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JOE BRENNAN

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Everything posted by JOE BRENNAN

  1. See post 40. I believe the only impact fuzed modern ASW 'ahead thrown' weapons are the RPK-8 guided weapon which can be fired from the RBU-6000 launcher (acoustically guided, shaped charge warhead, impact fuze), and the ASW rounds of the Swedish Elma (aka 601) system. The rockets fired from RBU launchers in RPS systems are many, with missions including anti-torpedo and torpedo decoy, but the generic ASW RGB rockets fired from those launchers are depth fuzed. Joe
  2. I'd say it's the same, 7V series antisubmarine rockets, aka retrorockets or retrobombs. These were modified versions of Mousetrap; both it and Mousetrap were developed by Cal Tech using the Hedgehog warhead, so all three were closely related. On blimps they apparently didn't fire rearward but forward or down(? don't know of photo or really clear description) from the Mark 53 type bomb rack which could carry 16. Joe
  3. Hedgehog (and Mouestrap) relied on direct hits with non-shaped charge, whereas most other 'ahead throwing' systems have relied on time, hydrostatic or influence fuzes w/ non-shaped charges, sometimes also with contact fuze in case of direct hit. The exceptions AFAIK are the RPK-8 round fired from RBU-6000 launcher, a guided shaped charge round, and the Swedish Elma system (used by Sweden and Finland nowadays on small vessels, as opposed to the bigger older Swedish 375mm system) which fires unguided contact fuzed shaped charge rounds. The warhead of the latter is based on the Carl Gustav, IOW much smaller than Hedgehog, and not necessarily intended to destroy a sub but rather force semi-wartime coastal intruder subs to the surface. I don't know of a documented case of a particular U-boat reaching base with known Hedgehog damage. Seems it might have happened with contact hit to perhaps a ballast tank, etc, but references I know only make vague statements that subs either did or never did survive Hedgehog hits. I've read most entries in Wynn's "U Boat Operations", a career history of each boat: I don't recall Hedgehog hits on returning subs ever specifically mentioned. Allied attackers fairly often recorded Hedgehog explosions without claiming a sub, or w/o claiming it until follow up attacks, but this isn't certain proof of subs surviving Hedgehog hits. For example in the attacks on U-853 near the Rhode Island coast in May 1945, many Hedgehog explosions were recorded, but the water was pretty shallow and only two holes were found in the wrecked sub by divers v. 264 Hedgehog projectiles fired, besides influence fuzed depth charges dropped, which might also have made the holes, not clear. Joe
  4. To take the example of post WWII US light torpedoes, Mk.44 had a Mark 19 exploder, contact only. The warhead was 75# of HBX-3. Mk. 46 has a selectable mode influence/contact exploder, Mark 20, and warhead 95# of H-6 on early mods, PBXN-103 on mod 5. and Mk.54, which is a kit upgrade of Mk.46. Those are regular 'bulk' warheads. Mk.50 has a shaped charge warhead 'around' 100#. Other LW torps also have these, like the European MU90, 50kg/110#, and in that case it looks pretty much like a HEAT warhead with copper liner at similar angle (see p 24 of link). MU90 has a contact exploder; Mk.50 presumably does also. USN officially states that PBXN-103, at the scale of the Mk 103 warhead in Mk.46 Mod 5/Mk.54, is 2.5 times as effective as same weight of TNT v an underwater target. This seems to be a 'relative bubble energy' measure of TNT equivalence by which HBX-3 might be officially rated 1.8-1.9 (estimated based on figures quoted in the public report on the ROKN Cheonan sinking, small graph in link p.26 implies similar for H-6); Torpex was officially rated 1.41 (in a 1947 USN ordnance manual). Other measures of 'TNT equivalence' in other contexts are quite different. Mk. 50 was developed in part from concern that Mk.46's warhead couldn't sink large double hull Soviet subs with one hit; same with MU90 to replace Mk.46 in NATO navies. OTOH in an actual case even a big double hull sub might not be in good shape after a single hit, contact or influence, by the Mk 103 warhead. http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2008gun_missile/6341HallsBernie.pdf Joe
  5. The position of bow planes, pretty far down the hull and near the sonar dome, and straight-in retracting not folding, looks like Project 705/Lyre/Alpha type. Here's a photo of a 705K in drydock with the planes retracted, visible aft and below the two openings, which wouldn't be visible in the picture above. And maybe from the angle of the damage photo you wouldn't see the flooding holes at base of sail? Not sure this is right, but I don't know of another sub with that type and position of bow planes. Joe
