Rubberneck

Some interesting stuff related to this topic. The Army didn't accept the A10s because they wanted the Patriots and also realized the opertions and maintenance costs for the A10s were going to be very much higher than what they had initially believed. They were also "all in" on the Apache as the aerial option for CAS... There is going to be a massive RIF. The first taste is coming next year, 3500-4000 Captains are getting the axe. There's another massive force structure reduction coming to the Army...currently dense friction between OSD and HQDA on how small the AC will actually get. More to follow there. Congress is unlikely to allow the Air Force to cut the A10s in their entirity. Number one, it actually flies and is proving excellent CAS, unlike the near mythical F35. Number two, the A10s would be cut from the Air Guard...these are constituents damnit!

Ken - thanks for the data dump. Interesting stuff, especially the 1st Armored Div version of events.

1st CAV Div had 47 battalions under its span of control in Iraq when it was commanded by then MG Chiarelli in 04-05. The 101st had between six and eight BCTs under its span of control in 10-11 in Afghanistan. When I was a planner at the Corps in Afghanistan in 10-11, we had three US Division HQs, and 15-18 BCTs/RCTs under the span of control. This included a German Battlegroup in RC-North, a British BDE in RC-Southwest, a Polish BDE in RC-East, US Army and National Guard BCTs in RC-North, South, and East, and USMC Regiments in RC-Southwest. This does not include the Turkish BDE in RC-Capital or the combined Spanish/Italian BDE in RC-West nor does it include any SOF elements. We also had multiple Combat Aviation Brigades and Sustainment BDEs in country. One Corps had roughly 75,000 Coalition troops under its span of control. With modern C2 systems, it's more than capable of handling that level of command and control. FA - no idea where the CSA got that number of BCTs from...I thought it was more like 10...4th ID, 2 ACR, and the 82nd BCT came in after 3rd ID and the Marines ripped through the country.

Some more info about the SCMR cuts: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130801/DEFREG02/308010021/Army-s-Problems-go-Deeper-Than-SCMR This article says the Army is losing three maneuver battalions, seems a little low from what I have seen but certainly in the ballpark. These are for the cuts down to 490K. Light M1A1 and FA stated, the switch from Armor or Light Infantry to a SBCT is not as easy as it seems at first blush. The biggest issue for the light guys to grasp is the huge amplification of maintenance requirements - something that easier for a personnel in an ABCT to SBCT conversion to grasp. The new vehicles and new systems take significant New Equipment Training time for the individuals, and then conducting collective training afterwards is significantly time consuming and difficult as well. As far as the Divisions, the current CSA stated in a meeting a few months ago that "It only took 7 BCTs to take down the Iraqis, how many Divisions and BCTs do we really need to face the threats of tomorrow?" By the way, this entire SCMR process is skewed in my opinion. They are basing requirements off Phase III/Decisive Operations instead of Phase IV which has been shown over the last two decades to be the true driver of how many "boots on the ground" are required. Probably going to come back and bite us in the ass.

This is probably going to happen. Like 95% certain. If my math is correct, the AC is only losing six battalions or so out of this BCT drawdown. But there's another cut coming... http://www.stripes.com/news/us/hagel-s-sequestration-review-points-to-few-good-choices-1.233231 Takeaway quote: "With 420,000 to 450,000 active-duty troops, the Army could fulfill the mission required by the recent national defense strategy that redirects the military’s focus to Asia, Hagel said." Another SBCT makes a great deal sense, especially in Washington state as most of the Western part of the state is built over a significant fault line. As I said, the probability of this is very high.

Does anything on this plane actually work as specified? More issues involving the missiles and particulate matter in the missile exhaust system. http://elpdefensenews.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-navy-problem-part-2.html

Exactly Ken. There is nothing new here.

The combined arms battalions are staying. FALF has it down pat. This whole deal is a bit of a shell game. They are cutting a lot of the temporary force structure that was approved for the expansion of the Army during the GWOT. In addition, the TTHS account is getting cut by another 6K or so, this is a temporary holding pool for personnel in schools, training, transient status and those who are hospitalized. The next round of cuts are the ones into the bone. The Army has known since 2004 that the two infantry battalion BCTs were tactically deficient. The RSTA more often than not ended being misused as a third maneuver battalion instead of being utilized for recon and surveillance missions. The lack of tactical flexibility (wait, I can have one up, one back or two up and none back or none up and two back) was recognized early on, but the Army leadership decided more BCTs were better than the fewer, more robust BCTs with the third infantry battalion. The SBCTs were the exception and that's why every Division and Corps Commander wanted them...more firepower, more troops, wider presence, more mobility than either an IBCT or a HBCT (now ABCT) in a COIN environment. The BLUF is that the Army is a tactical organization that can be expanded and reduced as necessary during times of war and "un-war." The USAF, USN and USMC are strategic organizations who help maintain the air and sea lines of communication for global trade. This isn't anything new, the Army is the billpayers for the rest of DoD. And since they have the most people - at $385,000 per solider per year - they are going to be used to keep the Air Force, Navy and Marines more capable.

