Argus

Minor (very minor) point in passing, NZ have evolved their idea of 'OPV' over recent years. They did some new research and modelling into Southern Ocean sea states, and found the pre-existing models were not fit for purpose. For the most part they were actually models developed for other areas like the North Atlantic tweaked around the edges - there's not a lot of money or interest in the Southern Ocean so its never been a high priority. Anyway, the season after the new study was published the RNZN did NOT send its shiny new OPV's back down into the patrol areas they had been bought specifically to work in... ships I believe have now been sold to Ireland. I suspect the next Kiwi 'OPV' to be corvette sized or bigger whatever the label they slap on the side.... there's a some BIG seas down there, old sailors tales about wave sizes backed up with hard bouy and Sat data.

If you are watching Dr Clarke, then he is also wont to point out that presence is a two tiered mission, Sloop and Cruiser or whatever one wants to translate that into current ship types. The RAN has those, more than most actually. He is also just a little bit wrong - as he often is tbh. Submarines, SSN's at any rate, are superb presence projectors, in good part because they are not seen, and thus can be anywhere so feel like they are everwhere. Their presence has massive deterrent value, great for intimidating the unruly or reassuring the friendly but disturbed.

I don't think either of us have a platform for getting too confident in our ideas. If the three factors driving the bus; are the USN's schedule to release the subs, the RAN's capacity to absorb them and country's ability to support them. It's the RAN's manpower that looks to be the biggest hard limit with the furthest to go. If in large part this time line is built around the RAN's manpower projections. I would suggest is is going to be a conservative estimate for a number of reasons. Not the least of these being the whole defense establishment has put it neck on the line for this project, and there is simply nowhere for them to hide with this amount of bi-partisan buy-in.

Why you would almost think we made a multi-generational habit of signing treaties with neighbouring nations and then invading them anyway.

I think the timeline being put forward now is the 'managing expectations' long form one. Things could, and might very well, go quicker. I believe the US VLS element was already part of SSN(R), there's beena bit of work between the US and UK on common elements beyond the reactors, I believe the next generation of US SSBN has its missile section based on the UK's new one... some deal like that anyway.

Former Australian PM is full of shit (msn.com) Keating has never liked this deal and piled a lot of hate on it under the previous government. So given it is impossible for him to ever be wrong about anything ever, he has no choice but to throw his own party and the nation under the bus and double down with the BS.

That's not actually what I mean., sorry for any lack of clarity. Japan will build its own submarines to fit its own needs, and will do so with any blend of domestic or foreign technology it sees fit to employ. What I was trying to say, is just that Australia getting SSN's makes it easier in diplomatic terms for Japan to get SSN's - if they wanted to. I think this is something the Japanese government might like, in the sense that it is a change in their favour that also costs them nothing, and who doesn't like a feebee? The idea of Japan getting SSN's is another thing altogether. Personally I can see a couple of reasons why they might, not the least being the diplomatic value. While only the US and China had SSN's they were not a currency among the strictly regional powers. But once one regional power has them, there is pressure on those other regional powers who want to be in the front rank to also get them - Japan is both a leading regional player and the only one able build their own SSN in house.

yes indeed thenkee I think a Japanese perspective may be: a/ anything that makes my friends stronger is a good thing b/ all animals are equal but some are more equal than others, if there is a two tier hierarchy of US allies in the Asia/Pacific region developing, Japan would like a seat at the top table too, as they are due IMHO. c/ if there is a wider 'free trade zone' of military technology and equipment evolving, again Japan would like to be on the inside, and unfortunate efforts with submarines notwithstanding, she is still sniffing forwards into military exports. d/ the Nuclear Club has had firmly locked doors for seventy odd years. Japan might have a love hate relationship with the atom, and gate crashing like India and Pakistan just isn't their style, but however you cut it here is Australia getting SSN's and if so why not Japan in due course?

