and systems, then translate it to today. I already did that for you earlier in this thread. Burkes aren't future-proof, other than they're the safe option and had to be made to work after dithering wasted opportunity after opportunity. Spruances were future-proofed, which is how a 6600 ton DD became a multi-role DDG, then a 10,000+ ton CG, all without altering the hull lines. And it's a travesty that we SINKEXed virtually the entire class to avoid keeping the hulls in reserve while hanging onto the pathetic FFG-7s. Burkes were built down to cost, just like the FFG-7s, hamstringing the design to the present day. It's got 3/4ths the missile cells of a Tico, half the 5" guns, compromised helo handling, constrained internal design, higher fuel consumption, and other issues that get worked around because its the hull we have. Doug

The LCS was a good concept, screwed over by Rumsfeld's transformation and poor execution by industry and the Navy. The Independence-class appears to be doing good work in the Pacific and with the MIW package. The Freedom class has been plagued with persistent powertrain reliability issues that have taken a long time to develop repairs for. The program was saddled by conflicting mandates--a compressed schedule for DD&C on the first two hulls, a requirement to be certified "transformational," a requirement to bring mid-tier small businesses into naval combatant construction, a requirement to be designed to and classed under ABS HSNC rules (then changed to NVR partway through the construction of the lead ship), a requirement to use novel hullforms and propulsion concepts, a requirement to accommodate and operate mission packages for a variety of distinct and unrelated missions that were rather vague in details, a requirement to have minimal manning, a requirement for shallow draft, and a requirement to be ~1/5th the cost of a Burke. I probably missed a few requirements.* Like most DOD programs, it was also saddled with the same up-or-out system as every other major procurement program. For the missions they were designed for, and the expected operational environment, I think there's a lot to recommend the overall approach of a relatively small, fast, reconfigurable ship. Both for the original idea they would be used for minor theater wars and for today's focus on the Pacific theater. Today, the ability to rapidly reposition, the ability to flex the mission package spaces, and the relative low cost and low personnel count could be useful for supporting the Marine Corps concept of distributed operations, for instance, moving small contingents around various island groups, with their speed, payload, and shallow water capability. While the 24-hr mission module swap concept did not pan out, the ability to reconfigure the ship in a few days would be useful. As would the ability to develop upgrades to the mission packages and not require major yard periods to integrate the modifications. The ability to tell systems designers: here's a weight budget, volume constraints, network interface, weapons deployment zones, and power & cooling interface parameters, now go design a combat system for Mission X is a pretty slick concept. With the truncation of the classes and the subsequent move back to traditional integrated ships, the concept has moved to USV/NOMAR field. Doug * I do not believe the speed requirement compromised the vessel as much as the conventional wisdom claims, hence I did not include it in the list of conflicting requirements.

The Saudi MMSC program was planned to deliver 4 ships between 2023 and May 2026. The first ship moved out of the erection building in October of this year. The keel was laid in May 2021. That ship has spent longer being erected (4.5 years) than it has taken the same shipyard to go from keel laying to delivery of any Freedom-class LCS, even though the MMSC is supposed to share much of the hull and powertrain of the older class. How the ships will work out in service remains to be seen. Doug

The point isn't to duplicate the Perry hullform. The FFG-7 is a tight design with obstructed firing arcs, compromised propulsion plant, and no room for growth, and the class is best consigned to the history books. However, there's no solid technical rationale for the contractor being unable to develop a modern equivalent of the Perry with a hull of twice the displacement. It is my belief that such should be possible in the realm of 6000-6500LT. Doug