  6. To somewhat repeat what I said a few pages ago, I think there's a lot of room between what *could* have been done w/ 30min, as in possible in a real human organization with the real starting point of early AM Dec; and what *would* have been done. Part of that difference would depend on the specificity of the warning ('a state of war exists' v 'enemy planes on the way *now*!'), and as importantly the direction from which it came (top down or bottom up). And part of that difference is just, IMO, difficult to estimate even with all the info we have about this very well known incident. I think good points have been made about the stiffenning of the AA defense as the attack proceeded, and that it's reasonable to think this process would have been accelerated with warning. OTOH a lot of the a/c listed as holed in the reports in post 357, it's 100's of bullet and fragment hits altogether, were loitering around strafing (Type 99's as well as Zeroes, and also Type 97's in a few cases). We can't extrapolate that directly to an early wave of torpedo dropping Type 97's, though they were also shot up a fair bit even as it was. The repair time to certain ships could probably have been reduced with watertight integrity measures possible in 30 min, even if hit as hard, again assuming it was an immediately credible order passing *down* the chain in a very efficient manner. It was mentioned a couple of times how US Army ammo stowage policies rendered a much quicker and better reponse by their AA less likely. It seems less solid evidence had been presented about how different a US Army fighter interception might have gone. I'm not sure it 'must have been' so much more numerous or effective in 30 minutes. It's not clear how many more a/c would have gotten off, and then there's also the factor that in the historical case US Army fighters picked off IJN a/c after the Zeroes failed to see enemy fighters around and went to strafing. If better alerted US fighters had met the incoming Japanese force head on, but not been far more numerous than the historical case, they might just have suffered one-sided defeat in air combat to the Zeroes still intent on their escort mission. That one is complicated, IMO. Joe
  7. When the US Supreme Court struck down the Texas anti-sodomy law in 2003, Lawrence v Texas, that effectively overturned similar laws remaining in 13 other states. All state laws are subject to being overturned by Federal courts if found to violate the Federal constitution. That follows directly from the Supremacy Clause, and was established in practice by the USSC from the early 19th century. And once a particular type of law from one state has been overturned, it's a waste of time for any other state attorney general to try to enforce a similar law, he'll surely lose any challenge in Federal court. Often in such cases legislatures don't even bother to repeal their similar laws, they are dead letter laws. Joe
  8. 1. Other social 'science' in the same era decided people's characters from the shape and size of their heads, concluded whites were the superior race, etc. That said, such areas of science like psychiatry haven't gotten all that much more 'hard' since them. Bottom line, homosexuality used to be considered a mental illness because that was the prevailing opinion among psychiatrists. Now it isn't because it isn't the prevailing opinion among psychiatrists. We're still nowhere near understanding mental processes on a physical, chemical hard science level (seeing which areas of the brain light up on a scan is a very primitive first step). And once and if we do fully understand them, the whole concept of what is 'free will', for all kinds of behavior, may change fundamentally. 2. But again there is no science answer for something like the social acceptability of homosexuality (or masturbation or anything else like that). It's a value judgement. One source of such value judgements is religion, either belief in religious texts as revelations from God, or else just as sources of time honored wisdom. Of course no one has to pay attention to such texts to form their opinion. But once you say 'put religion aside', all that's left is non-religiously inspired *opinion*, rather than religiously inspired *opinion*. And even if we had something beyond squishy-soft social science 'studies' (biased in various directions) about homosexuality as 'born', 'bred' or 'a lifestyle choice' it wouldn't answer the central question. Even if homosexuality were something people purely consciously chose (implausible IME, but just say for example), how does that justify discrimination against homosexuals by society? The answer to what society's policy should be about homosexuals/ity is inherently non-scientific. Joe