The Hotchkiss had the added advantage of there being a whole factory set up to make them in the UK and the Infantry having standardised on the Lewis.

Nn love for the idea of doing by which side of the eternal triangle it favours? Light - mobility Medium - Firepower Heavy - Protection

There's also a slice of market share in places that semi-autos which is being addressed by high end Euro and low end Turkish suppliers, where a mid level American product might fit quite well.

Frightening isn't it? I mean other than that leak this whole thing has been a poster child for process, problems identified early, addressed with courage and decision, new and innovative solutions found, long term commitments made, existing partnerships strengthened, benefit maximisation extending beyond the original scope/issue, win-win-fkn-win... I don't know if I mentioned it, but one of the key speakers at the big academic AUKUS beano in Canberra the other month was Japanese.

In terms of numbers, one thing worth pointing out - these Virginia's for the RAN are not new production, they're to be older boats if not the oldest in the US fleet. The 5+2 or 2+3 numbers we see bandied about, could well be a reflection of the 'fleet' having to turn over in RAN service as the boats come due for deep cycle maintenance and so on. There's also no percentage in going too hard too fast. Yes there's a lot to be said for going SSN ASAP, but the RAN has a juggling act, they have to both expand and diversify the personnel pipeline. At the end of the day our total pool of submariners needs to expand and that means keeping the Collins for a good while yet. So I'd expect our overall submarine numbers to contract briefly as operational personnel are sucked out of the Collins fleet to stand up Virginia's but then open up again as the pool refreshes - more people need more sea time to qualify and that means more subs operational. This brings up the whole people question in general. Had a chat with a mate today, who pointed out (from open sources) the USN is a bit tight on crews for its submarine force these days - this against normal attrition and new construction. With the increase in SSN production to three a year, that's a training pipe line that has to step up by 50% as a minimum. So from that point of view, for the USN this deal (per leak), really amounts to: a/ shuffling some crews out of SSN's at the bottom of the pile that can be better used in new construction where they will have all the best toys. While at the same time b/ not losing those de-manned boats, instead putting existing crews (and budget) into them that would otherwise be 'wasting its time' in SSK. Yes there are different flags involved, but bottom line this is just adding RAN resources into the bottom of the USN list that frees up USN resources for expansion. At the end of the day, whatever flag they fly, these boats are going to be running as Auxiliaries of the USN to one degree or another for their whole working lives. There are going to be limits to the amount of investment we'll make to a supporting a class taken into service on this basis and no point in re-inventing the supply chain which means there will always be a need to draw in US resources. The flag waving argument doesn't fly either pardon the pun, as His Majesty's Australian Submarines (yes I typed 'Her' first 07 Lizzy) it is perfectly possible they would not be directly available to do Uncle Sam's bidding. So sure in one sense the USN does lose X number of boats, a net loss in numbers is a net loss. However backfilling is standard practice even without any 'special' provision, fleet plots are vast swirly nebulous things, and when holes appear 'training opportunities' get offered to other countries. In a more active sense, 1982, guess who back filled for the RN around the world while they concentrated on the South Atlantic - Everybody. So in the (highly) unlikely event Washington comes up short a couple of SSN's for something Canberra doesn't want to touch with a barge pole, then HMAS Boomer is going to be exercising with a USN CBG off stage left for a few months, while the sub-plot shuffles the USN's SSN's across to fill the gap. Back to people problems, in terms of life cycle costs, the crew are pretty much the big ticket item or at least in the top three, as best I can tell for 'Western' navies and conventional ships. I don't know about nukes or submarines specifically, but at a guess I'd think the crew is still going to be in the top 5 costs, and yes all this depends on accounting standards and so forth. But however the details wash out, here's some numbers (from wiki) that are 'interesting' Soryu SSK 4,200ton - 65 Collins SSK 3,400ton - 58 Attack SSK 4,500ton - 60 Rubis SSN 2,600ton - 66+ Barracuda SSN 5,300ton - 60 Swiftsure SSN 4,900ton - 116 Trafalgar SSN 5,800ton - 130 Astute SSN 7,800ton - 98 Los Angeles SSN 6,900ton - 129 Seawolf SSN 9,100ton - 140 Virginia SSN 10,200ton - 135 With the broadest of broad brushes. 1/ Size doesn't seem to be a factor in minimum crew numbers, about 60 guys can do the basic job (and thats consistent back to WWII IIRC). 2/ Propulsion doesn't really matter either, the French have run two generations of SSN's with circa 60 (presumably very busy) bon amis. 3/ Size doesn't seem to be a factor in maximum crew numbers, a 10,000 ton sub or a 6000 ton sub can both get away with 130. 4/ What's with the extra ~60 guys the RN and USN seem to need? Given those two services have the reputations they do, I'd expect a lot of the 'special sauce' is in those extra hands. 5/ Yet for all of point 4/ the RN still seem to run half a notch lower down the manning scale and to be pressing down (economic pressures at least in part?), where the USN is stable if not pressing up. What is my point, idle speculation of course! I've run into the idea in a few places that SSN(R), which to be clear is the RN's next generation SSN and a program that is likely to involve Australia, could well actually be a fully tripartite program. As in a real three way AUKUS job, with the US actually building... well a derivation shall we say, of the same submarine. Stuart suggested something along these lines just a few posts ago, too which I objected. And yes it takes a certain suspension of disbelief to get there, the objections can start with simple NIH and progress though ever more sophisticated layers politics (that's a pun btw), to be crowned with the simple question of why? The USN has a perfectly good submarine program building world leading craft, that already incorporates collaboration with the UK, so why would they take such a jump? Wellll.......... If the Australian version of SSN(R) is going to have a US spec combat system and weapons, on 3/4 of the tonnage and 2/3 the crew.... simple economics might be one reason for the USN to look at it pretty carefully.