There was a German transgender officer in the ISAF HQ back in 2010-2011. Used to see he/she in the mess hall occasionally. Looked like Steven Segall...including the long black hair in a braid. Weird. Wondered what the Taliban would have done if he/she was captured...

If you think this is bad, wait for the Sequestration related cuts next year.

There are three Mortuary Affairs Companies in the Army. Two are in the Active Component and one is a USAR unit out of Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rico Company actually was used in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack at the Pentagon. http://amhistory.si.edu/september11/collection/record.asp?ID=21 Aberdeen and Dover are the two areas where KIAs are brought home. Dover gets the bodies, Aberdeen gets the personal effects - both are eventually restored to the KIAs family. The Aberdeen crew go through the personal effects to ensure there is nothing embarrassing that is given to the family - there is a story about a soldier's laptop that was given to the wife of a KIA and she found out that he was having an affair over in the CENTCOM AOR, and that was the reason why the Personal Effects Center was created. Horrible job, am thankful that we have folks who will do this sort of thing.

A topic close to my heart. The "up or out" system is the root of the problem, and the "key developmental" positions also lend itself to the problem. The entire officer corps consists of journeymen because the individual officer spends, on average, less than two years in each position. Don Vandergriff has written all you need to know about how screwed up the personnel system has become...one Congressional Aide I know said "The KGB couldn't design a personnel system that was this fucked up." Master's degrees are valued added, but the officer must get one in a field that directly benefits the service. I would recommend that the majority of officers get one in military history because most of them don't have any idea of how history impacts the present. I'd also add that the Army has completely lost the bubble in developing operational and strategic leaders. This percolates through the entire Army - one Colonel who works for the Secretary of the Army told me that the every primary staff member at HQDA are glorified tacticians and their inability to think operationally or strategically has crippled the Army's future. This is what the Army gets when they make the G3/5/7 of the Army a 12 month, check the box assignment. At this point, the system has to be destroyed and rebuilt. There's a very interesting battle brewing within the GO ranks about the future of the Army...the majority want to go back to the garrison Cold War environment (including the CSA) but there's a minority who has influence that is fighting against this. The promotion rates in the Active Component are a joke. Two of my fellow CGSC classmates, an AC Sapper and AC MP, were functionally illiterate. When the first cut line is battalion command at the 17 year mark, there is a systemic problem that has to be fixed. One last issue - the Army has to make staff work more palatable. Only 17% of a year group gets to command a battalion, so the average officer is going to have less than five years of troop leading time during a 20 year career. And this number is going to go down once the Army gets cut again.

Lujan is a stiff. I was at the conference that is shown here. He was used as a show pony by CNAS to support the furthering of the war in Afghanistan. I work with think tanks on a daily basis now - I can assure you that the people who are speaking at them are by no means impartial or unbiased. What Lujan was saying was correct - from his perspective - and he was in the one place in Afghanistan (Zabul) where the ANA have managed to scrape together a couple of battalions that don't suck. The rest of the ANA ranges from mediocre to bad to god awful. The ANP are far worse across the board. I was a Corps planner in Afghanistan in 2010-2011, and saw just about everything in terms of information associated with the ANA and ANP. We have continued the age old idiocy of "mirror-imaging" - aka, making the ANSF in our own image with all the baggage that comes with it. To think that a society that is 85% illiterate can form a national security apparatus with the appropriate bureaucracy that is needed to make it work is madness. Utter madness. Agreed. I'll look up Lujan, sounds interesting. EDITED TO ADD: http://www.cnas.org/lujan http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xmYT3sNhjeY Looks like he still has some influence. http://smallwarsjour...-fernando-lujan

BP - that's already happening with men...a friend was down there speaking to them and the RI's said they are being forced to graduate almost everyone who comes through because of the wars.

Benson was a senior mentor of my SAMS seminar. I spent the better part of a year listening and even learning from him. Couple of things. Number one, he was the CFLLC G5 for OIF 1. He still declares to this day that there was a Phase IV plan...he showed it to me and it was two pages long and really weak. Number two, our seminar was NORTHCOM focused. There was a retired Deputy NORTHCOM CDR present for most of our seminar who stated "boys, you need to grab some of that Homeland Security money, there's a lot of it and it's going to save force structure." Benson was there for that hot air as well. This is a weak STRATCOM effort to save force structure and garner resources. As seen by many of the responses, the use of Active Federal forces to suppress an insurrection has more than a few opponents...Benson screwed the pooch here big time. I'm shocked but not surprised...he doesn't know his limitations.