  9. Those numbers from Russia are interesting but not surprising in view of the figures from French campaign in which several 100 Flak 18 in Flak bns only even claimed 9 tanks. Many more claims were made by the only 33 modified (single gunner) Flak 18's issued to 3 AT bns, and there were also a handful of halftrack mounted SP guns (Flak 18 Sfl.). In that campaign, actual Flak to the front to defend against tanks wasn't so common. In some of the early North Africa battles though, Flak 18's were a fairly significant % of German towed AT guns, if considered so, especially if discounting 3.7cm. For example the 5th Light Division had an establishment initially of only 9 Pak 38 5cm v 12 attached Flak 18, plus 36 Pak 35/36 3.7 cm (though there were also of course tank guns, 27 Czech vz.36 type 47mm AT on Pz.I chassis, and 12 10.5 cm howitzers). These were small battles by the standards of the French campaign, let alone Russia, but where much of the Flak 18's reputation as AT gun was gained, especially in the English speaking world. Joe
  10. Also, to expand beyond just 'us' (the West) to other societies nobody calls 'savages', those features are a whole lot more recent than 100 years ago. And IME with people from cultures where arranged marriage was still common up till recently, it's not obvious it results in unhappier unions than are typical in our society nowadays. I wouldn't like the idea for myself, but just observing in general and trying to be objective, the grave evil of arranged marriage per se is not obvious to me. And full women's rights in the West is not more than a few decades old at most, and not everyone of a conservative persuasion is sold on it, my readings on Tanknet over the years have told me. As far as traditional Christian sexual teachings, they are also highly hostile to today's 'dating' culture among heterosexuals (not to mention porn, sex in 'mainline' entertainment and advertizing, etc), not just homosexuality. There's real potential for ridiculous inconsistency to complain about gay rights on a Christian basis and ignore Paul's teachings you don't like as modern hetero. They're a lot more extensive, and moreover are more strongly implied in Jesus' own words (though He didn't dwell directly on sexual topics much); whereas Jesus never clearly mentioned homosexuality at all. And His message to love everyone is absolutely clear*, so hateful attitude toward any group with Christian teaching as the supposed source is categorically BS. All that said, of course there are systemic problems in Muslim societies which rise to the level of being our business in Western societies because they affect us seriously. But, some of the comparisons and cherry picks used to criticize Muslims are ridiculously selective. And they are often clearly un-Christian, so should not associate themselves with Christianity even indirectly, IMO. *it's a theological debate the degree to which Jesus' direct teachings override everything, but the literalist Protestant view that everything in the Bible is equally true is incomprehensible to me either as Catholic or just objective person: many things clearly contradict one another if taken literally, especially Old Testament teachings v the Gospels, and Jesus literally said He was teaching something new. Joe
  11. IMHO that takes things a little too far in the other direction. In North Africa, 8.8cm Flak really did knock out a lot of British tanks (Italian manned 8.8 and their own 90mm too, as well as their 4" naval types). That was indeed partly because the available Axis AT guns were lacking against some tank types, especially in conditions often allowing long range fire. But that was often true of AT guns in various armies in WWII. And, AT guns which could meet any tank threat eventually also got big and unwieldy, or required extra resource and supply-consuming SP carriages. The tendency to try to hold onto the smallest handiest AT guns possible was not entirely a head-in-sand attitude of operators or the procurement system, but had real benefits if the gun could maintain a modicum of capability against tanks, and by same token a good performing intermediate caliber (between early war 25-47mm and late war >75mm) weapons like 5 or 7.5cm AT gun was definitely preferable if effective, depending on situation and enemy equipment. And even really big AT guns could still be better optimized in terms of height and silhouette than field or AA guns. But, one reason for the 8.8's success in North Africa was that typical desert mirage condition limited the problem of a high gun. It was still advisable to dig it in if possible, or else erect sandbag or rock breastworks, but the guns weren't as easy targets as they appear to be in close-up photo's. Also, the 8.8's use in NA in close coordination with other forces typified German superiority in combined arms operations, which was the basic reason they overperformed compared to the quantity and quality of their equipment (tank, other vehicle, AT, arty) generally in North Africa. That also wasn't specific to the 8.8cm Flak, but the weapon tended to symbolize it. As mentioned before, '88' as bogeyman to Western Allied tankers after the desert campaigns is more completely a myth, at least as far as the 8.8 Flak. 8.8cm caliber weapons encountered by Allied armor in the later campaigns was much more likely to be 8.8cm Pak or SP or tank guns of that caliber, with the 7.5cm Pak being a more common opponent still. Joe