A real joint venture with the US has been prosed in a few places, but even if it passed the political issues, I suspect it would be like a partnership with the French, in that with the best will in the world they would end up driving the bus whatever the agreements might have said - they are just too big for their needs to be compromised when it came to a pinch and there are some pretty fundamental differences in outline that would make a compromise difficult whatever happened. I think that's one of the lessons from the great international frigate programs of the recent past. They only work if partners have more in common than just needing new frigates, the closer to partners actual needs are to one another the better they work.

Actually the more I read of it and ponder the more sense it makes in that horribly back handed Yes Minister way. I think it comes down to which sticking points of the multitude are really immovable. If we stake our planetary orbit on the USN/Congressional lobby never ever under any circumstances letting any outside influence have any say in their submarine construction at all ever - and then throw that Australia needs some industrial input for good and serious reasons as a 'moon' to provide a counterpoise. Then it sort of falls into line. Any SSN is better than no SSN, or an SSK for the RAN. The US is and has always been the obvious source for everything - but only if taking exactly what they have on offer and running them more or less out of US yards and mail ordering everything. AUKUS is breaking down the barriers a bit, its been touted as its greater benefit and far greater than the subs, but we'll see. As things stand buying US subs would be like the same deal the French offer to their clients, a turn key lease in all but name. Which is fine for a prestige fleet but our actually works for a living, they rack up the sea time, they generate modifications as experience mounts up etc etc and that deal simply won't fly. Meanwhile the RN simply do not have the numbers to readily afford an antipodean diversion - with less than 10x SSN's 1 is too big a slice for comfort, and 2x is pretty much gutting operational capability (which is what drove the 7 as a minimum in the first place). So the US is the only short term source this side of 2040. But it can't be the long term solution because internal issues will not let them open up the full package (its frankly amazing they are going this far IMHO). The UK is the only long term solution, but it can't help too much in the short term. If we accept the game IS worth the candle, and the situation is serious enough to use money as a solvent rather than a glue... fuck that is a scary place... but this deal makes sense, its actually bloody awesome. In the short term we can turn over the whole fleet pretty much as fast as the intuition (RAN) can absorb the change, and do so even faster than originally anticipated. In the long term we have a sustainable solution.

