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KV7's Achievements


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  1. It along with others was non returning. The returning ones were for hunting flocks of birds, the straight flying ones for larger game. You can see the large game style one in action here:
  2. They have much more room to move in Afghanistan. Along with Pakistan they can push for some negotiated settlement and reconstruction. It will be a PR success story if they can show that they have done a much better job than the US occupation.
  3. If you look at their commitments overseas so far, they appear to be very restrained and timid. If they were on an assertive path, I would expect to see something mild well before something major. So far they have not even sent some token force to Syria or Afghanistan or similar.
  4. There is also some chance of a Nixon bluff: https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack
  5. Correct, though the US would have to worry that a launch will lead to Russia mistakenly thinking it is under attack. I suppose this depends on the Russian launch on warning posture.
  6. Yes the US can hurt Chinese technological development, and they have. The complication is that there is also a Chinese response. The Xi program is now widely seen as necessary in China to a large extent because of the Trump trade war and similar policy measures - these have pushed China to consider the US as an unreliable trade partner and have in response accelerated industry policy programs. Without the trade war, the Chinese would have been far more comfortable with reliance on imports of high end semiconductors for example. One of the most plausible mechanisms for Chinese collapse was some sort of misguided liberalisation, but that is now off the cards for some time. And for this reason the more astute Chinese nationalist are therefore quite pleased by Trumpism, because it has reduced the risk of some Gorbachev style (though the analogy here isn't very good) path to ruin.
  7. I am not arguing that Chinese hegemony is inevitable, I mean that the contraction of the western share of GDP is inevitable, because there is little that can be done to stop the poorer countries from catching up. China is assisting them here but I don't think the process can be stopped even if there is considerable effort given to frustrating Chinese trade and investment policy. The problem for those in the west who want to frustrate China economically is then much harder, because they need for example some plan to get much of Africa, Latin America etc. to spurn economic interaction with China, because US and UK sanctions would increasingly not be enough. But this is a basically impossible task for the reasons I outlined above.
  8. The difficulty that the west can make for China is via trade policy, but mostly here via restrictions on technology transfer, but this is something that does not have a military, but rather industrial policy solution, and one which is being pursued. The UK restrictions etc. are a sort of triviality, because the really big gains to be made are in the developing world. The 'west' here faces an inevitable decline in relative power because there is nothing that can plausible be done to halt economic convergence, and in such a world it will be population, and less so past technological leads, which will be most important. And this underlines the geopolitical difficulty of 'economic containment' of China - the US and it's overly enthusiastic allies cannot reasonably flip more than a few of the countries with the greatest growth potential into some anti-Chinese stance, because this block cannot offer anything sufficiently enticing and the regime change operations cannot plausibly be successfully extended to dozens of countries at once, given that it has failed even when applied to some restricted set of targets. The advantages of trade and cooperation with China are simply too great for developing countries to spurn it.
  9. I obviously meant avoidable above btw. I think it is best if China pursues only peaceful reunification, but either way it is not worth a major war.
  10. This sort of decisive action is unlikely, but some factions may be pushing for it. Because any major war is also avoidable, most reasonable people will surmise that largely acceding to growing Chinese power is preferable to starting a war, especially as China does not seem to have any intolerable ambitions.
  11. The main fact here is that China can currently get basically anything it wants without major war, just by biding it's time and letting it's economic power go to work. For Germany in the 1900s their situation was more dire, because France, the UK, and the US all had economic zones they could essentially close to Germany. This is not at all the case for China, who face no notable obstruction by any power regarding their foreign investment program. If there is a sustained peace and a continuation of relatively free trade, US hegemony is essentially over, which is why we need to worry that the US will not tolerate such a peaceful order. Indeed the Project for a New American Century hacks are explicit about this - the US in their mind should use it's military power to stifle China economically, via at the least some new Cold War. Luckily they are on the back foot though after the failure of their last chess move - the WOT.
  12. The Russian nuclear arsenal is also a deterrence against US escalation, though somewhat weakly. Russia and the US have nothing to fear from China, because their capacity for economic growth means that all of their objectives are best obtained via a sustained peace.
  13. They reasonably surmise that a buildup by them will lead to the US adopting a more bellicose attitude, and risk of a real Cold War style situation being hastened. Their shift in attitude is a result of a conclusion that the risk of accelerating US bellicosity is too high even if they maintain somewhat restrained stance. My prediction is that there will still be only a mild buildup, such that deterrence is achieved, but that the numbers will be well below anything that vaguely looks like an offensive threat, via some sort of first strike capability. A medium term goal of around 600 warheads seems likely.
  14. They have shown enormous restraint so far in not undertaking a large expansion. The current huge US advantage means that the US could, if it liked, simply escalate any conflict to the point where China capitulates. Some credit also has to be given to the US leadership which, despite being far too fond of regime change operations, has avoided the most destructive course of extreme provocation intended to force a humiliation or worse.
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