  12. 1. Not Americans, nor killing. It's cold hearted realpolitik to sacrifice (ostensible) foreign allies, but it happened all the time. It would be a further step in the wrong direction for it to happen on US soil, but then again it *didn't* happen. And what's an act of terror or not is completely subjective and doesn't particularly correlate with the more objective question of what could plausibly be *done* and kept secret, which is my point. 2. That's the Truther spin, will all due respect. The other way of looking at it is that plans are 'approved' to enumerate all options in many cases, and the buck always stops with the person at the top for any decision with that kind of import. And again it's irrelevant to the point of plausibly keeping something a secret, where a shelved plan and a large scale action are simply not comparable. Indeed, the implausibility of keeping the secret if such a plan was actually carried out seems an obvious reason weighing against its approval. 3. That's really grasping at straws as a comparison to alleged 9/11 inside job. That was mainly a question of different medical ethics and public morality than today's. Also different racial views (black patients, a few generations before the study started, they'd been viewed as property), but what's often forgotten in emphasizing even the racial aspect is the prevailing view at the time that people with syphilis brought it on themselves and that was an important factor in society's or the govt's obligation to them. Indeed there's nostaglia for that type of view among some when it comes to HIV now. That's hardly comparable to attacking people out of the blue to make a point, or infecting them. So no, killing 1000's of people by the govt in something like 9/11 could not be kept under wraps, at all. There's not only no evidence of it, but no actually remotely comparable case. Joe
  13. I wouldn't reject it out of hand in the first place if stated so broadly as 'stage attacks against its own citizens'. At one end of that spectrum is the drone attack on Al Awlaki, which most people find reasonable and justified. Where along the spectrum? And the problem with Northwoods discussion is that 'Truthers' tend to twist it to their own agenda. So, they ignore the explicit references in the proposal to *fake* killings, as by shooting down drones, blowing up *unmanned* ships, pretending there were casualties, and blaming them on Cuba. They focus on a few ambiguous references which could be read to mean actually killing innocent Americans. But moreover it didn't actually happen. Again IMO a key dividing line for 'outlandish' conspiracy theories is where they feature actions which could not plausibly be kept secret over the timespan suggested. It's one thing for a plan like Northwoods to be drawn up secretly and shelved secretly. There are plenty of plans drawn up to illustrate options which have little real chance of being executed. It's quite another thing to actually stage it, even with the baseline of fake deaths, and expect to keep it a secret for anywhere near as long. It's not IOW a matter of conspiracy-friendly people being 'skeptics of the govt' and conspiracy-skeptics being naive or trusting of the govt, but a common sense assessment of what can really be kept secret. A never executed plan with clear references to fake deaths, and only ambiguous references to possible actual innocent deaths: no surprise it could be kept secret for a long time. An actual govt operation really killing 1000's of Americans: couldn't possibly be kept secret even for 10 years. So I think the latter can indeed reasonably be rejected out of hand. Joe
  14. Yes it's probably AK-29, which is comparable to HY-100 and was the steel used at least on the earlier Delta's. However while this kind of steel is not 'hardened' on purpose as the earlier post implied, it could potentially be messed up by the heat and water extinguishing of a fire. It is heat treated at the mill, quenched and tempered. Hardening is a byproduct of welding (in the heat affected zone of welds), but the process must be strictly controlled wrt heat input (preheating, postheating) and elimination of moisture (by baking the welding electrodes, etc) to prevent hydrogen assisted cracking. Lapses in those procedures have been the source of various scandals where submarine welds fail inspection and have to be redone at great cost. An uncontrolled fired of unknown temperature w/ spraying of water could introduce doubt about the integrity of the structure. Joe