If you don't much care about ice, you can Great Circle from the UK direct to NZ and on around to do a full circumnavigation )

That '5' is a strain on my credulity, that the US would let so many go, that we would buy so many of a class and then switch streams and suppliers ... I dunno. We might lease 5 perhaps or something like that, but SSN's seem a little too weighty to go flitting about with like that - in peacetime. I suppose that is the kicker at the end of the day, all problems are soluble in money IF the need is strong enough.

The Astute program had time issues early on, partly first of class woes, but also a lot of trouble from having to spin the design office and yard back up again. Partly as a consequence this production of the whole class, along with the Dreadnought's and the SSN(R) to follow is on a scheduled 'drumbeat' to pace the whole business out and avoid future gaps in activity. The estimate I heard was that Barrow had the yard time to build another 2 Astutes before Dreadnought, if they'd been the need. I would agree that some form of dual crewing is the most likely and a commitment of two boats might well mean only one on station down here at any one time. I also can't help notice Trenchant and Talant were only decommissioned in May last year - they might be in a position to be reactivated to bring back into the mix?

I'm not sure about that, I know the Finns are rather partial to a cup of coffee, but are you really prepared to play host to World War Coffee Canada vs Australia? Tim Hortons vs Gloria Jeans - round one *ting ting*

Ummm sure, whatever....... 🥺

Dutton was one of the ministers involved originally and he wanted an off the shelf Virginia buy, the logic behind that option is and was strong - the problem being (As I understand it all) that the US is less interested in it now than they were 2 years ago, and they were not all that interested back then anyway, one senses the difference between a reluctant maybe and and a quiet 'if you don't ask, we won't have to say no.' At the end of the day its not America's job to pull us out of our own Kimchee, lovely if/when they do mind, but there's no obligation, as it was put elsewhere, its not like they are the RN and this is the 30's or even 60's.

A demolition raid on the Miaflores locks in the spirit of St Nazire might have been interesting. We did look at this about a decade ago, and by 'we' the group included a naval officer with demolitions training and a handful of history geeks with various backgrounds and one member who directed his vacation around doing site recce. So it was a little more serious than the usual damp dream type thought experiment. Anyway, we concluded it that it did indeed look possible. Get the right moon/weather window, submarine to the jump-off, motor sampan 5 mile up to the locks and then its two platoons (IIRC) of SNLF against against a rifle squad, hold for 30 minutes for the demo against a ready reaction force that was 20 minutes away, it was something like that. As best I remember, the demo plan was to get all the open gates with a hose charges inside the hinges, dangle some more hose changes at hinge and middle of all the closed gates, then blow it. The idea being to pop most of the gates off their hinges, then if not blowing the closed gates, jam them shut. Nothing that could not be repaired of course, but oh sooo very annoying.