  15. It seems you feel that to be a 'non naive' person you must take an extremely dim view of 'what the govt is capable of'. I'm not really arguing that per se, just saying that your latter suggestion doesn't make rational sense, to me. I can't imagine any group in the govt w/ enough to gain by committing a crime like the one you are suggesting, as if an almost equal probability to well intentioned failure, relative to the risk (virtual certainty IMO) of it being revealed. Maybe in a society or govt where people can gain absolute power for life or lose their life if they lose their power, but in our system as far as I know it, I don't see a rational reason why a group of Americans who work for the govt (which is what the govt consists of) would see it as rational to do that. I frankly think option 2 can be ruled out pending credible evidence it really happened, of which AFAIK there's zero. As they say (something like) never theorize malfeasance when stupidity will explain it. And beside stupidity, there's apathy and petty politics. But even besides those, there's room for legitimate difference of opinion of how extensive and well co-ordinated govt intelligence gathering should really be, since it has the positive potential to protect the country, but also potential for abuse. Reasonable people can disagree on such things without being murderers, in my 'naive' view. Joe
  16. I'd take a stab at defining 'outlandish conspiracy theories' as those which assume large networks of people, especially in non-totalitarian govts, can keep a secret about actions clearly and intentionally against the public interest and the nominal rules of the society. All evidence is that people in other than the most regimented societies just can't do that. People in govt who know of say intelligence efforts which violate some rules, might still all reasonably believe the ends justify the means in terms of the general public interest, and keep the secret, at least among a relatively limited number for awhile. But that's just not plausible for a broad conspiracy to cover up 'the truth' of a JFK assasination involving the govt (especially after almost 50 years), 9/11 inside job, contrails to control the population, etc. It's an approximate defintion, but none of the examples given so far qualify as 'outlandish conspiracy theories that turned out true', IMO. For example it was a well known that the Soviets were relatively successful placing agents in Germany and Britain WWII/postwar. It stood to reason they were trying in the US. In part because some on the right irresponsibly accused particular Americans of communist connections without proof, even moderate center-left people long tended toward a kneejerk to understate the possiblity, and the extreme popularized version of that often became ridiculous. But it was never generally accepted as an 'outlandish theory' that the Soviets had recruited agents in the US. Recently DHS did not 'target conservatives as enemies of the state'. They made debateable assessments of the possibility of terrorism coming for example from some small splinter of disaffected war veterans, based on the real (though isolated) example of Tim McVeigh. Debateable assessments, but hardly 'outlandish' to suppose such assessments might be made. 'Fast and Furious' lacks evidence of malign intent. Govt agencies do stupid things all the time, try to cover up, but are exposed. It's hardly 'outlandish conspiracy theory' to expect scandals of that type and relatively limited scale, periodically; they are inevitable. Joe
  17. See the info from kodochosho in post 357, those outright Type 99 loss numbers for each ship are confirmed. The ready for duty numbers in general approximate the number of Type 99's which were launched but not hit at all (Shokaku 20, Zuikaku 12, Akagi 1, Kaga 4, Soryu unk, Hiryu unk) so seem plausible. The write off/overboard number is again not beyond reason given for example Kaga Type 99's hit 22 and 18 times, 109 hits on only 16 returning Type 99's on Hiryu, and details for 13 damaged 99's on 'Zui' not visible on the scan of the report. But, at this stage of the game I don't view our knowledge as really being advanced by just another book citation saying 'around a dozen' a/c were written off, without saying the original source of that information, even by a thorough author like Tagaya. Because again, the kodochosho in many other cases listed returned irreparable a/c as 'greatly damaged' and included them as 'expended' but here none of the ships recorded that. There are other cases of info well established in other sources which doesn't appear on the kodochosho; but they tend to be smaller omissions. Joe
  18. On the standard arrangement, you might reasonably say there was one gunner, but another man also had to manipulate controls. The 'gunner' would set the range on the ZF 20, but wouldn't actually elevate the gun, but just set the pointer which the elevation man would follow by actually turning the elevation handwheel to 'follow the pointer', as he also would if that pointer was turned by commands from an AA director. The second guy was essentially acting as a servo mechanism,. According to Jentz, the modification whereby a chain drive did this instead (and rendered the gun unsuitable for AA work unless converted back) was just used by Heer AT bns in France, not Flak troop 88's in that campaign, nor in NA or Russia. But he's not absolutely clear, nor infallible in any case. But reference to 'modifying' the guns could also refer to the shield (Reich AA defense guns in most photo's don't have them), etc. It's true though that the ZF 20 'regular' set up still had only one guy sighting the direct fire target. The US 90mm direct fire arrangement had two guys sighting the target, 'trainer' (in USN terminology) sighting through his telescope, and 'pointer' (again as called in USN for the elevation man) through his; M24 and M26 telescopes on the M1 90mm mount, M24A1 and M26A1 on the M3 (anti-MTB) mount, and 'M7 sighting system' on the M2 90mm which still had separate telescopes. As far as other posts referring to AA capabilities, these depended much more heavily on the director, and in late WWII radar and fuze capabilies, than the gun itself. So, the great reduction in 3.7" claimed rounds per kill numbers was not from changes to the gun but incorporation of items such as GL Mark 3A (aka SCR-584) radar, directors incorporating the(Western Electric) No. 10 Predictor, and VT fuze. The similar set up (M9 director, SCR-584, VT) gave 90mm batteries similar capabilities, far superior to contemporary German heavy AA. Assuming a reasonably capable weapon, the gun itself only really mattered much in heavy AA work in going after very high altitude targets. Joe
  19. The usual configuration of German 88mm in ground combat was to have separate trainer and pointer (in USN terms). There was one telescope (Flak zielfernrohr 20), but while the man operating it both trained the gun in azimuth and set the range drum, another man 'followed the pointer' from that range drum setting to actually set the elevation. In the French campaign in 1940 some Flak 18's, used by Heer AT battalions, were modified with drive mechanisms so that the single gunner's range drum setting also elevated the gun, and so were no longer AA guns without hardware modifications to change them back. But the guns used by extensively by Luftwaffe flak units in North Africa and Russia against tanks apparently always used the two man arrangement (based on the discussion in Jentz "Dreaded Threat"), and so could be redeployed as AA guns if hooked up to directors. Some other sources say the Flak 37 could no longer be used in direct fire role at all, but a photo in Jentz's book seems to belie this, a Flak 37 still fitted with ZF 20 E. But as far as the Western Allies, AFAIK 88 Flaks were pretty seldom encountered as AT guns after North Africa (US armor had some tough battles against static AA guns in Germany, including 128mm's, in the final weeks of the war). 88 in the later Western campaigns usually meant 88mm caliber weapons on purpose designed Pak carriages, or SP or tank guns of that caliber. On US 90mm AA there were separate azimuth and elevation telescopes for direct fire. This system was apparently workable enough to be retained in the M3 fixed anti-MTB coast defence mount, and the M2 ground mount, which emphasized dual and triple (incl field arty) purpose capability respectively. US 90mm M1's of 213th Coast Artillery were deployed for AT work in the Kasserine battles but never fired; the clumsy carriage and lack of shield were viewed as the main drawback forcing them to be deployed too far to the rear. These were the key items (along with significant depression capability) improved upon for direct fire with M2, which could fire from its wheels (like the Flak 18) and had a shield (one modification for ground fire which Flak 18's didn't always have early in the war). Pre-war, US 3" AA guns were apparently not always been fitted with sights (discussion in US Army FM), but could only be aimed via director commands. Joe
  20. Re: Pearl Harbor IJN a/c losses, one, though not the only, original source are the ‘kodochosho’ or ‘tactical operation records’ of the ships, available online at http://www.jacar.go.jp I summarize each below. The a/c types are written on these reports starting with a funny ‘f’-like character (it’s neither a Chinese character nor Japanese kana) followed by the Latin letter ‘c’ for fighter, ‘k’ for torpedo (aka ‘carrier attack’) plane and ‘b’ for divebomber (aka ‘carrier bomber’) and year type number: 0, 97 and 99 respectively. These reports don’t have details like a/c serial numbers. Some individual a/c records do survive; I saw one posted online on a Japanese language site for a particular Zero lost at Midway, for example. But I don’t know how complete they are and anyway they aren’t at this Jacar site AFAIK. A/c outright losses are listed under descriptions like ‘shot down’, ‘missing’ and ‘suicide crash’, though those had no standard definitions across units and time. Then there’s a total of a/c ‘expended’. There’s also a category ‘greatly damaged’ (same word can also be translated ‘wrecked’). A/c in that category are sometimes