Glenn, seriously mate I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT CONVOY, nor have I been since I started talking about battleships, aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers that were sunk by submarines. Their ASW was poor, if the USN had had torps that worked or the Anglo-Dutch had enough submarines the IJN would have paid heavily for their neglect of ASW. I don't want to be that guy, but when I post: and your paragraph in response contains a sentence like this I'm not sure we are on the same planet - and even 180 degrees out of phase, you manage to grab the wrong end of the stick. No I don't have to account for the savage fury of the USN's 1944 campaign, I'm not arguing that point at all, I agree with you, the Japanese were going to lose, the only questions being when and at what price. But since you keep wanting to talk about the impact of better IJN ASW on the late war, ok lets talk about that. The USN shaped the battlefield of 1944-5 with its submarines in 42-3, ripping Japanese merchant shipping to shreds and with it gutting Japans ability to furnish a defence. Better ASW for the IJN would have increased the cost and decreased the effectiveness of the Allied (mostly USN) submarine campaign against Japanese trade. The winner being Japanese shipping and with more materials flowing into Japan, and more military resources shipping out of Japan, the US is going to have much harder time in 43-45. Sure we can say its just making things worse to no good end. Japan is going to lose anyway, so the harder she fights the more men die to no purpose - but I'm sure if you'd offered the option to the Japanese at time time they'd have taken it worth both hands. So no IJN ASW was not adequate for a short war, their fleet was far too vulnerable to submarine attack, and in a long war it would have made a substantial difference. Almost, we almost agreed on something, but then... nup. Merchant seamen have always been a strategic resource, they only get turned over to a friendly port as a very last option - but absolutely, a fair chance at seeing a POW camp would made a difference in more than just this area. The reason I don't agree with brutality being a problem per say, is that a reputation for brutality has been by far the most effective means of getting merchant ships to surrender for most of recorded history. It is the staple of piracy through the ages, give the prize two options and absolutely no doubt of the consequences should they chose the wrong one. 🏴‍☠️

No on two points. 1/ Factually incorrect, they had the worst ASW of any major power by any objective standard, so given the world leaders in ASW proved barely up to the job, the IJN did not come within a bulls roar of 'adequacy' for war of any length, and speaking of which.... 2/ What is this short war BS again? Short decisive wars are pretty hard to pull off if some bugger in a sub torpedoes your critical CV's or BB's. I gave you three warships sunk by submarine in blue water. Now sure the Japanese did not lose ships this way, but that was on the allies fucking up, not anything the Japanese were doing - 'cos they were not doing shit. How is 'ASW' is not just trade protection, attritional economic warfare and all that jazz unclear? Warships are not immune to torpedoes from submarines. Oh please, we are talking about the navy that specifically emphasised technical quality over the quantity they knew they could not have - turns out they failed at both, but Yamato, Long Lance.... they WANTED the best just as much as any other navy if not more. ASW is not that expensive in shipbuilding resources, utter rubbish. Yes it has costs, the weapons have a bit of ship impact, sure, and there's some accommodation to be made for the Sonar. But please, if a better ASW capability then the IJN put on DD's, could be retrofitted to hundreds of fishing trawlers under emergency conditions in the UK... It's not even that expensive in electronics - again the RN's Type 122/123 ASDIC mass produced for trawlers, the Type 122 came with its own turbo generator for ships that didn't have an electrical system. The problem with capturing shipping on a raid is two fold, a/ none of those ships wanted to surrender to the Japanese, so taking them more difficult than it might be, b/ once taken the Japanese fleet is now stuck at the speed of the slowest ship it just captured, which is likely to be sub-10 knots. This is not a place any fleet commander wants put themselves.

There was no fault in a legal/diplomatic sense in seizing the battleships. It was PR disaster and gave the Turks all the pretext they needed, but from a procedural point of view it was perfectly straight forward. At exactly the same time the Admiralty took up ships being built for Greece, Brazil and Norway that I can think of off hand, I'm sure there were others. No one else made a fuss. Because if you weren't looking for a raison de guerre it was not only perfectly legal (written in the contracts as part of the boiler plate) and diplomatically expected (it had been in every contract for 60 years or so), everyone knew that the RN 'would see you right' for any ship they took up, with a full refund and some degree of compensation for the bother. IIRC in 1939 both Greece and Turkey lost ships being built in UK yards to similar Admiralty requisition, and didn't bat an eyelid. On the other hand I think you're spot on with the failure in British and I'd add French diplomacy pre-war. It's hard to fault the Turks for drifting into the German orbit. Unfortunately, and I mean that in every sense of the word, I think a lot of the story here it tied up in Armenian situation and with Russia. As a result the records are unreliable, no serious academic wants to touch it and the public domain is befouled by partisans of at least 3 sides who have less regard for the truth than for their positions.