included in ‘expended’ or not, speaking in general of 1941-43 ‘kodochosho’ I’ve studied. However, no a/c were classed ‘greatly damaged’ in these PH reports. So, these reports give no direct evidence of total losses besides the 29 a/c lost outright, which they confirm. That’s not to say they are proof of no write offs, but if that’s documented in Japanese records, it’s somewhere else. On causes of loss, AFAIK no one has definitely tied each US aerial victory credit to a particular Japanese loss, and the number of ‘official’ claims varies anyway. IMO it probably understates the actual losses to ground fire by several a/c to subtract 11 from 29, though OTOH at least one Japanese a/c was downed by a US a/c but not credited (Ishii’s Zero from Soryu by P-36). But ground fire was from all types of guns over ships and land, not only shipboard or USN manned guns. Akagi: C08051579600 pp. 1-2: 9 fc0, 27 fk97 (15*800kg, 12* torpedo); 1 fc0 suicide crash, 1 total a/c expended; 2 KIA, 2 lightly WIA; 10 a/c damaged (3 fk97 w/800kg hit once each, 4 fk97 w/ torp hit 21, 3, 1 and unk [w/KIA] times, 3 fc0 hit once each). Akagi: C08051579600 pp. 3-4: 9 fc0, 18 fb99; 3 fb99 missing (table p.3, but actually listed as ‘suicide crash’ individually on p.4), 1 fb99 suicide crash, 4 total a/c expended; KIA 8 (pg 3 summary table says 7, but 4*2 man crews are named as ‘war dead’ on pg 4); 13 a/c damaged (12 fb99 hit 2*6, 3*5, 2*4, 2*3, 2, 2*unk times; fc0 hit once) (not including CAP/local recon flights, uneventful) Kaga: C08051585400 pp 1-2: 9 fc0, 26 fk97 (14*800kg, 12*torpedo); 2 fc0 missing, 5 fk97 missing (all torpedo), 7 total a/c expended; 17 KIA, 2 lightly WIA (disagrees with notations on pg 2 which say heavily WIA); 9 a/c damaged (2 fk97 w/800 kg hit 3 and 1 times; 4 fk97 w/ torpedo hit 2*8 [one w/ WIA], 4, 2 [w/ WIA] and 1 times; 2 fc0 hit 3 and 1 times) Kaga: C08051585400 pp 3-4: 9 fc0, 26 fb99; 2 fc0 missing, 6 fb99 missing, 8 total a/c expended; 14 KIA, 2 lightly WIA; 19 a/c damaged (3 fc0 hit 2*2 and 1 times, 16 fb99 hit 22, 18, 2*7, 2*5 [one w/WIA], 6*4 [one w/ WIA], 2*3, 2*1 times) Soryu: C08051578600 pp 1-2: 8 fc0; 1 lightly WIA; 2 a/c damaged (hit 2 and 1 times) Soryu: C08051578600 pp 3-4: 10 fk97 (800kg); 2 a/c damaged (hit once each) Soryu: C08051578600 pp 5-6: 8 fk97 (torpedo); 1 a/c damaged (hits unspecified) [this is the only piece of info at odds with that quoted from Aiken’s article, which I don’t have; an a/c was flown by a PO2C Mori is listed but damage is given as ‘none’] Soryu: C08051578600 pp 7-8: 9 fc0; 3 suicide crash, 3 total a/c expended; 3 KIA; 4 a/c damaged (hit 9, 5, 4 and 2 times) [2 lost and 3 damaged were by P-36’s which lost 1 with another shot up but landed safely] Soryu: C08051578600 pp 9-10: 17 fb99; 2 suicide crash, 2 total a/c expended; 4 KIA; 13 a/c damaged (hit 7, 6, 3*4, 3, 4*2, 3*1 times) (not including CAP flights, uneventful) Hiryu: C08051579100 pp 1-2: 6 fc[0], 18 fk[97]; 25 total hits on an unspecified number of a/c. Hiryu: C08051579100 pp 3-4: 9 fc0, 18 fb99; 1 fc0 shot down [Nishikaichi who landed on Nihau], 2 fb99 missing, 3 total a/c expended; 5 KIA, 1 seriously WIA; 109 total hits on an unspecified number of a/c. (not including fk97 patrols, uneventful) Shokaku: C08051577100 pp 1-2: 26 fb99; 1 suicide crash, 1 total a/c expended; 2 KIA; 4 a/c hit once (as I read it, not completely clear) Shokaku: C08051577100 pg 3: 5 fc0, 1 a/c hit 2 times. Shokaku: C08051577100 pg 4-5: 27 fk97 (46*250kg, 48*60kg); 14 a/c damaged (details not given per a/c on pg 5) (not including CAP flights, uneventful) Zuikaku: C08051577600 pp. 1-2: 6 fc0, 25 fb99; 13 a/c damaged (including 2 fc0 hit 3 and unspecified number of times, details of fb99 damage cut off on the scan) Zuikaku: C08051577600 pp. 3-4: 27 fk99[sic, 97] (36*250kg, 108*60kg); 2 a/c damaged Joe
  21. Yes, those were the sorts of things I meant by 'assuming a really credible convergence of interests', which is much harder to see happening between Britain and Japan than the obvious consergence of British and Soviet interests v. Germany in June 1941. In fact besides being anachronistic, the theory of British public revulsion to renewed alliance with Japan might also be viewed as projecting US prewar attitudes toward Japan onto Britain when such attitudes differed significantly. US opposition to Japanese aggression in China, though much less before the Pac War than during it, was driven to a serious degree by US popular sympathy with China even pre-war, via the 'China Lobby' in the US, not only realpolitik/balance of power considerations; that was less so in Britain. And there was pre-existing tension directly between the US and Japan on issues like immigration which didn't poison Anglo-Japanese relations, either. So, if public opinion was among the obstacles to a 1940 Anglo-Japanese reprochement it was mainly *US* public opinion not British, in view of the greater potential benefit for the British through close alliance to the US. Joe
  22. I agree. China trade in earlier era's of greater Chinese strength was often lengendarily lucrative, for example the long standing arbitrage between Chinese and Western valuation of gold v silver. The relationship with China moved on outright exploitation and trampling o f their sovreignty because the Europeans gained the power to do it, and the Chinese lost the power to stop it. It's over-thinking to try to come up with any other basic explanation. On renewed Japanese alliance with Britain ca. 1940, I don't think it would had been greeted with 'jubilation' in Britain, but would have been accepted as a necessary accomodation, assuming a really credible convergence of Japanese and British interests. Britain allied with a mass murdering Soviet regime, but de facto alliance was automatic with Germany's attack; the only decision was whether to actively help the USSR. I think the Soviet example also illustrates the popular perception of other countries was dependent on circumstances and national interests (still so, of course). During the Cold War it became more common in the West to emphasize the massive Soviet crimes, but distinctly less so in the WWII era. By the same token, emphasis on Japanese crimes is still often seen now through the prism of the Pacfic War, particularly mistreatment of Allied military POW's, and that Japan humiliated the Western powers early in that war. Stuff like bio-weapons research wasn't even known till after the Pac War. John Rabe (the pro-Nazi 'good German of Nanking') tried to get his govt to help against what he estimated was IJA soldiers' murder of several 1,000 Chinese civilians there because their officers would't control them, not deliberate 200k massacre the Chinese claim and has tended to become 'fact' in the West (though Rabe had only a limited view and his account isn't necessarily definitive). There are horrific stories of IJA abuse in China that come from Japanese sources even at the time and can hardly be questioned, but the big picture in the West still tends to take Chinese propaganda at face value, something Western publics became distinctly more inclined to do only after their own countries went to war with Japan. In short, it's anachronistic IMO to imagine that British public reaction in 1940 would made a renewed British-Japanese alliance impossible. That wouldn't be a deal breaker if the alliance made real sense otherwise. Joe
  23. In the $1mil/$10mil case just mentioned, $1mil is both the median and the mode. If the US median income was the midpoint of the range of values for income in the US, it would be on the order of several $100mil, since some hedge fund guy or IPO entrepeneur usually realizes $1bil+ in income in any given year, and some people make $0 in any given year. Instead, the median income is on the order of $40k, that being the number where an equal number of households have incomes higher and lower than that number. The page you linked doesn't even support your definition if you read it correctly. Get yourself an elementary statistics textbook. Some people can wing stuff they are clueless on with a little googling; obviously you aren't one of them. Joe
  24. It's not an 'assumption' that half the population is on either side of the median income. The median is *defined* as the point in a distribution where half the sample values are higher and half are lower. DB as well as Mobius previously stated this correctly. Half the people have below national median incomes in every country, always. In the case you gave, 99% have $1mil incomes and 1% have 10mil, the median would be taken as $1mil. Joe
  25. I guess that might have been part of his mindset when the shooting started, but in 1938 there was no IJA draft for Koreans. In fact it was the first year they were allowed to join the IJA and only around 600 were accepted that year. The draft only started in 1944. In between, the 'volunteering' became more coercive but still according the Japanese less than 20,000 Koreans were accepted into the IJA before the formal draft, of around 800,000 applying. In 1944-45 a few 100,000 more Koreans were drafted. I think it's politeness/PC (from Korean POV) to speak of the guy as a 1938 draftee. As for German units consisting of Soviet POW's, of any ethnicity, they were useful for non-combat roles and as AA troops in the Reich. But first rate performance in direct contact with Anglo-American ground forces could hardly be expected. There are photo's of quite a number of possible ethnic Koreans in 'Ostbattalion' captured at Normandy, and Ambrose's book mentioned first hand accounts of them from Americans. Some in the photo's could be non-Korean, Soviet-born Koreans, or Korean-born communists who fled to the USSR and joined the Red Army (some high ranking NK officers in the KW period were Red Army veterans in one of those two categories). They didn't necessarily fully share the remarkable story of Yang. Joe
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